The Legal Accountability of the UK Intelligence Services by Rushton, Bridget Ann
  
 
 
 
The Legal Accountability of the UK Intelligence Services 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
 
Bridget Rushton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of MPhil at the University 
of Central Lancashire  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
STUDENT DECLARATION FORM 
 
 
 Concurrent registration for two or more academic awards 
  
 I declare that while registered as a candidate for the research degree, I have not been a 
registered candidate or enrolled student for another award of the University or other 
academic or professional institution 
 
 
 
 
 
 _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 Material submitted for another award 
 
 I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for 
an 
 academic award and is solely my own work 
 
 
 
  
 
 Collaboration 
 
 Where a candidate’s research programme is part of a collaborative project, the thesis must 
indicate in addition clearly the candidate’s individual contribution and the extent of the 
collaboration.  Please state below:   
 
  This is not a collaborative work. 
 
 
 
Signature of Candidate __ 
 
B.A. Rushton 
 
 
                            MPhil 
Type of Award                ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
                            University of Central Lancashire, Law School 
School                             _______________________________________________________ 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years there has been a considerable amount of debate regarding the accountability of the 
intelligence agencies.   However, much of the debate may have approached the subject from a one-
sided perspective. Either the discussion has tended to be weighted in favour of the ideological values 
integral to the civil liberties agenda or it has been weighted in favour of potentially countervailing 
national security considerations. This thesis argues that neither of these perspectives, in and of itself, 
is fully able to reconcile the need to protect national security with the need to ensure the optimal 
protection of civil liberties.   
 
The distinctive character of this thesis lies in the use of an immanent critique method to draw out the 
strengths and weaknesses of both the civil liberties and the national security agendas.  Immanent 
critique involves the evaluation of the claims and self image of a legal or ideological perspective by 
reference to the very standards to which it must appeal in order to secure its own legitimacy.  This 
may be achieved by identifying the major claims of any given ideology, either implied or stated, and 
comparing them to the reality of their procedural and institutional operation in practice. Where the 
research reveals internal discrepancies and contradictions within the ideology, these contradictions 
can be subjected to critical scrutiny. It is then possible build upon the constructive implications of 
these two critiques by suggesting alternative legal, constitutional and political approaches to issues of 
the regulation and accountability of intelligence services.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  General Introduction 
 
The central impetus of this thesis is to critically analyse and assess the methods by which the British 
security services have been, and are being, legally regulated and held accountable.  The thesis 
analyses the credibility and effectiveness of these provisions in the light of what is known about their 
practical enforcement. It pays particular attention to the actual and possible tensions that exist 
between the need for preserving important national security imperatives, and the seemingly competing 
requirement that civil liberties be safeguarded, as far as possible, in that all forms of state power 
should be exercised in accord with the rule of law. 
 
In order to achieve its objectives, the thesis will review the arguments regarding accountability from 
the internal perspectives of both civil libertarians and those charged with protecting the UK’s national 
security agenda. The main thrust of the thesis will be to explore the actual and potential tensions that 
exist between these two approaches, and to bring forward suggestions for legal and constitutional 
reform in the area of security service regulation, that may take into account the internal contradictions 
of each. 
 
This topic is important because, whilst provisions for the accountability of the security agencies have 
previously been analysed in some depth, much of the research has approached the subject from a 
distinctly one-sided perspective. Exclusive emphasis has been placed either upon the ideological 
values integral to the civil liberties agenda or to countervailing national security considerations. For 
example, civil libertarian critics, such as Helen Fenwick,
1
 argue that the overriding purpose of the 
state is to secure and protect its citizen’s fundamental human rights and personal autonomy. For 
Fenwick, civil and political rights are universal and inalienable. Interruption to basic freedoms and 
liberties must be justified by showing that there is ‘a clear and substantial risk’2 that exercising the 
right: ‘will do great damage to the person or property of others.’3 A perceived threat to some abstract 
risk, such as moral health, or the subversion of democratic practices, may not be enough to justify the 
suspension of basic and individual rights.  By contrast, those who adopt a national security agenda, 
such as Aldrich,
4
 but also David Cameron, have tended to emphasise the perceived need for a 
collective approach to civil liberties that prioritises national security considerations and the economic 
                                                             
1 See discussion, Helen Fenwick, Civil Rights: New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act 1998, Longman, 2000, 
p297-416. 
2 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Cavendish, 2002, p13. 
3 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Cavendish, 2002, p13. 
4 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and the Cold War Secret Intelligence, Murray Publishers, 2001. 
well-being and security of the country and its core democratic institutions.  A typical argument here is 
that terrorism represents a gross violation of the ‘right to life’ and security on which all the other civil 
rights ultimately depend. Consequently, national security considerations are treated as if they self-
evidently ‘out-trump’ the claim to civil and political rights asserted as absolute by civil libertarians.  
 
This thesis argues that neither of these one-sided perspectives is able to define and successfully 
interpret the full range of issues that arise whenever questions of the legal accountability of 
intelligence services are discussed. Each may view such issues only from the limits of its own 
assumptions and perspectives, which inevitably means that vital dimensions of the topic may be 
glossed over and ignored, particularly those which are incompatible with the entrenched assumptions. 
 
 
1.2 The Methodology of the Thesis 
 
In order to fully understand the core assumptions of these two opposing ideologies, and to assess their 
individual strengths and weakness, the thesis utilises a classic ‘Frankfurt School’ methodology of 
immanent criticism of competing ideologies. However, this is deployed in the service of a social 
science critique of ideology rather than social philosophy.
5
 For the ‘Sheffield School’, an imminent 
type of criticism represents an empirically focused ‘methodology’ of evaluation, animated with 
practical intent.  Its particular virtue is in calling to attention discrepancies evident within the 
relationship between noble constitutional ideals and practical institutional realities. 
 
The immanent critique methodology involves the assessment of legal ideologies by reference to their 
own standards and ideals. It is an effort to turn the normative standards that a legal ideology employs 
back upon the institutional procedures and actions which are supposed to embody those standards. 
The methodology aims to ‘hold to account a given legal perspective or institutional practice by 
judging how it operates in the light of the very norms and ideals which it claims to embody, and from 
which it seeks to derive its sense of public legitimacy.’6 It determines whether an object corresponds to 
its indigenous principle, holding that: ‘objects are true when they are that which they should be, that 
is, when their reality corresponds to their concept.’7  An immanent critique methodology may be 
                                                             
5 This is unlike Hegel and Marx, who utilised the methodology of immanent critique to break new theoretical and 
philosophical ground.  Hegel, for example, challenged the liberal understanding of ‘possessive’ individualism.  He argued 
that the concept of personhood presupposes an established political community, which is committed to the worth and will of 
every individual, but that individuals must recognise duties to uphold just institutions and embrace public obligations.  For 
discussion see: Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction: Reason in History, Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, 114f. See also: Andrew Buchwalter, Hegel, Marx, and the Concept of Immanent Critique, Journal of the History 
of Philosophy, 29, pp 253-79 and Michael Salter, Hegel and Law, Ashgate, 2003, p77-81. 
6 Geoff Pearson and Michael Salter, Getting Public Law Back Into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as a Source for 
Immanent Critique, Social and Legal Studies, 1999, Vol. 8(4). 
7 Geoff Pearson and Michael Salter, Getting Public Law Back Into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as a Source for 
Immanent Critique, Social and Legal Studies, 1999, Vol. 8(4) p 62. 
usefully employed to disrupt and challenge the operation of legal ideologies by identifying some 
degree of ‘shortfall’ between what is being promised on the one hand, and that which is actually being 
practiced on the other.  Harden and Lewis provide an example of the benefits of the methodology.  In 
their book, ‘The Noble Lie,’8 Harden and Lewis assess apparent discrepancies within the British 
conception of the rule of law.
9
 They contend that, whilst there are ‘immanent expectations of a system 
of open and accountable government, which may run deep in the British people, and that the rhetoric 
and claims made for our system of government foster such expectations,’10 these expectations often 
square ill with the contemporary constitutional and political scene. This, claim Harden and Lewis, is 
because the ‘pragmatic development of British political and governmental institutions and practices 
has meant that alongside expectations of openness, democracy and public accountability, there have 
developed strong traditions and practices concerning the day-to-day running of the nation’s business, 
which live very uneasily with those expectations.’11 Consequently, claims in support of open 
government, democratic accountability and parliamentary scrutiny, may promise far more 
ideologically than they are delivering in reality.  
 
An immanent critique methodology is defined by Harden and Lewis as one which: ‘Seeks to identify 
the major claims or beliefs of a group or order, and to subject them to different degrees of scrutiny.  
The first stage is to examine the logical interrelationships between the various claims for control, for 
consistency and internal ‘fit’...If…some degree of dissonance appears then such contradictions must 
be addressed.’12 According to this definition, subjecting the major claims of any given ideology to 
scrutiny involves various stages of analysis.  The first is to identify and neutralise any external value 
judgements, which do not form an integral part of the norms and claims, but which the ideology itself 
claims to embody and be orientated towards. The research must confine itself to only those goals 
which can be shown to be internal to the area of legal regulation in question. Hence, it is inappropriate 
to assess the civil libertarianism of Fenwick and others by the standards and ideals of other 
approaches to the legal regulation of the intelligence services.  
 
The result of this neutralisation is that, where researchers find fault with an area of legal regulation 
informed by a specific ideology, it is because this area is failing to honour, in actual practice, the very 
standards and goals which it claims itself to be orientated towards, and from which it attempts to 
justify itself and appear legitimate to the public at large.  This methodology gives the researcher the 
benefit of being able to avoid what may otherwise be an unduly positive, distorted or one-sided 
                                                             
8 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie, The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986. 
9 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie, The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986. 
10 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie, The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986, p11. 
11 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie, The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986, p11. 
12 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie, The British Constitution and the Rule of Law, Hutchinson, 1986, p 10. 
account of the relationship between legal and constitutional values and the results of how legal 
regulation actually operates in practice.
13
 
 
In the context of this thesis, applying the methodology of immanent critique entails developing an 
initially sympathetic appreciation of the values, interests and concerns of both the civil libertarian 
agenda and the framework of interpretations which informs the claims made by those who adopt a 
national security agenda.  A second phase of the methodology reconstructs, from primary sources, the 
explicit and implicit rationale behind these two opposing ideological viewpoints on questions of the 
legal and constitutional accountability of the intelligence agencies, by the measures in which each 
defines their own purpose and justification.  This ‘phenomenological’ immersion into each ideology 
continues until the researcher manages to uncover and understand an insider’s view of the precise 
meaning and justification for the particular norms which each ideology seeks to vindicate. Through a 
close comparison between the stated claims and objectives of each ideology on the one hand, and the 
nature and impact of the actual institutional practices on the other, it is possible to identify a shortfall 
between the ideological assumptions and values and that which is actually being delivered in practice.  
 
The implications of these findings can be further realised by asking how, in principle, the law would 
have to operate if it were to fully embody and adequately represent the practical culmination and 
realisation of the norms of each of the two ideologies. As well as further elucidating the true meaning 
of the ideologies, this serves the purpose of assessing the full impact of each ideology on the activities 
of the security agencies, and on those persons under surveillance, should their ultimate standards ever 
be realised in practice.  This helps to uncover additional areas of the two ideals that claim to represent 
solutions to the need to protect security or civil liberties, but which, in practice, fail to deliver their 
own promises and standards. Therefore, it is possible though the application of this methodology for 
an ideological viewpoint to be shown to be indefensible when evaluated by reference to the very 
standards and ideals that it purports to be relying upon and vindicating in practice.  
 
However, if critical analysis remained fixed at this stage ‘then its value judgements would remain 
abstract and lack practical realism.’14 Hence, immanent criticism requires a further phase involving 
recourse to the empirical realm of actual institutional conduct.  With respect to this, Harden and Lewis 
suggest that, in order to examine the relationship between claims and reality, it is necessary to ‘set the 
exposed beliefs against the empirical world….to examine the degree of ‘mesh’ or ‘disjuncture’.15  
This makes it possible to describe the ‘behaviour of political and governmental institutions and make 
                                                             
13 David Campbell, The Failure of Marxism, Dartmouth, 1996, pp 5-6, 12 and 47. 
14 Geoff Pearson and Michael Salter, Getting Public Law Back Into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as a Source for 
Immanent Critique, Social and Legal Studies, 1999, Vol. 8(4). 
15 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986, pp 10, 13. 
an attempt to analyse that behaviour against the claims of traditional doctrine.’16  Achieving this 
involves identifying specific examples of how legal regulation is, in practice, being carried out and the 
impact of its enforcement, or non-enforcement, on different groups in society. This has the virtue of 
uncovering how legal and institutional practices appear to those who are socially located on the 
receiving end of legal implementation.  
 
The conclusions of the empirical research can be utilised to bring analytical questions.  These 
questions will explore the meaning and implications of the relevant legislative measures and what 
they may be saying about the protection of, for example, civil and political rights on the one hand, and 
the actual operation of legally empowered covert surveillance on the other.  This is likely to uncover a 
series of disparities between that which a specific legal or constitutional ideology claims in principle 
to be about, and the actual nature of the project which it can be shown, empirically, to be actually 
carrying forward in practice.
17
  For example, in the context of this thesis, the research has found 
discrepancies between rhetorical promises of enhanced accountability mechanisms to regulate the 
activities of the security services and their actual implementation in practice. For example, the 
introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) was claimed provide a 
scheme for state surveillance that would meet the demands of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which seeks to protect civil liberties and political rights.  However, Helen Fenwick argues that 
‘the most striking feature of the RIPA is the determination evinced under it to prevent citizens 
invoking Convention rights in the ordinary courts,’18 rather than its ability to limit state interference or 
provide effective oversight mechanisms. 
 
Thus far, an immanent critique has allowed this project to explore the core principles and ideological 
perspectives underpinning the standpoint of certain key participants in debates over the legal 
accountability of intelligence services. A further stage of the immanent critique methodology requires 
that the research focus specifically upon their critique’s practical implications for institutional reform.  
That is, what changes must, in practice, be both proposed and then implemented in order to resolve 
discrepancies at the level of lived experience between, say, political rhetoric about the accountability 
of the security agencies, and the concrete empirical reality.  According to Harden and Lewis, 
immanent criticism should lead to a reform process involving the advocacy of policies which would 
seek to realise currently unfulfilled aspects of existing constitutional norms.
19
  This has the virtue of 
allowing the critique to both update and then revise practice and doctrine in order ‘to bring the 
                                                             
16 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986, pp 10, 13. 
17 David Campbell, The Failure of Marxism, Dartmouth, 1996, pp  45, 47, 67 and 77. 
18
 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Cavendish, 2002. p724. 
19 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law Hutchinson, 1986, p290.  See also the 
discussion in: Geoff Pearson and Michael Salter, Getting Public Law Back into a Critical Condition: the Rule of Law as a 
Source for Immanent Critique, Social and Legal Studies, 1999, Vol. 8(4). p 493. 
expectations and the reality into closer harmony.’20  In the case of this research, by comparing the 
degree of coherence or mismatch between ‘legitimating claims’ and practical actions within the 
sphere of  security service accountability, it should, in principle, be possible to identify the general 
direction that constitutional and legal reforms must take to minimise future contradictions.  It is to 
these suggestions for reform that the PhD phase is largely devoted. 
 
 
1.3   The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Aside from the introduction and conclusion, the thesis is organised into five chapters.   
Chapter two is concerned with setting the scene for further analysis by outlining the current legal 
context within which the security agencies operate.  This chapter is divided into three parts.  Part one 
will examine the legal mechanisms that regulate the security agencies, including the implementation 
and effect of the Security Service Act 1989, the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and the Investigation 
of Regulatory Powers Act 2000. The discussion will ask how these regulations have been interpreted 
by the security agencies in the light of actual operational practice.   It will examine security agency 
work in the areas of counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, espionage, subversion, serious crime and 
protecting the critical national infrastructure.  Part two of this chapter will assess the various 
techniques of covert surveillance which may be employed by the security agencies, and the 
mechanisms by which these techniques are legally authorised.  The discussion will include an 
examination of the relevant provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, including 
the authorisation of warrants for directed and intrusive surveillance.  The final part of this chapter will 
examine the key methods by which the security agencies may be held to account.  Part IV of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides for Commissioners, who can review the lawful 
authorisation of warrants and the circumstances in which investigations are conducted. This Act also 
adds a layer of judicial oversight in the form of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.  A further element 
of accountability may be provided in the form of parliamentary oversight.  Parliament, and 
particularly the House of Commons, may affect the way in which the security agencies operate by 
subjecting security policy to a measure of scrutiny and influence and by creating or amending 
legislative provisions. There is also an added level of parliamentary accountability for the intelligence 
agencies in the form of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which was set up by the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994.   
 
The next two chapters are concerned with comparing the two competing ideologies against their own 
standards and ideals.  The object of these chapters is to assess whether each of the two ideologies 
                                                             
20 Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. Hutchinson, 1986, p 290. 
(liberalism and the national security agenda) can deliver, in operational practice, what it promises in 
institutional ideals.  Chapter three will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the civil liberties and 
human rights agenda as seen through the perceptions of certain academics and human rights lawyers 
who promote the beliefs associated with liberalism.  It asks how civil libertarian values, such as the 
primacy of individual rights, may influence the way in which liberals perceive national security.  
Chapter four considers the traditional state-centred approach to defining national security, which is 
often employed by the security agencies and the government.  It asks how the preference for securing 
the protection of the state and its territories may affect the way in which national security is thought 
about and dealt with.    It is important to understand the underlying perceptions of these groups 
because their key values can potentially have a significant effect on the way in which national security 
is defined and, in turn, the way in which it is thought that the security agencies should be regulated.    
 
Chapter five seeks to further develop and elucidate the real meaning of the discussion in the previous 
chapters by examining how national security would be defined and protected if either of the 
ideologies were ever fully realised and implemented.  In other words, this chapter asks, what would 
the outlook for national security be if liberalism were the predominant theme by which security policy 
was applied?  In the same way, how would security policy be defined and applied if the national 
security agenda were the only, or sole, imperative?  This chapter will highlight certain discrepancies 
between the promises that each ideology advances to legitimise its core principles, and the real effect 
of these principles, were they ever to be put into full operational practice.   
 
Having fully reviewed the arguments regarding accountability from both the national security and the 
civil libertarian agendas, and illustrated these issues with respect to actual cases, chapter six will 
assess the degree to which current legislation has struck a proper balance between the competing 
perspectives. To this end, it will analyse whether the current legal position represents an optimal 
balance between the civil liberties agenda and national security interests. Where the previous research 
has identified discrepancies between the two competing ideals, the chapter will make proposals for 
reform that mesh the least discredited elements of the two ideologies together.  Consequently, the 
final phase of this research will culminate in an evaluation of various recommendations for legal 
change and reform.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE SECURITY AGENCIES AND 
THEIR LEGAL REGULATION 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the contemporary role of the intelligence agencies and on their legal 
regulation. Over the last two decades, the security agencies have undergone a number of changes to 
the way in which they are officially authorised and legally sanctioned. Many of these changes have 
been made in the name of transparency and greater accountability in response to the requirements of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and associated case law, which has now been 
incorporated into the UK’s domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The stated intention behind 
these reforms is to provide a fully comprehensive statutory scheme for state surveillance that will 
meet the requirements of this Convention.  This re-thinking has resulted in the security agencies being 
placed on a statutory footing; MI5 by the Security Service Acts of 1989 and 1996; and MI6 and 
GCHQ by the Intelligence Services Act 1994.  More recently, further changes were made to the 
agencies accountability in the form of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). The 
RIPA places most forms of state surveillance on a statutory basis and extends to certain forms of 
interception of communications which fell outside the former regime.  The 2000 Act makes clear the 
purposes for which each of these powers may be used, which of the law enforcement agencies may 
use them, and the uses which may be made of the information acquired. 
 
This chapter will begin by examining the nature and extent of the legal role of the intelligence 
agencies as defined by the relevant Acts. This part of the chapter will analyse the way in which the 
Intelligence agencies have interpreted these Acts in the light of their actual areas and methods of 
practice. To this end, the chapter will examine security agency activity in the areas of terrorism, 
counter-proliferation, espionage, serious crime, subversion and the protection of the critical national 
infrastructure.  The second part of the chapter will review the various modes of surveillance which are 
employed by the security agencies and the way in which these practices are authorised and controlled 
by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  The final part of the chapter will concern itself 
with the mechanisms of accountability that have been established by both the Acts and by the 
parliamentary and constitutional systems of the UK.  It will analyse the efficacy of the role of the 
Commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal which are now regulated by the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers 2000. It will also analyse the role that debate and scrutiny in parliament has to 
play in setting appropriate security agendas which may affect the security agencies.  In this respect the 
discussion will include an examination of the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), 
which was set up under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, to scrutinise certain elements of security 
agency work.    
 
 Only by understanding the real nature of security operations can one assess whether the current legal 
and political position, regarding the accountability of the security agencies, adequately reconciles the 
need to protect civil liberties with the requirement that the UK's national security interests be 
safeguarded.   
 
 
PART ONE 
 
2.2 The Legal Regulation of the Security Agencies 
 
Until 1989, the law did not regulate the security agencies.  This effectively meant that they had no 
statutory recognition, powers, complaints or supervisory procedures.  Rather, they were set up by 
executive decision, with functions determined by the executive, and accountable only to the 
executive.  For example, prior to 1989, a directive issued by the Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-
Fyfe in 1952, governed the operation of MI5.
21
  This directive provided that, although the Security 
Service did not form part of the Home Office, the Director General would be responsible to the Home 
Secretary with a right, on appropriate occasions, of direct access to the Prime Minister.  The directive 
stated that the Service ‘is part of the defence forces of the country,’22 and that ‘its task is the defence 
of the realm as a whole from internal and external dangers arising from attempts at espionage and 
sabotage, or from the actions of persons and organisations, whether directed within or without the 
country, which may be judged to be subversive of the state.’23  The directive made it clear that the 
work of the Service was to be strictly limited to what is necessary for these purposes: It was expressly 
required to be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence. 
MI5 was governed under the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive until the 1980’s.  Thus for much of their early 
history, the intelligence agencies may have operated with relative anonymity and impunity. Indeed the 
historian Christopher Andrew observed that the work of the British intelligence and security agencies 
may have been underpinned by two constitutional doctrines.
24
  The first of these doctrines was that the 
existence of the intelligence agencies should never be officially acknowledged. In this respect, 
                                                             
21 A copy of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive has been reproduced in: Nigel West, A Matter of Trust, Hodder and Stoughton, 
1982, Appendix I. 
22 A copy of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive has been reproduced in: Nigel West, A Matter of Trust, Hodder and Stoughton, 
1982, Appendix I. 
23 A copy of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive has been reproduced in: Nigel West, A Matter of Trust, Hodder and Stoughton, 
1982, Appendix I. 
24 Christopher Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5, Penguin Books, 2009. 
Michael Howard observed, ‘so far as official government policy is concerned, enemy agents are found 
under gooseberry bushes, and our own intelligence is brought by storks,’25  The second constitutional 
doctrine was that the work of the agencies would not be subject to external scrutiny or legislation. On 
this point, Andrew’s points out that ‘any regulation which was carried out was undertaken by the 
agencies themselves, and occasionally, with a very light touch by the Government.’26  This was a 
situation, Andrew’s added, that was widely accepted by both Parliament and the public at that time.27 
However, since the 1980’s, the issue of how to institute increased legal and democratic control over 
the security agencies has tended to steadily permeate the political agenda.
28
  The impetus for change, 
it has been suggested, involved scandals regarding alleged abuses of power by the agencies.
29
  For 
example, in the UK, public confidence in the ability of the Security Service to act without bias or 
prejudice may have been shaken by the publication of books, such as Peter Wright’s ‘Spycatcher’.30  
Wright alleged that MI5 ‘bugged and burgled its way around London,’31 and that the Director-
General from 1956-65 was a Soviet agent. Wright and others also claimed that the Service attempted 
to destabilise the Labour government of Harold Wilson.
32
  It was alleged that MI5 viewed the Labour 
Party’s electoral victory of 1974 as against the national interest and instigated a plot to feed anti-
Labour Party information, from MI5 files, to pro-conservative newspapers.
33
   Wright’s accusations 
highlighted the danger that the considerable powers exercised by the Security Service, under cover of 
secrecy, may render them more capable than any other civilian agency of destroying civil rights and 
freedoms and even democracy itself. 
 
These concerns, along with the need to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights,
34
 
may have been instrumental in leading to the enactment of the Security Service Act 1989.  This and 
the later Security Service (Amendment Act) 1996, placed MI5 on a statutory footing. The Acts seek to 
set out the functions of MI5 and enable certain actions to be taken on the authority of warrants issued 
                                                             
25 Quoted in R. Godsen, Comparing Foreign Intelligence: the US, the USSR, the UK and the Third World, Pergamon-
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 Christopher Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5, Penguin Books, 2009, p753. 
27 Christopher Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5, Penguin Books, 2009, p753. 
28 See comments in: Peter Gill, Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of the Intelligence Services after September 
11th, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper No. 103, January 2003. 
29 Peter Gill, Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of the Intelligence Services after September 11 th, Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper No. 103, January 2003. Gill suggests that this change is 
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30 Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, Stoddart, 1987. 
31 Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, Stoddart, 1987. 
32 See also Leigh, The Wilson Plot, Pantheon, 1988. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70: A Personal Record, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.  Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, 
Stoddart, 1987. 
33 See also: Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70: A Personal Record, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. 
34 Wrights allegations also came at a time when the European Commission on Human Rights found that cases challenging 
MI5 surveillance were admissible.  The European Court of Human Rights has consistently found that administrative 
discretion in matters affecting individual rights be, wherever possible, prescribed by law. See: Harman and Hewitt v UK. 
Appl. No.121175/86: (1992) 14 EHRR 657. 
by the Secretary of State.
35
  The 1989 Act also established, for the first time, a procedure for the 
investigation of complaints about the Service and a Commissioner charged with the task of reviewing 
the procedure by which the Home Secretary issues warrants.  The 1989 Act was followed in 1994 by 
the Intelligence Services Act, which sought to regulate the activities of MI6 and GCHQ.  The Act 
defines the functions of these services and the responsibility of its chiefs. This Act also established, 
for the first time, a system of parliamentary accountability for all three services. 
 
Each security and intelligence agency has its own formal role, structure and legal remit.  They also 
have formal and informal links with other organisations. For example, the interlocking relations 
between the intelligence agencies are underpinned by the Cabinet Office which, with the help of the 
Joint Intelligence Committee, tasks the agencies, assesses their product and determines their resource 
needs. In order to better understand the nature of these structures it is necessary to look at each agency 
in turn. 
 
 
2.3 The Legal Regulation of the Security Service (MI5) 
 
The Security Service, also known as MI5, is based at Thames House in London.  It is responsible for 
protecting the UK from covertly organised threats affecting its national security and economic well-
being.  The Security Service is also tasked with assisting other law enforcement agencies, such as the 
police, in preventing and detecting serious crime.
36
 In order to meet these requirements the Service is 
involved in: investigating threats by gathering, analysing and assessing intelligence; countering 
specific threats by taking action; and advising both the government and other bodies on the nature of 
any given threat, and on the relevant protective security measures.
37
 By gathering secret intelligence, 
the Security Service aims to obtain detailed knowledge of target organisations, their key personalities, 
infrastructure, intentions, plans and capabilities.
38
 
 
The Security Service operates under the authority of the Home Secretary who may appoint the 
Director-General for the service.
39
  The Director General is responsible for the operations and 
efficiency of the Service; for ensuring that the service only obtains and uses information in 
accordance with its functions;  and for ensuring that the Service does nothing which might further the 
interests of any political party.
40
  The Director General must also make an annual report on the work 
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39 See: Security Service Act 1989 s2(1). 
40 See: Security Service Act 1989 s2(2). 
of the Service to the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister, and may at any time report to either of 
them on any matter relating to its work.
41
  
 
These reporting obligations on the Director General can potentially add a layer of parliamentary 
scrutiny of the Director General’s exercise of power.  It may effectively mean that the Director 
General is required to account for the lawful and efficient handling of the Service.     However, 
problems may arise if there is too close a nexus between the Prime Minister and the agencies. In such 
a case, it is argued that ‘it may be impossible for them to act as a course of external control and a 
basis of democratic oversight will be undermined’.42  The problem is that if ministers are too closely 
involved in day-to-day matters, the reporting obligation on the Director General may do little to 
increase the scrutiny of the agencies actions.   Indeed, at the time that the provisions of the 1989 Act 
were debated in Parliament, there were calls to increase the levels of Parliamentary scrutiny.
43
  These 
proposals were not heeded at the time, but were eventually implemented by the Intelligence Services 
Act, 1994. This Act introduced the Intelligence and Security Committee, which may now add a 
valuable extra level of Parliamentary scrutiny.
44
   
 
Section 1 of the Security Service Act 1989 sets out the major tasks of the Security Service.  It 
provides that: ‘The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in 
particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities 
of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means.’45 Thus, the primary task of the Service is the 
protection of national security against a number of possible threats. However, whilst the Act makes it 
clear that the Security Service is restricted to countering only those threats that rise to the level of 
being a threat to national security, the precise meaning of the term ‘national security’ is not further 
clarified.   This gives rise to the question, under what criteria and with what information does the 
Service decide when, or when there is not, a risk to national security? The Home Secretary, during the 
debate of the Security Service Bill, assured that the term ‘can only refer...to matters relating to the 
survival of the nation as a whole, and not to party-political or sectional or lesser interests.’46 
However, questions still persist regarding the true extent to which the security agencies may define 
any given risk as a national security issue. 
 
                                                             
41 See: Security Service Act 1989 s2(4). 
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A second brief given to the Service by the 1989 Act is found in Section 1(3). This section provides for 
the function of safeguarding the ‘economic wellbeing of the UK against threats posed by the actions 
or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.’47 Whilst it seems that such protection is limited to 
countering the actions of persons outside the British Islands, the definition is far from unproblematic 
and there exists the potential to give a very broad interpretation of the concept.  When asked to 
elaborate on the extent of this subsection, the Home Secretary stated that it referred to oil and other 
commodities on which we are dependant and to the protection of scientific and technical secrets.
48
 
 
The 1989 Act was later amended by the Security Service Act 1996 to add the further function of 
acting ‘in support of the activities of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the 
prevention and detection of serious crime.’49 According to the Government, the provision would 
allow the Security Service to be deployed against organised criminals such as drug traffickers, money 
launderers and racketeers.  Whilst the provision has been controversial because there is no concrete 
definition of ‘serious crime,’ and no guarantee that the work of the Service would be adequately 
confined, calls for a tighter definition were dismissed in Parliament on the ground that it would 
‘distract us from our task,’50 and could create ‘loopholes that could be exploited by unscrupulous 
defence lawyers to challenge the legality of the Security Service’s involvement in a case.’51  However, 
in any event, MI5’s involvement in the area of serious crime was suspended in early 2006.52  Much of 
this work is now undertaken by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).  SOCA works in 
partnership with other government agencies,
53
 and private organisations, to tackle serious crime both 
in the UK and abroad. It is involved in the detection and prevention of people smuggling and human 
trafficking, major gun crime, fraud, computer crime, money laundering and class A drugs.
54
 
 
Since its inception, the Act and its provisions have been criticised. One potential problem is that it 
may be assumed that the legislation will prompt genuine change, as opposed to artificial and bogus 
change.  However, as Peter Gill argues, ‘laws may only achieve symbolic change so that people can 
be reassured that problems have been dealt with.55 According to Gill: ‘if these laws are not matched 
by even greater effort in implementing those laws then little that is real may change.’56  The problem 
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49 Security Service Act 1996, s1. 
50 HL Deb, 14th May 1996, Cols. 398-9. 
51 HL Deb, 14th May 1996, Cols. 398-9. 
52 See: www.mi5.gov.uk. 
53 For example, the UK Border Agency, HM Revenue and Customs and the Association of Chief Police Officers in the 
Organised Crime Partnership Board. 
54 See: www.soca.gov.uk. The Home Secretary sets SOCA’s strategic priorities.  At its inception, its top priorities included 
dealing with Class A drugs and organised immigration crime. 
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for Gill is that it is not unconceivable that ‘beneath the surface of the new law, what the agencies 
actually do and how they do it might remain essentially unchanged.’ 57 Thus, Gill argues that 
‘achieving cultural change in agencies that may have long histories of complete autonomy from 
outside control or influence is a long term project that may require even greater political will than 
achieving initial legal reform.’58  
 
 It is true that legislation will not be effective if it is merely superficial.  However, under the 1989 Act 
the notion of accountability was, at least to some extent, given some legislative effect and the age of 
oversight may have been born.  Indeed, the successful enactment of the 1989 Act may have been a 
major factor in implementing similar mechanisms in 1994 for the regulation of MI6 and GCHQ.  The 
enactment of the Act also seems to have encouraged an atmosphere of increased openness and 
transparency. Since 1989 there has been a steady growth in the amount of intelligence material placed 
in the public domain, either by the government or the agencies themselves.  For example, the heads of 
MI5 and MI6 have made public speeches, and the agencies have declassified numerous documents.  
The agencies also seem to have become much more cooperative with the media.  For example, a 
report drafted by the Foreign Affairs Committee confirmed that there ‘are now systems that allow the 
press to make enquiries of the Intelligence Community.’59   The Intelligence and Security Committee 
has also revealed that a number of accredited journalists are now able to contact the agencies with 
questions and, in certain circumstances, receive briefings from them.
60
 However, on this point, whilst 
it seems that ‘there are no specific ground rules regarding contacts between the intelligence services 
and journalists,’61 it is claimed that unauthorised contacts should never be permitted.62 There have 
been some concerns that Andrew Gilligan, who alleged that a dossier supporting the UK’s entry into 
Iraq had been ‘sexed up’, painted a picture of frequent contact, both official and unofficial.  
According to Gilligan, he had four unofficial contacts, one of which showed him a Defence 
Intelligence Staff paper classified ‘Top Secret’, and another which showed him a Joint Intelligence 
Committee paper.  In the opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Gilligan’s contacts should be 
thoroughly investigated, and the Government should review links between the security and the 
intelligence agencies, the media and Parliament, along with the rules which apply to them.
63
 Thus, it 
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seems that whilst the security agencies are increasingly open, considerations of national security may 
continue to ensure that they are unable to be transparent.   
 
 
2.4 The Legal Regulation of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
 
The Secret Intelligence Service, commonly known as MI6, is a Crown Service responsible for 
information gathering and operations outside the UK.  It is MI6 operations, together with military 
intelligence and GCHQ, which gathers intelligence from around the world through espionage and 
covert action.  MI6 comes under the jurisdiction of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and its 
activities are answerable to the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet.   The GCHQ was established under 
the Royal Prerogative as part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The principle tasks of GCHQ 
include the security of military and official communications and the provision of signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) for the Government. 
So far as legal regulation is concerned, both MI6 and GCHQ are now governed by the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994.  The functions of MI6 are to: (a) obtain and provide information relating to the 
actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles,’ and (b) ‘to perform other tasks relating to 
the actions or intentions of such persons.’64  MI6, therefore, is responsible for obtaining secret 
information and conducting operations in support of the UK’s foreign policy objectives, and to 
counter threats to the UK’s interests worldwide.  These threats, according to the Government, may 
include: ‘the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons, terrorism, 
serious crime, espionage, sabotage, and the threat to our armed forces in times of conflict.’65  Thus, 
MI6 is geared towards its traditional role of protecting external, rather than internal, security.  This, 
however, does not mean that the Service will not carry out operations on UK soil.  Targeted 
individuals may enter the UK temporarily and information relating to them may be found here. 
The functions of GCHQ are defined by s3.
66
 Its role is twofold.  Firstly, it is tasked to ‘monitor or 
interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such 
emissions’ and to ‘obtain and provide information derived from or relating to such emissions.’67  
Secondly, GCHQ is to provide advice and assistance about language and cryptology to the Armed 
Services, government departments and any other organisations approved by the Prime Minister.
68
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Whilst the functions of these two agencies, as defined in the Act, may seem rather vague, they are 
limited by Sections 1(2) and 3(2) of the Act, which provide that the functions of MI6 and GCHQ will 
be exercisable only in the interests of national security with a particular reference to the defence and 
foreign policies of HM Government; or in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK; or in 
support of the prevention and detection of serious crime. As in previous legislation the expression 
‘national security’ is used without further definition and, as a consequence, the concerns expressed 
during academic and Parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of the Security Service Act 
1989, were not addressed by the new Act.  Indeed, the general view of Parliament, as regards a clearer 
definition, may have been summed up by the Prime Minister in 1988 when he said: ‘National security 
is generally understood to refer to the safe-guarding of the State and the community against threats to 
their survival or well-being.  I am not aware that any previous administration has thought it 
appropriate to adopt a specific definition of the term.’69 
Both the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 have been criticised for 
their ambiguity and lack of clarity. For some academics and civil libertarians, the lack of a concrete 
definition of terms such as ‘national security’ and ‘serious crime’ leaves room for ‘reasoning in a 
circle, in the crudest form, so that national security becomes whatever the institution concludes, in 
good faith, that it ought to be involved in.’70 Thus, it is argued that the Acts might afford the security 
agencies too much power to define the extent of their own remit.  These concerns are seemingly 
shared, to some extent, by some in the agencies themselves.  For example, the former head of the 
Security Service, Dame Stella Rimington, has expressed concerns that the ‘fear of terrorism is being 
exploited by the government to erode civil liberties and risks creating a police state.’71 Therefore, 
whilst the Home Office and the security agencies have counter argued that the relevant legislation  
‘provides law enforcement agencies with the tools to protect the public as well as ensuring that the 
government has the ability to provide effective public services,’72 questions still persist regarding 
whether the Acts adequately protect the civil liberties of UK citizens. For example, it has been 
suggested that in the threat climate since the 9/11 attack, debates around security and intelligence 
issues have tended to shift away from accountability towards ‘intelligence failure’ and how future 
threats can be averted.
73
  In other words, the predominant concern may have been more about how the 
security agencies  are dealing with the alleged ‘war on terror’ at an operational level rather than how 
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they are legally regulated, controlled or made accountable
74
. In such a case, as Gill argues, it is not 
inconceivable that accountability ‘may be swept away in the naive belief that agencies ‘unhampered’ 
by oversight requirements might somehow be more efficient and effective,’75  
Perhaps, one way of analysing the scope of national security as outlined in the various Acts is to 
examine its actual interpretation by the intelligence agencies. This can be achieved by investigating 
the fields of operation in which these agencies are currently involved. Such an analysis may uncover 
the areas that the security agencies do, or do not, consider to be a national security risk. For example, 
much of security agency work is currently taken up by countering threats emanating from terrorism, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and espionage.
76
  However, an examination of 
current security activity, whilst useful, will not highlight the potential for future changes in the way in 
which national security is perceived.  The security agencies must assess and prioritise constantly 
changing covert threats to UK security and allocate resources accordingly.  It follows, therefore, that 
at any one time the intelligence agencies may not be exercising in all areas of their potential remit. 
Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs will analyse the activities of the security agencies in the light of 
both their actual and potential practice. The following areas will be discussed: 
 
1. The duty to protect national security from threats related to terrorism. 
2. The work of the security agencies in frustrating procurement by proliferating countries of 
material, technology or expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction. 
3. The duty to prevent damage to the UK emanating from foreign espionage. 
4. The extent of security agency work in the prevention of serious crime. 
5. Protection from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy – 
Subversion. 
6. Protection of the Critical National Infrastructure and security advice. 
 
 
2.5 The Duty to Protect National Security from Threats Related to Terrorism 
 
The intelligence agencies are charged with protecting UK national security from the threat of 
terrorism both at home and abroad.  Indeed, countering threats emanating from terrorism and terrorist 
activity currently constitutes a major part of the work of the intelligence agencies.  For example, 
88%
77
 of MI5’s resources are currently deployed in counter-terrorist work. This is mainly divided 
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between international counter terrorism (73%);
78
 terrorism related to Northern Ireland; and domestic 
terrorism (15%).
79
 
The intelligence agencies are assisted in defining potential terrorist threats by the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JTAC).  This body, which is based at the MI5 headquarters in Thames House, was 
formed following the events of 11
th
 September and has been in existence since June 2003.   The JTAC 
analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets 
threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a 
wide range of government departments, including the intelligence agencies. It also produces in-depth 
reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities. According to JTAC and the intelligence 
agencies,
80
 it seems the threat from terrorism has increased significantly in recent decades and 
particularly since the attacks in America on 11
th
 September 2001.  MI5 claim that groups such as Al 
Qaida present a threat ‘on a scale not previously encountered,’81 and that, ‘Al Qaida and its related 
networks seek to carry out terrorist attacks around the world, aiming to carry out ‘high impact’ 
attacks causing mass civilian casualties,’82 In addition to civilian terrorist cells, such as Al Qaida, 
MI5 also claim that states and their leaders have sponsored terrorism as an instrument of foreign 
policy.  These states may shelter, arm, train and finance terrorist groups in order to use them as 
surrogates in attacks rather than face international retaliation by using members of their intelligence 
agencies.
83
  Terrorist groups may have a wide range of aspirations, but the major causes of terrorism 
include:  replacing governments that are regarded as insufficiently pious; reclaiming what is regarded 
as occupied territory; rejecting democratic institutional values in favour of a particular interpretation 
of Islam; and reducing the influence of Western countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
In the light of these threats and other emerging threats, such as the potential use of biological, 
radiological and nuclear weapons, and from attacks on IT and other computer systems, the UK 
Government has introduced a raft of anti-terrorist legislation.  This new legislation includes: the 
Terrorism Act 2000, which provides a widened definition of terrorism;
84
  the Terrorism Act 2006, 
which makes it an offence to commit acts that encourage others to prepare for, or ‘glorify’, terrorism; 
and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which allows the Secretary of 
State to impose restrictions on those he believes to be involved in terrorist activity. There are also 
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Acts which allow for the proscription of terrorist organisations along with the power to freeze terrorist 
funds.
85
  
 
Whilst, to an extent, previous anti-terrorist legislation, particularly those provisions designed to deal 
with paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland, has merely been adopted and made permanent in the 
new Acts, many new offences have been created.   This has meant that there has been a significant 
increase in police and security agency powers to combat terrorism.  Indeed, it has been argued that the 
extent to which law enforcers and prosecuting agencies, can and now do, operate has been widened in 
such as way as to fundamentally alter the relationship between the citizen and the state, and may have 
had a major impact on civil liberties.
86
  For example, the Terrorism Act 2000 includes a re-working of 
the statutory definition of terrorism that may broaden the interpretation of terrorism to include so 
called ‘domestic terrorist’ groups. These groups have been described as dissident single issue factions 
that may be prepared to engage in violence to further their concerns.
87 They may include: animal 
rights extremists,
88
 environmental rights activists; and potential new groups espousing other causes, 
for example, militant anti-abortion groups.
89
 Since, those defined as terrorists are more likely to be 
subjected to covert investigation by the security agencies, it is necessary to examine this definition in 
more detail. 
 
The Terrorism Act 2000 was brought into force in response to a Consultation Paper.
90
  The Act 
received the Royal Assent on 20th July 2000 and came into force on 19th February 2001.
91
 It repeals 
and replaces the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act, which described terrorism as: ‘The use of violence for political ends [including] any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear.’92 
 
The definition of terrorism has been widened by the 2000 Act, Thus terrorism is now defined as:  
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‘The use or threat of action designed to influence government, an international governmental 
organisation,93 or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public,94 and is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause95 and it involves or causes either: 
 
 Serious violence against a person;96 
 Serious damage to property;97 
 A threat to a person’s life;98 
 A serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or99 
 Serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system.100 
 
Much of the legal argument surrounding this Act has focused on this definition because it leaves a 
number of areas open to interpretation.  For example: what constitutes a threat?  What is an 
ideological cause? What is meant by ‘serious’ as opposed to any other variety of violence? What is 
meant by the terms ‘to influence government’ or to ‘intimidate the public’? How explicit do such 
intentions have to be?  For example, it has been noted that the threat of action is not limited to public 
protection. According to the Act the use or threat of action ‘must be designed to influence government 
or intimidate the public.’ The use of the word ‘or’ in the Act, rather than the words ‘by’ or ‘through 
the means of’, means that the two elements of the clause are logically separated.  Therefore, it has 
been argued that even where the possible action involves no threat, violence or intimidation of the 
public, but seeks to influence government, the threat or action may still qualify as terrorism.
101
  It is 
true that intimidating the public in order to influence government is a traditional tactic of terrorism, 
but the ability for protest groups to undertake action designed to influence government may also be 
the guarantee of a democratic society.  The problem is that, as phrased, it is conceivable that terrorism 
can now encompass, in pure legal terms at least, those forms of direct action or protest sometimes 
engaged in by, for example, environmental and animal rights groups and by trade unions, where such 
activities might have an impact on public health or safety, whether or not they are violent. 
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In Lord Lloyd’s ‘Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism,’102 this extension to the legal definition 
of terrorism is upheld. Lord Lloyd claimed that: ‘There is no difference in principle…between 
domestic and international terrorism given that the perpetrators use many of the same methods and 
inspire the same fear in those caught up in, or affected by, their activities.’103  However, whilst it may 
be true that some of the methods employed by militant domestic groups may seem similar to 
terrorists, it is noteworthy that the Government,
104
 and the Security Service, acknowledge that the 
organisation and methods of these groups is less well developed than that of international and Irish 
terrorist groups. Indeed, opponents of the new definition pointed out that ‘at the time the consultation 
paper was elaborated, the UK was enjoying a period of decreasing violence and relative calm.’105 
Thus, it was argued that ‘the extension was based upon a rather speculative prediction of future 
risks,’106 rather than being a response to actual and real threats.   
 
At the time the Act was passed, the Home Secretary offered some reassurance to those who expressed 
concerns, saying: ‘The new definition will not catch the vast majority of so called domestic activist 
groups which exist in this country today’,107 because the main focus of official effort against such 
groups ‘will continue to be a problem for the police rather than an issue for the Security Service.’108 
However, when he was challenged to include the most militant animal rights organisations within 
MI5’s counter-terrorism efforts, the Home Secretary acknowledged that ‘there is a thin dividing line’, 
saying that ‘there are people who claim to be in favour of so called animal liberation who have 
engaged in acts which have…resulted in the most serious of violence to individuals.’109   
 
Since the inception of the Act, some of its provisions have been successfully challenged in the courts. 
In Gillan and Quinton v UK,
110
  the use of stop and search powers, introduced under Section 44 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000, were found to breach Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights. 
The Court found that these stop and search powers were a clear interference with the privacy of the 
person. The Court concluded that the interference was not ‘in accordance with law’ finding that the 
‘wide discretion’ provided by the legislation had not been limited by adequate legal safeguards to 
prevent abuse of the process. Indeed, the Court indicated that the ‘public nature of the search, with the 
discomfort of having personal information exposed to public view, might even in certain cases 
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compound the seriousness of the interference because of an element of humiliation and 
embarrassment.’  The outcome in this case, along with widespread concern regarding the alleged 
misuse of Section 44 powers, may have been instrumental in encouraging the Government to 
introduce new legislation.  Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, these ‘stop and search’ 
powers have been repealed and replaced.  The Act provides for the creation of a code of practice in 
relation to the use of the new, more limited, powers.
111
 
 
According to the Government, the Terrorism Act 2000 was designed as a consolidating provision, 
drawing together previous anti-terror laws into a single code that would not require renewal or re-
enactment.
112
 However, since the passage of the Act, it is claimed that ‘the consequences of terrorism 
have been dramatically highlighted in the West by the attacks of 11th September 2001, the Madrid 
bombings, the 7/7 bombings in London and a host of failed domestic and international plots’.113 There 
have been 59 terrorism related deaths in Great Britain since 2001.
114
 Thus, the Government claims 
that the threat should not be underestimated because ‘the authorities have been able to prevent a 
series of plots, and atrocities have been avoided through the incompetence of the terrorists 
themselves.’115 
 
The need to deal with these potential terrorist attacks has meant that the provisions in the 2000 Act 
have been heavily amended by subsequent Terrorism Acts. Some of the provisions of these Acts are 
claimed to have further undermined the liberties of the person.
116
 Indeed a number of measures, most 
notably the imposition of control orders, and the power to indefinitely detain certain suspected 
terrorists, have been the subject of successful legal challenges. The subsequent paragraphs will 
explore some these provisions and the legal cases that have arisen from them in more detail.  They 
will begin by exploring certain detention measures, which were introduced under the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001, and which were eventually declared to be incompatible with the Human 
Rights Act 1998.  The discussion will then analyse the cases that arose under the subsequent control 
order regime and the new provisions that have been introduced by the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011.   
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 2.5.1 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, was formally introduced into Parliament on 19th 
November 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on New York on 11th September. It received the 
Royal Assent and came into force on 14th December 2001. One of the most notable provisions in this 
Act was that it allowed the Home Secretary to certify any non-British citizen whom he suspected to be 
a terrorist and to detain them indefinitely pending deportation.
117
  The Government claimed that the 
provision was necessary because, whilst The Immigration Act 1971 allows for the deportation of 
those who are a threat to national security in cases where there is insufficient admissible evidence for 
prosecution, a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal v United Kingdom in 
1996,
118
 had prevented the deportation of persons to another country where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the person would be subjected to torture, degrading or inhumane 
treatment.
119
 However, the detentions were potentially an infringement of the right to liberty, which is 
protected by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  This potential infringement 
necessitated the inclusion of Section 30 of the Act, which provided for a derogation from Convention 
rights. Such derogations are possible under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
where there is a ‘state of emergency threatening the life of the nation.’120 
 
Between 2001 and 2003 sixteen foreign nationals were detained and held using these powers at HM 
Prison Belmarsh.
121
  Whilst the Act did provide a process for appealing to a judicial tribunal against 
the Home Secretary's decision to detain in each case,
122
 the Government had argued that a special 
appellate process was needed to deal with these appeals. This, the Government claimed, was 
necessary because of the possibility that much of the evidence or information, upon which the Home 
Secretary's suspicions may be based, was likely to be sensitive information of a confidential nature 
whose release to the person detained, or the public, might compromise intelligence methods, 
operatives, and other persons. Thus, the process established by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
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Security Act 2001, involved appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). The 
SIAC, which is still in operation, adjudicates using special rules of evidence which, most notably, 
permit the exclusion of the detainees and their legal representatives from proceedings. In an attempt to 
ensure that their rights are safeguarded at these times, security-vetted 'special advocates' are appointed 
in the place of their legal representatives.  
 
In spite of these limitations to the normative due process of law, some of the provisions of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act were successfully challenged in the courts. In A and Others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,
123
 the Law Lords ruled that the powers of detention 
conferred by Part 4 of Act were incompatible with the UK's obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
124
 The Court ruled by a majority of 8–1 that the purported derogation 
was not authorized by Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights since the measures 
taken could not rationally be held to be ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.’ This, the 
court stated, was because there was no observable state of emergency threatening the life of the nation 
and because no other European country, which had experienced far more severe crises, had declared 
such a state of emergency over such a long time period.  The Lords also held that the law was 
unjustifiably discriminatory because if a British citizen was suspected of terrorism, there was no 
power to detain them indefinitely without trial and that no detention pending deportation had lasted 
for more than seven days, let alone three years.    
However, a declaration of incompatibility by the courts does not deprive the legislation of legal effect 
under British law. Parliament may, if it wishes, decline to repeal or amend any provision declared to 
be incompatible by the courts.  Nevertheless, a declaration of incompatibility carries strong moral 
force, and may create considerable political pressure to address the incompatibility.  This, and the fact 
that the Act was also subject to a sunset clause,
125
 may have been instrumental in prompting the 
government to amend the Act. Thus, Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was 
replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 in March 2005, and later by the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.  The 2005 Act replaced detention in prison with 
‘control orders’ which allowed for the imposition of an extensive and non-exhaustive set of conditions 
on the movements and activities of the suspected person.  Even at the time of its enactment there was 
considerable debate as to the compatibility of this Act's provisions with domestic and international 
human rights laws. Thus, the provisions have attracted a high volume of litigation.  Control orders 
have now been replaced by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM’s). 
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 2.5.2 Control Orders and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 introduced the concept of control orders. A control order was 
an order made by the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom to restrict an individual's liberty for the 
purpose of ‘protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.’  It could place restrictions on 
choices such as, what the person could use or possess; his place of work; his place of residence; to 
whom he spoke; and where he could travel. The targeted individual could also be ordered to surrender 
his passport; let the police visit his home at any time; report to officials at a specific time and place; 
and allow himself to be electronically tagged so his movements could be tracked.
126
  The Secretary of 
State or a court could impose control orders on people who were suspected of involvement in 
terrorism where it was ‘necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement 
by that individual in terrorism-related activity.’127  The vague wording of the clause may have meant 
that the criteria to be satisfied were very wide.  Under UK law, ‘involvement’ in terrorist activity can 
be defined very loosely and can potentially include conduct which gives encouragement to the 
commission, preparation or instigation of such acts [of terrorism] or is intended to do so.
128 
The Act established two types of control order – derogating129 and non-derogating.130  Derogating 
control orders are those that may infringe the right to liberty, protected by Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in that they deprive liberty rather than merely restrict it. In these 
circumstances, therefore, the Home Secretary must first opt out (derogate) from Article 5 under 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  This provides that a derogation can be 
allowed when there is a ‘war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. The Home 
Secretary must apply to a court for the authority to grant such an order.
131
 A derogating control order 
was never sought or used under the Act.  Indeed, in his annual review of the operation of control 
orders, Lord Carlile, stated that ‘given the restrictive nature of non-derogating orders, and the 
reverberations that a derogation would cause, I hold as strongly as before to my often expressed hope 
that no derogating orders will ever be required.’132 
Non-derogating control orders, are those that the Government does not think require it to opt out of, or 
risk, breaching Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  These were made by the 
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Home Secretary; they lasted for 12 months,
133
 and could be renewed each year, or revoked or 
modified by the Home Secretary at any time.
134
 A system of law for the supervision by the court of 
non-derogating control orders was provided by Section 3 of the Act.
135
  In every case there was to be 
an application to the court for permission, in non-urgent cases to make the control order, and in urgent 
cases for the confirmation of the order.
136
  
The language of the Act made it clear that the order would subsist unless the decision was ‘obviously 
flawed’.137 Since this provision is retained in the new Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011, it is worth considering how the courts have dealt with it in regards to control 
orders. In each case the Administrative Court must undertake a full judicial review, which will hear 
all the evidence and consider whether the decision to make the control order was flawed.
138
 Following 
the Court of Appeal judgment in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB,
139
  in order to 
review the decision of the Secretary of State, the Court is required itself to decide whether the acts 
relied upon by the Secretary of State amounts to reasonable grounds for suspecting that the subject of 
the control order is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.
140
 Whilst paying a degree of 
deference to the Secretary of State’s decisions, the Court must give intense scrutiny141 to the necessity 
for each of the obligations imposed on an individual. For example, where the original decision was 
not flawed, the Court is additionally required to consider whether or not the control order continues to 
be necessary at the time of the hearing.  Thus, the determination on whether the Secretary of State’s 
decision was, or was not, flawed will be decided at the Court, rather than at the time the order was 
made.
142
 Under the 2005 Act, the Court had the power, pursuant to Section 3(12), to quash the order, 
to quash one or more obligations imposed by the order, or to give directions to the Secretary of State 
for the revocation of the order or for the modification of the obligations imposed by the order.
143
 
After its inception, the control order regime received considerable judicial scrutiny. The case law has 
addressed, in particular, the manner in which orders are made, particularly regarding the admission of 
‘closed’ evidence;144  the Home Secretary's requirement to give sufficient consideration to the 
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possibility of a criminal prosecution before resorting to a control order;
145
 and the actual restrictions 
imposed in individual cases, such as the length of curfews.
146
 In some cases, aspects of the control 
order regime were heavily criticised by the courts. For example, in April 2006, in the case of Re 
MB,
147
 Mr Justice Sullivan made a declaration under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that 
Section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was incompatible with the right to fair proceedings 
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  In his judgment, Mr Justice Sullivan 
stated: ‘To say that the Act does not give the respondent in this case, against whom a non-derogating 
control order has been made...a fair hearing in the determination of his rights under Article 6 of the 
Convention would be an understatement. The Court would be failing in its duty under the 1998 Act...if 
it did not say, loud and clear, that the procedure under the Act whereby the Court merely reviews the 
lawfulness of the Secretary of State's decision to make the order upon the basis of the material 
available to him at that earlier stage, is conspicuously unfair. The thin veneer of legality which is 
sought to be applied by Section 3 of the Act cannot disguise the reality. That controlees' rights under 
the Convention are being determined, not by an independent court in compliance with Article 6.1, but 
by executive decision-making, untrammelled by any prospect of effective judicial supervision.’148 
In response to these cases, along with widespread concern about the general erosion of civil liberties 
under the various terrorism Acts, the Government announced a revision of key counter-terrorism and 
security powers. One of the legislative changes emanating from this review came in the form of the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which replaces the control order regime.  
Home Secretary, Theresa May claimed that ‘that the new system would be less prohibitive and 
intrusive, and would be complemented by increased funding for police surveillance of suspects.’149  
Thus, the new measures may have a significant effect on the operations of the police and security 
services. Indeed, these bodies are expected to receive an extra £80 million over four years to keep 
track of terror suspects once control orders are relaxed.
150
  A Home Office spokesman has claimed 
that ‘extra funding for covert surveillance will help to manage the risk that such individuals pose and 
to maximise the opportunities to put them on criminal trial in open court.’151  
 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM’s) are imposed on individuals by a TPIM 
notice. Their primary intention, it is claimed, is to protect the public from the risk posed by persons 
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whom the Home Secretary believes to have engaged in terrorism-related activity, but whom it is 
feasible neither to prosecute nor to deport.
152
 Ten TPIM notices were in force at the end of 2012, nine 
of them on British citizens and all of them on men believed to have participated in Al-Qaida related 
terrorist activity.
153
 
Under the new Act, in order to impose a notice (TPIM) on an individual, the Secretary of State must 
hold a reasonable belief that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.154  
This, according to the Government, is a higher threshold than the one which was in place for control 
orders which only required ‘reasonable suspicion’.155 Unlike control orders, there is a two year time 
limit on measures imposed under a TPIM notice.156  Further measures can only be imposed if an 
individual has re-engaged in terrorism.157  Thus, TPIM’s cannot normally be renewed year-on-year as 
control orders were. The new Act also requires the Secretary of State to seek the court’s permission 
before imposing the measure, except in urgent cases where the notice must be referred immediately to 
the court for confirmation.158   The court is required to review the Secretary of State’s decision that the 
relevant conditions were met in relation to imposing the measures.159 However, as under the previous 
Act, the order will remain unless the court finds that the decision was ‘obviously flawed’.  
Under the Act, the Secretary of State must also consult the Chief Officer of the appropriate police 
force on the prospects of prosecuting the individual subject.
160
 The chief officer must report back with 
details of the ongoing review.
161
  In this sense alternatives to imposing a TPIM are explored.  
However, the notice can stand whether or not any investigation leads to a criminal prosecution. Thus, 
it is argued that TPIM’s, just like control orders, can operate outside the criminal law and this may 
effectively mean that persons may be punished without charge or trial. For these critics, ‘unless the 
purpose of monitoring and restricting a person is to gather evidence in order to put him on trial in 
open court, the measures are counter-productive and legally problematic.’162 
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Overall, there has been widespread concern that, once in effect, a TPIM will be little different to a 
control order.
163
 For example, there is still provision for curfews, electronic tagging, and restrictions 
on freedoms of association, employment and movement. Indeed, the first report of the Independent 
Reviewer on the operation of the Act, states that ‘TPIM’s resemble control orders in most 
respects.’164 Thus, it is argued that all of the most controversial aspects of control orders will be 
carried over, in some form, to the new regime.
165
 Therefore, it is possible that the controversy 
surrounding control orders may not be curbed by the provisions of the new Act.  
 
 
2.5.3 The Terrorism Act 2006 
 
This Act, which is largely concerned with preventing the encouragement of terrorism, was drafted in 
the aftermath of the 7
th
 July Bombings on public transport in London.   The government claimed that 
the Act was a necessary response to an unparalleled terrorist threat.  However, the Act has 
encountered a good deal of opposition from those who feel that it is an undue imposition on civil 
liberties, and could even increase the terrorism risk.
166
  
 
Part 1 of the Act creates a series of new criminal offences intended to assist the police in tackling 
terrorism.  Sections 1 and 2 of the Act are concerned with the encouragement and dissemination of 
material that may incite terrorism.  Section 1 prohibits the publishing of  a ‘statement that is likely to 
be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or 
indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of 
acts of terrorism or Convention offences.’ Indirect encouragement, it seems, includes any ‘statement 
which glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such 
acts or offences; and is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be 
expected to infer that what is being glorified is conduct that should be emulated by them in existing 
circumstances.’  Similarly, Section 2 prohibits the dissemination of a publication which is either (a) 
likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging terrorism, or (b) includes information 
which is likely to be understood as being useful in the commission or preparation of an act of 
terrorism. With regard to the remaining sections in Part one, Sections 5, 6 and 8 prohibit anyone from 
engaging in any conduct in preparation for an intended act of terrorism;
167
 or from the giving or 
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167 Terrorism Act 2006, s5. 
receiving of training for terrorist activities;
168
 or from attendance at a place used for terrorist 
training.
169
 Sections 9, 10, 11 and 12, prohibit the production,
170
 misuse
171
 or possession
172
 of 
radioactive devices or materials
173
 and trespassing on nuclear sites.
174
   Such devices may be used in a 
terrorist attack. 
 
In regard to the provisions of this Act, Liberty claims that ‘new speech offences including the 
‘encouragement of terrorism,’ which encompasses making statements that glorify terrorist acts, have 
the potential to seriously infringe free speech rights, criminalising careless talk and having a chilling 
effect on free speech surrounding, for example, foreign policy.’175  For Liberty, ‘the banning of non-
violent political organisations effectively amounts to state censorship of political views, which has the 
potential to drive debate underground.176’   
 
Thus, the provisions of both this Act and the other Terrorism Acts have been subjected to extensive 
criticism. For example, Liberty has extended concerns that the definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act 
is ‘dangerously broad.’  It claims that since ‘many offences are linked to this definition of terrorism, 
large numbers of people are potentially criminalised.’177  Indeed, as noted above, such has been the 
unease regarding recent counter-terrorism Acts, both amongst the public and civil rights groups, the 
Government has been prompted to review the current legislative framework.
178
 Thus, under the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the length of time a terrorist suspect can be detained before charge 
has now been reduced to 14 days; the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 
by local authorities along with access to communications data is now subject to authorisation by a 
magistrate; and the alleged ‘indiscriminate use’179 of Section 44 stop and search powers has been 
limited. 
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2.6  The Work of the Security Agencies in Frustrating Procurement by Proliferating Countries 
of Material, Technology or Expertise Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
 
During the last two decades, the government has publicly named the proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) as one of the issues that is at the very top of the government international 
security agenda. For example, in March 2003, Tony Blair claimed that: ‘There are several countries – 
mostly dictatorships with highly repressive regimes – desperately trying to acquire chemical 
weapons,180 biological weapons,181  or in particular, nuclear weapons capability.  Some of these 
countries are now a short time away from having a serviceable nuclear weapon’.182 More recently, 
the Security Service has claimed that: 'much of the material, technology and expertise required for 
WMD programmes can be found in the UK and that many of those seeking to develop WMD try to 
acquire these here'.183 
 
The security agencies co-operate with other government departments, such as the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC),
184
 to investigate and disrupt attempts by countries to acquire UK materials, 
technology or expertise that could be relevant to a weapons of mass destruction programme. In past 
years, the intelligence bodies have claimed a number of successes in the counter-proliferation field.  
For example, in 2004, MI5 claimed to have contributed to the disruption of 30 proven or suspected 
attempts by countries of concern to acquire WMD related goods or expertise from the UK.
185
  The 
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181 A Biological weapon is a living micro-organism or a toxin combined with a means of dispersing it.  Delivery systems 
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infectious doses of anthrax bacteria in one week. 
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184 One of the functions of the Joint Intelligence Committee is to monitor and give early warning to the development of 
foreign threats to British interests, whether political, military or economic. It also keeps under review the organisation and 
working of British intelligence activity in order to ensure efficiency, economy and prompt adaptation to changing 
requirements for the approval of ministers. 
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Foreign Office has also claimed significant breakthroughs in countering the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. For example, the Foreign Secretary stated that; ‘the UK has worked effectively 
with the United States in the case of Libya’s programmes and in countering AQ Khans network,’186 
and that ‘the UK has played a leading role, with France and Germany, on the issue of Iran’s nuclear 
programme.’187 It is also claimed that ‘the UK has been active on a proliferation security initiative 
designed to interdict the passage of cargoes intended for use in WMD programmes.’188 
 
There are a number of ways in which the intelligence agencies may ensure that the proliferation of 
WMD may be stopped, slowed, or at least made more difficult and expensive.
189
 Firstly, the collected 
intelligence may be useful in assisting the military, who can use the information to make 
improvements to overall military potential and create relevant offsetting capabilities to reduce 
vulnerabilities.  Such planning requires an understanding of the proliferant's strategic culture, doctrine 
and perceptions along with the knowledge of the potential proliferant's weapon types, production, 
storage, dispersal and launch sites.  Secondly, diplomatic action might be taken, based on secret 
information, to dissuade proliferants, or to dissuade their suppliers.  This may be particularly useful 
where the proliferants are unwilling and unwitting.  Governments may be quite genuinely unaware of 
how questionable export contracts, even by state owned firms, can be. Thirdly, intelligence may 
contribute towards maintaining and updating export control regimes by both re-framing and 
developing the multi-national export restrictions and by refocusing the attention of export licensing 
officials. Finally, in addition to identifying those who are of proliferation concern, the information 
gathered in intelligence operations may also have the equally important benefit of proving a negative 
as well as a positive confirmation. For example, information on a state or group may suggest that it 
does not, in fact, have specific WMD of concern, and that finance or technical resources; strategic 
doctrine and/or ideology, make it unlikely that it will obtain them, at least in a given time scale.
190
 
 
However, in order to receive any of the benefits discussed above and others, the intelligence gathered 
must be reasoned, well assessed, accurate and from reliable sources. It must be evaluated by an 
independent body and used in an appropriate manner.  This task is assigned to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC).  The function of the Joint Intelligence Committee is to monitor the development of 
foreign threats to British interests, whether political, military or economic. It also keeps under review 
the organisation and working of British intelligence activity in order to ensure efficiency, economy 
and prompt adaptation to changing requirements for the approval of Ministers.  The JIC is intended to 
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operate in close cooperation with, but independently of, both the intelligence agencies and politicians.  
The importance of this distinction was highlighted by Jack Straw.
191
 He claimed that: ‘The reason why 
we have a Joint Intelligence Committee which is separate from the intelligence agencies is precisely 
so that those who are obtaining the intelligence are not then directly making the assessment on it.  
That is one of the very important strengths of our system compared with most other systems around 
the world.’192 Others have agreed with this view. For example, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
found that there would be cause for grave concern if the JIC were ‘to be used by Ministers, or their 
advisers, for political purposes, for example, by the application of pressure to change the content or 
emphasis of an assessment.’193 Indeed, the JIC itself is aware that their assessments should not be 
politicised.
194
  For example, their former Chairman, Sir Percy Cradock, wrote in his book ‘Know Your 
Enemy’195 that ‘ideally, intelligence and policy should be close but distinct.  Too distinct and 
assessments become an in-growing, self-regarding activity, producing little or no work of interest to 
the decision-makers: Too close a link and policy begins to play back on estimates, producing the 
answers the policy-makers would like - The analysts become courtiers, whereas their proper function 
is to report their findings without fear or favour.  The best arrangement is intelligence and policy in 
separate but adjoining rooms, with communicating doors and thin partition walls.’196 
 
However, it has been claimed that ‘such partitions can easily break down,’197 and that the JIC, which 
is part of the Cabinet Office, has become too close to Number 10.198  In this respect, the JIC came 
under heavy criticism, from the media and public, when it decided to include certain claims in a 
dossier which was used by the Government to support the UK’s entry into the conflict in Iraq. The 
dossier, which was published by 10 Downing St, described Saddam Hussein’s WMD programme as 
being ‘active, detailed and growing.’199  It claimed that Iraq was five years from producing a nuclear 
weapon on its own – or only one or two years away if it managed to obtain weapons grade material 
abroad – and that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological agents and had military plans 
for their use.  The report also claimed that some weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an 
order to use them.
200
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196 Sir Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy – How the Joint Intelligence Committee saw the World, John Murray, 2002, p296. 
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This claim went to the heart of the Government’s case to support UK entry into the conflict in Iraq.  
For example, in his forward to the 24
th
 September dossier, the Prime Minister stated: ‘In recent 
months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, 
despite the damage done to his capability in the past, and despite the UNSCR’s expressly outlawing it, 
Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them, the ability to inflict real damage upon 
the region and the stability of the world….I am in no doubt that the threat is serious, and current; that 
he has made progress on WMD and that he has to be stopped.’201 Therefore, the professed reason for 
the war on which the government had based its legal case, both in the UK and in the UN, was that the 
war had to be started quickly, because Iraq possessed WMD which posed an urgent threat. The 
subsequent failure to discover any WMD, after the allied victory in Iraq, led to a widespread concern 
that Parliament and the public had been deceived by the contents of the dossier and that the evidence 
contained in it had been ‘doctored’ by No 10.202 
 
Some of these concerns were addressed by Lord Butler, who led the inquiry into British handling of 
Iraqi intelligence.  The Butler committee was tasked to investigate the intelligence coverage available 
in respect of WMD programmes in countries of concern, taking into account what was known about 
these programmes.  As part of this work it was to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi 
WMD up to March 2003. To this end, it was tasked to examine any discrepancies between the 
intelligence gathered before the conflict and what has been discovered, by the Iraq survey group, since 
the end of the conflict.  The key findings of the report, published on the 14
th
 July 2004, were that, 
whilst there was no evidence of deliberate distortion of the intelligence material, or of culpable 
negligence, some of the human intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was ‘seriously 
flawed’ and ‘open to doubt’.  Lord Butler stated that ‘the intelligence couldn’t stand up to the weight 
put upon it. For example, the 45 minute claim should not have been put in as the intelligence 
supporting it was not good enough.’203 The Butler report also found that the language of the 
Government’s dossier may have left the reader with the impression that there was a ‘fuller and firmer’ 
intelligence behind its judgments than was the case.
204
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Another inquiry, conducted by Lord Hutton, considered some allegations made by Andrew Gilligan 
that the dossier was ‘sexed up’ by the Government.205  In the event, Lord Hutton found that the Prime 
Minister’s desire to have as compelling a dossier as possible may have subconsciously influenced the 
JIC to make the language stronger than they would otherwise have done, but that the JIC, and its 
Chairman, were concerned to ensure that the contents of the dossier were consistent with the 
intelligence available to the JIC.  Thus, Hutton found that the dossier could only be said to be ‘sexed 
up’ if this term was taken to mean that it was drafted to make the case against Saddam as strong as 
possible.  However, Mr Gilligan’s claims were unfounded, because the term ’sexed up’ could be 
understood to mean that the dossier was embellished with items of intelligence known, or believed to 
have been, false and unreliable.  Hutton concluded that the dossier was, in fact, based on a report 
received by the intelligence services that they believed to be reliable.  Therefore, Gilligan’s report had 
incorrectly made a grave allegation that attacked the integrity of the Government and the JIC. 
 
After Hutton’s inquiry, the Prime Minister was almost completely exonerated, and the only question 
mark to be raised over the JIC was that the drawing up of the dossier could have been ‘subconsciously 
influenced’ by the Prime Minister’s desire to have a strongly worded dossier.  However, the Hutton 
Inquiry was widely regarded as a ‘whitewash.’  Lord Hutton was ‘thought by many to have been too 
kind to the Government and too harsh on the media.’206 There was a popular perception that his 
conclusions were ‘not findings in law, but were opinions on the conduct of public office and on media 
practice.’207  The consequence of this was that ‘people felt able to disagree and many did.’208  As 
William Rees-Mogg put it, ‘public opinion has overturned Lord Hutton on appeal.’209 
 
This episode certainly highlights the necessity for intelligence input that is objective, cautious and 
well grounded in order to avoid acrimonious suspicions of threat inflation and deliberate justification 
of policy intentions.  Whilst it is imperative that  intelligence is collected that may help to reduce and 
delay the scale of WMD around the world and lessen its consequences in peace and war, the 
credibility of intelligence and its international usefulness may be undermined where it is inaccurate 
and even policy dominated.  As Paul Shulte states ‘crying wolf, or hyping up ‘rent-a-threats’, is the 
worst way for the intelligence organisations to oppose proliferation.’210  The problem is that 
manipulating intelligence information to support government policy aspirations may undermine the 
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ability of the public and Parliament to correctly assess the nature of the enemy.  This, in turn, may 
lead to abuses of power and a general lack of trust between the government and the citizen. 
 
 
 
2.7  The Duty to Prevent Damage to the UK Emanating from Foreign Espionage 
 
Espionage can be defined as the practice of obtaining information about an organisation or a society, 
which is considered secret or confidential, without the permission of the holder of the information. It 
has been described by the Home Office as: ‘Covert or illegal attempts to acquire information and 
materials in order to assist a foreign power.’211 
 
According to Michael Smith, the art of espionage can be divided into three separate categories. These 
are: 
 
1. Strategic intelligence, 
2. Counterintelligence, 
3. And, tactical intelligence.212 
 
 
2.7.1  Strategic Intelligence 
 
Strategic intelligence concerns the collection of the sort of information which keeps political and 
military leaders, and their advisors, well informed of the situation in target countries and allows them 
a better chance of predicting how those countries will react in the future.  Such information will 
include: assessments of a given political situation; the leaders and their potential successors; economic 
and sociological factors that might influence policy; and the details of the target’s economic activities 
and scientific and technological capabilities. The main British agencies for gathering strategic 
intelligence are GCHQ and MI6.  GCHQ monitors the communications of Britain’s enemies and 
friends from a number of remote sites around the world, providing the British government with 
intelligence that will help it to formulate its security, foreign, defence and economic policies.  MI6 
collects exactly the same type of information as GCHQ, but by acquiring it through a variety of other 
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sources, including both human intelligence and by liaison with a wide range of foreign intelligence 
and security services.
213
 
 
 
 
2.7.2  Counterintelligence 
 
Counterintelligence work concerns keeping national secrets secure against the schemes of foreign 
spies or hostile enemy forces.  The loss of sensitive information may result in damage to the nation’s 
economic well-being or national security.  MI5 are tasked to undertake counterintelligence work on 
behalf of the UK.  MI5 seek to discover, investigate and disrupt the activities of foreign intelligence 
officers, who may attempt to steal commercial secrets, or secret information, concerning the UK’s 
foreign policy, defence information and other government matters.  MI5 estimate that at least 20 
foreign services are operating against the UK.  Consequently, they claim that: ‘The UK is a high 
priority espionage target and a range of countries are actively seeking British information and 
material to advance their own military, technological, political and economic programmes.’214  
According to MI5, even after the collapse of communism in 1991, and the consequent disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, the number of Russian intelligence officers in London has not fallen 
significantly.
215
 MI5 claim that countries such as Russia and China may want to acquire both 
classified material and technology for exploitation by their own industry. For example, Russia is said 
to task its intelligence services to gather information ‘to promote…economic development, scientific-
technical progress and military-technical backup.’216 Thus, the information required will include new 
communications technologies, IT, genetics, aviation, lasers, optics, electronics and other fields,
217
 as 
well as political and military secrets. 
 
Whilst the nature of espionage has remained the same throughout the years, the motives and rationale 
behind it may, to some extent, have changed.  In the past, espionage activity was typically directed 
towards obtaining political and military intelligence. According to MI5, whilst this remains the case, 
economic espionage has also been defined as an important and growing problem confronting the 
Western states.  It has been claimed that ‘some governments in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and ... 
Latin America, as well as some former communist countries, ... are involved in intelligence activities 
that are detrimental to our economic interests at some level.’218 For example, a document produced 
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by MI5 to provide security advice for visitors to China, gives some indication of the risks. The 
document claims that the Chinese Intelligence Service is involved in cultivating ‘friendships’ with 
British businessmen with the intention of using the relationship to obtain information which is not 
legally or commercially available to China, and which may promote China’s interests.   The 
information required can range from comment and analysis on Western political and economic trends, 
to Western Security and defence matters, commercial practices, negotiating positions and industrial 
developments.
219
 
 
 
2.7.3  Tactical Intelligence 
 
Tactical intelligence concerns the type of information that would be useful to military commanders in 
the field.  For example, it includes: working out the precise order of battle of the enemy’s armed 
forces; tracking the deployments of individual units; and monitoring and examining their peacetime 
training exercises in order to determine the type of tactics they will employ in war and how those 
tactics can be best countered.  Tactical intelligence information is collected, in the main, by the 
military intelligence agencies, whose activities are co-ordinated by the Defence Intelligence Staff. 
 
 
2.7.4  Current Security Agency Activity in Espionage 
 
In the light of the high risks described above, it would seem appropriate to direct a significant 
proportion of the security agency budget towards ensuring that the UK’s national and global interests 
are adequately protected.   However, the Intelligence and Security Committee has, in recent years, 
expressed its concern that, ‘because of the necessary additional effort allocated to counter-terrorism 
by the Security Service, significant risks are inevitably being taken in the area of counter-
espionage’.220  The Committee noted that in the period 1999-2002 just over 20%221 of the Security 
Service’s work was directed against hostile activity by foreign intelligence agencies.  Following the 
terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001, this was reduced to 16%,
222
 and by 2004 the figure 
was only 11%.
223
  Consequently, the Committee has warned that the focus on international terrorism 
is potentially undermining the ability of the intelligence agencies to deal with the threats emanating 
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from countries such as Russia and China.  However, the downward trend in the resources allocated to 
counter-espionage has continued - The current figure is a mere 3%.
224
 
 
 
 
2.8  The Extent of Security Agency Work in the Prevention of Serious Crime 
 
It is currently claimed that the Global economy, European integration and the end of the Cold War 
have presented national crime gangs with new business opportunities.
225
 On an international level, the 
influence of organised crime is claimed to ‘corrupt government and law agencies in many states 
world-wide, which desperately need good and honest government as a foundation for economic 
prosperity.’226 Some crime groups are thought to be so powerful that they can control many of the 
social, economic and political processes, particularly in young and emerging democracies.
227
 Within 
UK borders, is claimed that organised crime can ‘blight our most vulnerable communities, driving out 
innocent residents and legitimate businesses.’228  Organised crime groups may operate across police 
basic command units (BCU’s) or force boundaries, often at national or international level.  Some 
organised criminal groups may resort to extreme violence, intimidation and corruption in order to 
achieve their objectives.
229
 They may display detailed awareness of law enforcement methods and use 
effective counter-measures, including sophisticated counter-surveillance techniques and elaborate 
money laundering arrangements.  It is further alleged that organised crime groups share many 
characteristics with terrorists, including tight-knit structures and the preparedness to use ruthless 
measures to achieve their objectives. Since many terrorists use the techniques of organised crime to 
fund their activities, it is claimed that ‘a successful approach to organised crime is...inseparable from 
our wider effort against threats to our national security.’230 
 
All three agencies are tasked, under the relevant Acts, to act in support of the prevention and detection 
of serious crime: MI5, through the Security Service Act 1996, and the Secret Intelligence Service 
along with GCHQ, by the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Whilst, the precise meaning of the term 
‘serious crime’ is not clearly described in either of the Acts, it is generally accepted that it may be 
widely defined.  According to a recent Government paper entitled ‘One Step Ahead: A 21st Century 
Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime,’231 serious and organised crime may include drug trafficking, 
                                                             
224 www.mi5.gov.uk. Major Areas of Work. (Last accessed 2011). 
225 www.fco.gov.uk.  International Organised Crime: Non-Drugs Issues.  June 2006. 
226 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 2004, Cm 6167. 
227 www.fco.gov.uk.  International Organised Crime: Non-Drugs Issues.  June 2006. 
228 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 2004, Cm 6167. 
229 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 2004, Cm 6167. 
230 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 2004, Cm 6167. 
231 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 2004, Cm 6167. 
money laundering, immigration crime, counterfeiting, financial and business fraud, intellectual 
property theft and tax evasion. 
 
The Security Service has, in the past, claimed to have deployed its ‘full range of skills and resources, 
used traditionally against the terrorist and espionage targets, to combat the threat from serious 
crime.’232   However, the Security Service suspended work in the area of serious crime in April 2006, 
following the launch of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the need to redeploy 
Service resources towards combating the increased threat to the UK from international terrorism. 
 
The SOCA will co-operate closely with the intelligence agencies and other bodies such as the Assets 
Recovery Agency, HM Revenue and Customs, and the Foreign Office. SOCA officers are empowered 
to perform a number of surveillance roles traditionally associated with British intelligence services 
such as MI5.  However, unlike MI5 officers, some designated SOCA officers enjoy powers of arrest. 
SOCA's officers are not required to take the traditional Police Oath and the SOCA is exempt from the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.   The SOCA is led by a Board which consists of 
11 members. On its inception the Board decided that around 40% of its effort should be devoted to 
combating drug trafficking; 25% to tackling organised immigration crime; around 10% to fraud; 15% 
on other organised crime; and the remaining 10% on supporting other law enforcement agencies. 
 
 
2.9  Protection from Actions Intended to Overthrow or Undermine Parliamentary Democracy – 
Subversion 
 
The term 'subversion', according to the Oxford Dictionary, includes the notion of an overthrow, 
overturning or visible ruin, particularly of Government.  Many may think of subversion in terms of 
dissident individuals or groups that secretly indulge in, or plan, insurrectionary, underground or 
otherwise seditious or treasonous activity in order to cause the pillars of state to collapse or be 
undermined. Leigh and Lustgarten liken the concept to either, ‘a beetle, eating away unseen at the 
timbers of society, or a mole steadily and secretly tunnelling under the pillars of state so as to cause 
them to collapse without warning.’233 
 
With regard to an official and legal definition of subversion, it is currently taken to concern protection 
‘from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or 
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violent means.’234  The potential elasticity and flexibility by which several key terms in this definition 
may be interpreted has brought criticism and debate. For example, there can be no categorically 
correct understanding of which actions may, or may not, ‘undermine parliamentary democracy’.  One 
may believe that parliamentary democracy is safe when the constitutional machinery is intact and 
unthreatened.  For another, democracy is safe where there is the promotion of political toleration.  The 
problem is that, as phrased, it is conceivable that peaceful demonstrations against such things as the 
imposition of new taxes or anti-war demonstrations could be interpreted as civil disobedience, and 
consequently, as subversive behaviour.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that there is no requirement in this 
definition that the subversive act should be tied to illegal conduct.  On the contrary, Leon Brittan once 
claimed that ‘tactics which are not in themselves unlawful could be used with the aim of subverting 
our democratic system of government.’235 Indeed, during the 70’s and 80’s, two now senior 
politicians, Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman, were put under MI5 surveillance as ‘communist 
sympathisers’ whilst working for human rights organisations.236  This led to a legal action in which 
the European Commission found that secret surveillance, conducted by MI5 on Hewitt and Harman, 
had infringed Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
237
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the threat to British parliamentary democracy emanating from 
subversion has diminished and is now assessed as negligible.
238
 Therefore, MI5 are not presently 
engaging in counter-subversion work.
239
 However, whilst this may lead some to hold the opinion that 
the surveillance of subversives is a thing of the past, Lustgarten and Leigh argue that: ‘The issues, 
intellectual and political, have not vanished with the changed climate of international relations after 
the Cold War.  Subversion remains part of the legal armoury of the Security Service, and the 
definition of ‘subversion’ has never been limited to organised communism.’240 The point is that the 
legal obligation to protect national security from subversion has never been repealed. It remains 
possible that certain political groups and movements may still be at risk from investigation and 
possible interference by the security agencies. Indeed, Lustgarten and Leigh suggest that: ‘one 
example, which has potentially explosive implications, is the British Muslim community, whose 
outlook is already crudely misinterpreted in the press and popular discussion as a primitive 
‘fundamentalism’.241  They argue that ‘this cultural stereotype could make it virtually impossible for 
security and intelligence officials, working in an area of which they have little knowledge or training, 
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to distinguish between the rhetoric of outrage and the serious intention to carry out political 
violence.’242  It is further noteworthy that many groups, which may have once been investigated as 
subversive, may now fall under the power of the security agencies to investigate cases of alleged 
‘domestic terrorism’ under the Terrorism Act 2000. 
 
 
2.10  Protection of the Critical National Infrastructure and Security Advice 
 
The critical national infrastructure is defined as: ‘The underlying framework of facilities, systems, sites 
and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services 
which we rely on in every aspect of our daily life.’243  Examples of essential services include the 
supply of water, energy and food, transport, telecommunications, government and public services, 
emergency services, health and finance. ‘The failure of this infrastructure, and loss of the services it 
delivers, could include severe economic or social damage and/or large scale loss of life.’244 
Attacks on the critical national infrastructure may come in the form of physical attacks such as bombs, 
either delivered by vehicle, by post or in person. Attacks may also be electronic.  The growth of 
networking and telecommunications technologies, particularly on the internet, leads to vulnerabilities 
being discovered which allow criminals, terrorists and others to hack into computers, either to gain 
vital information or to destroy or manipulate its contents.    Attackers may be external to an 
organization or they may rely on the co-operation of an insider member of staff.  There are some 
attacks that can only be committed by insiders, such as the unauthorised release of proprietary 
information, or the sabotage of assets that only employees can access. 
Protecting the critical national infrastructure mostly involves providing protective security advice to 
potentially vulnerable businesses and organisations. Much of this work is currently undertaken by the 
Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure, which operates under the Security Service Act 
1989, and is accountable to the Director General of the Security Service.  However, the work of 
protecting the national infrastructure may also include guarding installations of particular 
vulnerability, such as nuclear power stations and facilities.  This responsibility is tasked to the Civil 
Nuclear Constabulary, who guard all nuclear power stations and other nuclear installations. The 800 
strong force also protects nuclear material, when it is moved around the country, and investigates any 
attempt to steal or smuggle atomic material. Its officers are routinely armed and it has 17 regional 
headquarters, mainly at nuclear plants around the UK. 
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PART TWO 
 2.11 Covert Surveillance Operations and their Legal Authorisation 
Having explored the threat environment in which the security agencies carry out their tasks, it is now 
possible to examine the covert practices that the security agencies use to achieve these objectives. 
Covert surveillance, operated by the security agencies and other bodies, is for the most part given 
legal effect under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  This Act describes the types of 
surveillance that may be used and lays down the legal criteria for its authorisation.  This part of the 
chapter will begin with a brief account of the methods of surveillance.  It will then assess these 
methods in the light of the legal provisions contained in the relevant Acts.  Where it is applicable, the 
provisions will be discussed in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. This will make it possible, in 
Part Three of the chapter, to discuss the mechanisms of accountability and oversight which may 
provide some control and limitation to the powers granted to the security agencies.   
 
2.12  The Methods of Surveillance 
 
According to the Security Service, its role is firstly, to investigate target individuals and organisations 
in order to obtain, collate, analyse and assess secret intelligence about potential security threats. 
Secondly, it is to act to counter the sources of these threats, including compiling evidence that enables 
the security agencies to bring suspects to justice.  Thirdly, it is to advise government and others as 
appropriate, by both keeping them informed of the threats, and by advising on appropriate responses 
to those threats, including protective security measures, Finally, it is to provide assistance to other 
agencies, organisations and departments in combating threats to national security.
245
  Thus, the 
gathering and collection of intelligence is at the heart of security agency work.  By gathering secret 
intelligence, the security agencies seek to obtain detailed information about target organisations, their 
key personalities, infrastructure, plans and capabilities.
246
 Intelligence gathering involves the 
observation, recording and categorisation of information about people, processes and institutions.  It 
calls for the collection of information, its storage, examination and, quite often, its transmission.
247
  
Principally, the methods employed by the security agencies include techniques such as the use of 
covert human intelligence sources; the use of directed surveillance, which involves following and 
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observing targets;
248
 the interception of communications such as telephone tapping; and intrusive 
surveillance methods,
249
 which may include, for example, eavesdropping in someone’s home or car.250 
 
The use of covert surveillance is now governed by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  
The major aims of this Act are to make provision for the interception of communications; 
251
 the 
acquisition and disclosure of data relating to communications;
252
 the carrying out of surveillance; the 
use of covert human intelligence sources
253
 and the means by which electronic data, protected by 
encryption or passwords, may be accessed.
254
  The Act also provides mechanisms which may 
strengthen the accountability of those authorities operating under the Act. In this respect, the Act 
provides for Commissioners and a Tribunal with functions and jurisdiction in relation to entries on, 
and interferences with, property or with wireless telegraphy, and to the carrying out of functions by 
MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.
255
 
 
The principle reason for the introduction of the RIPA 2000 was to regulate the use of surveillance 
measures within the legal parameters set down by European Convention on Human Rights.
256
  Under 
Article 8 of this Convention, the state has an obligation to respect the citizen’s private and family life, 
home and correspondence. In relation to the security agencies, observing the requirements of Article 8 
entails controlling the activities of decision-makers and agents who may be collecting personal and 
private information, and ensuring that any surveillance is justified under Article 8(2) of the 
Convention.
257
 This provides that covert surveillance will only take place in the interests of ‘national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country; for the prevention of disorder or 
crime; for the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
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others.’258  European Convention jurisprudence has interpreted Article 8(2) to mean that, regardless of 
the end to be achieved, no right guaranteed by the Convention should be interfered with unless a 
citizen knows the basis for the interference through an ascertainable national law.
259
 In other words, 
the surveillance activity must have some basis in domestic law.
260
  This law should be accessible to 
the person concerned, who must, moreover, be able to foresee its consequences.
261
  Thus, in Kruslin v 
France
262
, a case concerning surveillance techniques, the European Court commented, ‘it is essential 
to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is 
continually becoming more sophisticated.’  Indeed, the Court has expressed the view that the 
interception of communications, such as phone tapping, represents a more ‘serious’ interference with 
private life, so the law must be ‘particularly’ precise.263   In addition to these imperatives, state 
interference with Article 8 guarantees, must be carried out for a legitimate objective; be necessary in a 
democratic society and be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion.
264
  Necessity is essentially a test of 
proportionality.  The authorising authority must show that any interference with a Convention right is 
both necessary to fulfil a pressing social need and is a proportionate response to that need. The 
importance of the legitimate aim and the actual situation through which the aim is being secured are 
factors to be taken into account,
265
 and action taken for the prevention of terrorism or serious crimes 
may not be the same as action for a relatively minor offence.
266
 Overall then, in order to comply with 
the essence of the Convention, the surveillance operation must be compatible with the rule of law.
267
  
 
 
2.13  Surveillance Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
 
The RIPA regulates the manner in which the security agencies, and certain other public bodies, may 
conduct surveillance and access a person's communications.  The Act regulates 5 broad types of  
surveillance which are defined in Part II.  These are: 
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 The interception of communications, such as intercepting a person’s telephone or accessing 
the content of a person’s private e-mails or correspondence.268 
 Intrusive surveillance, such as eavesdropping in a target's home or vehicle.269 
 Directed surveillance. These operations involve the covert monitoring of a target’s 
movements, conversations and other activities.  This work is carried out by surveillance 
officers who may work in vehicles, on foot or from fixed observation posts. 
270
 
 Covert human intelligence sources. A person is defined as a covert human intelligence source 
if he maintains a relationship with a person for the covert purpose of obtaining information, or 
providing access to any information to another person, or covertly discloses information 
obtained by the use of such a relationship, or as a consequence of the existence of the 
relationship.
271
  
 Communications data.  This brand of data contains the record of a communication, such as a 
telephone call, e-mail or website visited, but not the content of the communication.
272
 
 
 
2.14  Directed and Intrusive Surveillance 
 
The Part II provisions for the regulation of directed and intrusive surveillance have been amongst the 
most controversial because the distinction between them is seemingly ambiguous.  Directed 
surveillance is surveillance that is covert and undertaken for the purposes of a specific investigation; 
is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person; and is not an immediate 
response to circumstances or events.
273
 According to the Covert Surveillance and Property 
Interference Code of Practice, private information should be taken generally to include any aspect of a 
person’s private or personal relationship with others, including family and professional or business 
relationships.
274
  Where directed surveillance would not be likely to result in the obtaining of any 
private information about a person, no interference with Article 8 rights occurs and an authorisation 
under the 2000 Act is, therefore, not necessary or appropriate.
275
  Intrusive surveillance, on the other 
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hand, is covert surveillance which is carried out by an individual on residential premises,
276
 or in any 
private vehicle,
277
 or is carried out by a surveillance device in relation to anything taking place on 
residential premises or in a private vehicle.
278
  Thus, the definition of surveillance as intrusive relates 
to the location of the surveillance, and not any other consideration of the nature of the information 
that is expected to be obtained.  Thus, the Act fails to recognise that surveillance that is intrusive may 
occur outside of these places through, for example, prolonged surveillance, or in a place in which the 
target would legitimately expect to enjoy privacy, such as in business or professional relationships. 
This is significant because the distinction between directed and intrusive surveillance has 
consequences for the level of authorisation required, with the former being much easier to achieve.     
 
 
2.15  Authorisation and Warrants 
 
The level of authorisation required to conduct investigations which may intrude into the personal and 
private lives of targeted individuals will vary with the method of surveillance used.  However, with 
such a fine distinction between, say, intrusive and directed surveillance, it can be legitimately argued 
there would appear to be no reason why the regulation of directed surveillance should be of a lower 
level than that required for intrusive surveillance because, as noted above, the only real difference is 
where it occurs.  However, authorisation for directed surveillance may be significantly easier to 
acquire.    
 
 
2.15.1 The Authorisation of Directed Surveillance 
 
The authorisation of ‘directed’279 surveillance is outlined in Section 28 and requires only internal 
authorisation, which can be granted by a designated person if he believes that it ‘is proportionate to 
                                                             
276 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part II, s.26 (3, 4 and 5). See also: Home Office, Covert Surveillance 
and Property Interference, Revised Code of Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000. 
277 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part II, s.26 (3, 4 and 5). A private vehicle is defined in the 2000 Act 
as any vehicle, including vessels, aircraft or hovercraft, which is used primarily for the private purposes of the person who 
owns it or a person otherwise having the right to use it. This would include, for example, a company car, owned by a leasing 
company and used for business and pleasure by the employee of a company.  See comments in:  Home Office, Covert 
Surveillance and Property Interference, Revised Code of Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000. Chapter 2.17. 
278With respect to the use of surveillance devices, Section 26(5) adds that if the device is not actually present on the premises 
or in the vehicle, the surveillance will not be regarded as intrusive ‘unless the device is such that it consistently provides 
information of the same quality and detail as might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on the 
premises or in the vehicle’. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.26(5)(b). 
279 Please also note that authorisation for the conduct or use of covert human intelligence sources is on the same grounds as 
for directed surveillance. 
what is sought to be achieved’ and is ‘necessary.’280  Designated persons are defined in Section 30 as 
‘individuals holding such offices, ranks or positions with relevant public authorities as are prescribed 
for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of  State and can include the 
Secretary of State himself.’281 Relevant public authorities include the intelligence and security 
services, the police, Customs and Excise, the Armed Forces and any other authority designated by an 
order from the Secretary of State.
282
   It is noteworthy, therefore, that in some organisations this may 
lead to authorising officers authorising surveillance activities in operations in which they are directly 
involved.  In Kopp v Switzerland,
283
 the practice of internal authorisation was severely criticised.  It is 
arguable that this level of authorisation may not, in the final analysis, be enough to satisfy the 
European Court of Human Rights.    
 
With regards to the requirement that the authorisation be proportionate and necessary,
284
 the Covert 
Surveillance Code of Practice
285
 suggests that the following elements be considered:   
 
 Balancing the size and scope of the proposed activity against the gravity and extent of the 
perceived crime or offence;  
 Explaining how and why the methods to be adopted will cause the least possible intrusion to 
the subject and others;  
 Considering whether the activity is an appropriate use of the legislation and a reasonable way, 
having considered all reasonable alternatives, of obtaining the necessary result;  
 Evidencing, as far as reasonably practicable, what other methods have been considered and 
why they were not implemented.
286
   
 
The Code of Practice also notes that, before authorising applications for directed or intrusive 
surveillance, ‘the authorising officer should also take into account the risk of obtaining private 
information about persons who are not subjects of the surveillance or property interference 
                                                             
280 In the interests of national security; preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; in the interests of the 
economic well-being of the United Kingdom; in the interests of public safety; for the purpose of protecting public health; for 
the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty or levy payable to a government department; or for any purpose not 
mentioned above which is specified by an order made by the Secretary of State. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 
(Prescription of Offices, Ranks and Positions) Order 2000 SI no. 2417. 
281 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part II, s.30(1). 
282 The public authorities that are entitled to authorise directed surveillance are listed in Schedule 1 of the Act.   
283 Kopp v Switzerland, App. No 23224/94, 1998-II. 
284 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part II, s.28(2). For a similar requirement in regards to intrusive 
surveillance, see s.32(2). 
285 Home Office, Covert Surveillance and Property Interference, Revised Code of Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
286 Home Office, Covert Surveillance and Property Interference, Revised Code of Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Chapter 3.6. Several other Codes, also introduced under the RIPA, contain 
similar provisions: See: Home Office, Interception of Communications, Code of Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Home Office, Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data, Code of 
Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Home Office, Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources, Code of Practice Pursuant to Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  
activity.’287  In other words, measures should be taken, wherever practicable, to avoid or minimise 
unnecessary intrusion into the privacy of those who are not the intended subjects of the surveillance 
activity. However, the Code of Practice makes it clear that where such collateral intrusion is 
unavoidable, the activities may still be authorised, provided this intrusion is considered proportionate 
to what is sought to be achieved. In this regard, the same proportionality tests apply to the likelihood 
of collateral intrusion as to intrusion into the privacy of the intended subject of the surveillance.
288
  
 
 
2.15.2 The Authorisation of Intrusive Surveillance 
 
The authorisation of intrusive surveillance is more narrowly defined. The Secretary of State and 
senior authorising officers have the power to grant authorisation for intrusive surveillance.
289
 As with 
directed surveillance, the issue of proportionality should be addressed (could the information 
reasonably be obtained by other means), alongside a consideration of whether the authorisation is 
necessary; in the interests of national security; for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious 
crime; or in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.
290
  With regard to 
authorisation by senior authorising officers, when authorisation is given or cancelled for intrusive 
surveillance, notification must be given to the Surveillance Commissioner 
291
  The Surveillance 
Commissioner must decide whether or not to approve the authorisation.
292
  If the Surveillance 
Commissioner is not satisfied that the grounds (such as proportionality) for authorisation have been 
met, he may cancel the authorisation, or cancel it from the time when the relevant grounds ceased to 
exist to his satisfaction.
293
  As a result of exercising his power to cancel, he may also order the 
destruction of any records relating to information obtained by the authorised operation.
294
  However, 
the exercise of this power is discretionary. The Commissioner is not compelled to cancel any given 
authorisation and a senior authorising officer may appeal to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner 
against either an order to destroy records; a refusal to approve an authorisation; or a decision to quash 
or cancel an authorisation.   
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2.16 Criticisms of Surveillance Practices under Part II of the RIPA 
 
In summary, Part II of the Act provides an element of legal accountability in relation to the 
authorisation of many surveillance operations in that it provides a legal framework designed to ensure 
that surveillance activities are ‘in accordance with law’ and ‘proportionate’ as required by the Human 
Rights Act and associated case law. The Government justification for the enactment of the Act was 
that it was essential to allow law enforcement agencies to catch up technologically with the 
increasingly sophisticated tools used by terrorists, drug smugglers and organised criminal gangs. The 
Government also claimed that it was necessary to put the Bill through Parliament, before the Human 
Rights Act became law in October 2000, in order to ensure that law agencies had a framework for 
covert surveillance that was compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.  However, 
whilst Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary, claimed the Bill merely ‘formalised existing powers,’295 
and that ‘what was new is that, for the first time, the use of these techniques will be properly regulated 
by law,’296 civil libertarian groups have claimed that the Act fails to provide adequate safeguards to 
protect individual privacy and offers no way for an individual to obtain effective redress if the powers 
are abused. For example, James Welch, the Legal Director of Liberty, has argued that when the Act 
was passed in 2000 only nine organisations, including the police and security agencies, were allowed 
access to communications records.  However, Welch notes that the number of public authorities that 
have access to the information has been significantly expanded since the inception of the Act.
297
  
Indeed, in 2007 there were 519,260
298
 requisitions of communications data from telephone companies 
and ISPs, potentially from a wide range of public authorities, including Local Authorities, The 
Gaming Board and Jobcentres.
299
  Thus, Welch has argued that ‘it is one thing to use covert 
surveillance in operations investigating terrorism and other serious crimes, but it has come to a pretty 
pass when this kind of intrusive activity is used to police school catchment areas.300  For Welch ‘this 
is a ridiculously disproportionate use of the RIPA and will undermine public trust in necessary and 
lawful surveillance.’301  The problem is that ‘privacy is an increasing concern to people, who do not 
wish to feel that they are unprotected, or inadequately protected, from the prying eyes of state 
officials, but find that new technologies give ever greater ability and commercial temptation to gather 
data.’302  
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PART THREE 
 
2.17  The Mechanisms of Oversight and Accountability 
 
There are several broad ways in which the security agencies can be held accountable for their 
activities.  Firstly, the security agencies can be held to account through statutory measures.   The 
relevant statutory mechanisms are found in Part IV of the RIPA entitled ‘Scrutiny of Investigatory 
Powers and of the Functions of the Intelligence Services’.303   Part IV provides for three 
Commissioners and a Tribunal. Secondly, there is an element of accountability provided in the form 
of Parliamentary oversight. Parliament, and particularly the House of Commons, may affect the way 
in which security is thought about and dealt with in two major ways. It may formally give assent to 
security related legislative measures, enabling them to be designated Acts of Parliament, and it may 
subject measures of security policy to scrutiny and influence.  With regard to the security agencies, 
there is also an added layer of Parliamentary accountability in the form of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee, which was set up by the Intelligence Services Act 1994.    
 
2.18  Statutory Oversight under the RIPA:  The Commissioners and the Tribunal 
The RIPA provides for the appointment of two Commissioners to oversee certain aspects of the work 
of the intelligence agencies,
304
 namely The Interception of Communications Commissioner and the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner.
305
  The Commissioners, who are appointed by the Prime 
Minister, must hold, or have held, high judicial office.  The thinking behind this, it is claimed, is that 
‘the holder of high judicial office is independent of government and likely to form his own 
disinterested judgement and...by virtue of his judicial position, he may be seen to carry authority.’306  
The Interception of Communications Commissioner oversees the arrangements for access to 
communications data under Part 1, Chapter II of the RIPA.  The Intelligence Services Commissioner 
is responsible for reviewing the internally authorized use of directed surveillance and of covert human 
intelligence sources, such as agents, to check that they are acting in accordance with the requirements 
of the law.  Both Commissioners are charged with reviewing warrant applications and visiting the 
                                                             
303 Part IV, Sections 57–72.  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
304 Sections 57 and 59. 
305 The Chief Surveillance Commissioner, appointed under part III of the Police Act 1997, must also now, under s.62 of the 
RIPA, take on the review of Part II authorisations, and part III activity other than by the Secretary of State and any other 
areas of RIPA not covered elsewhere.   
306 Sir Peter Gibson (Intelligence Services Commissioner), Oversight Arrangements in the UK and the Role of the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner, 6th Conference of the Parliamentary Committees for the Oversight of Intelligence and 
Security Services of the European Member States, Brussels, 30th September –1st October 2010. 
security agencies to discuss any case which they wish to examine in more detail.
307
 They must, by 
law, be given access to whatever documents and information they require.
308
  The Commissioners 
must also submit a report to the Prime Minister, at the end of each reporting year, which is 
subsequently laid before Parliament and published.
309
 However, these reports are not uncensored. The 
Prime Minister decides how much of the report should be excluded from publication on the grounds 
that it is prejudicial to national security; or to the prevention or detection of serious crime; or to the 
economic well-being of the United Kingdom; or to the continued discharge of the functions of public 
bodies subject to the Commissioners' review.
310
 In practice, the Commissioners have adopted the 
custom of writing their report in two parts, with a confidential annex containing matters which in their 
view should not be published.
311
  In addition to these duties, the Government has occasionally asked 
the Commissioners to take on other tasks outside their normal remit. These, it seems, have typically 
required ‘an ongoing role in monitoring compliance with new policies or an intensive health check on 
a particular work area.’312   
The appointment of the Commissioners has ensured that there is some, albeit limited, oversight of the 
use of covert surveillance measures, their lawful authorisation, and the circumstances in which 
investigations are conducted. As such, it is claimed that the Commissioners may provide assurance 
and challenge to Ministers and Heads of Agencies on the legality and proper performance of the 
activities of the Agencies. For example, they may advice on how the Agencies can enhance their 
compliance with statutory obligations and ensure that new and existing capabilities are developed and 
used lawfully, proportionately and only where necessary.
313
 However, it has been claimed that the 
measures, whilst useful, are inadequate. Firstly, The Foundation for Information Policy Research has 
argued that it does not ‘believe that one centralised office, (of the Interception Commissioner) can 
provide proper oversight of more than one million requests per year.’314 The Foundation notes that 
‘even when properly resourced, the office will only be able to examine a tiny fraction of the total 
requests made.’315  In the view of this group, the Interception Commissioner should continue to 
oversee the system, but he should publish far more detailed statistics on its operation. This, it is 
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argued, would better provide the material necessary to enable outsiders to make an informed 
appreciation of the justifiability of the use of invasive powers.
316
 
A second criticism relates to the lack mandatory judicial supervision. It has been noted that the UK 
has opted for a system where Parliament has not required any judicial involvement prior to the 
warrant or decision and that, as such, the Commissioners only have the function of retrospective 
review.  The argument is that, at best, the current provisions only marginally satisfy the criteria for 
authorisation laid down in Klass v Germany,
317
 which views supervision by the judiciary as desirable 
though other independent safeguards might suffice.
318
  However, in the event, these concerns have not 
been dispelled by the European Court of Human Rights.  In the recent case of Kennedy v UK, the 
ECHR found that ‘having regard to the safeguards against abuse in the procedure, as well as the 
more general safeguards offered by the supervision of the Commissioner and the review of the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the impugned surveillance measures, insofar as they may have been 
applied to the applicant in the circumstances outlined in the present case, are justified under Article 
8.2.’319 Thus, in the view of the Court, the oversight mechanisms, such as the provision of 
Commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal provided adequate safeguards. 
A third criticism is that the structure of the current provisions remains complex.  There are several 
different Commissioners covering activities which may in fact be part of the same operation.  Indeed, 
the Government has recently acknowledged that the UK regime differs from that found in other 
jurisdictions,
320
 for example, Australia, where non-Parliamentary independent oversight of security 
and intelligence agencies is undertaken by one single body.  These bodies, it is further noted, tend to 
have a more public-facing role, and are often  explicitly tasked to explain what they do and how they 
hold the Agencies to account.   In this way they are able to provide public assurance that the activities 
of the Agencies are at all times reasonable, proportionate, necessary and compliant with all legal 
obligations.  However, according to the Justice and Security Green Paper, having these functions 
carried out by one body carries the risk that the oversight person or body can develop a more political 
relationship with the Government and thus potentially seem to provide less independent advice than, 
for example, the Commissioners do currently. However, it is accepted that this problem can be 
mitigated by employing a rigorous and open appointments process.
321
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The Government is currently inviting consultation with regards to whether the benefits of a major 
change to the current role of the Commissioners would outweigh the costs.
322
  In this respect it claims 
that there are a number of different approaches that could be taken.  One approach would be to 
appoint an Inspector-General who would be responsible for the oversight of all the covert 
investigative techniques undertaken by the various intelligence agencies.  This would effectively 
subsume, into one body, the current roles of the Intelligence Services Commissioner and of the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner as they relate to the Agencies. Potentially, other 
functions not currently undertaken by either Commissioner could also be added to the remit, for 
example, the ability to oversee the operational work of the Agencies.
323
  However, unless the 
Inspector-General was also to have responsibility for oversight of the non-agency bodies,
324
 a 
consequence of this approach would be to have two overseeing bodies.  One whose remit includes 
responsibility for Agency activity and another which would oversee non-agency activity. This 
approach brings the risk that the two bodies would take different approaches to the oversight of 
interception and interpretation of the law, in a context of complex and rapidly evolving 
communications technology, and so the standards and practices of interception relating to the 
Agencies and Non-Agency bodies could diverge.  
 
2.18.1 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal  
A further mechanism of accountability is found in Section 65 of the RIPA, which establishes the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal.
325
 The Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider complaints about the use 
of surveillance by any organisation with powers under the RIPA. Indeed, it is the only judicial body 
with the power to investigate the conduct of the various intelligence agencies. The Tribunal, which is 
independent of government, has full powers to investigate and decide any case within its 
jurisdiction.
326
  Thus, the organisations under the Tribunal's jurisdiction must provide details to the 
Tribunal of any activity that is being complained about. The Tribunal has a duty to investigate 
allegations against the security agencies, and to hear and determine any proceedings brought.  The 
Tribunal is not under any obligation to hear or determine any case which is frivolous or vexatious.
327
  
Complaints must be brought within one year after the alleged conduct to which it relates, but the 
Tribunal may, if it is equitable to do so, extend the time.
328
  The Tribunal has the power to make an 
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award of compensation.  It may also order the quashing or cancelling of any warrant or authorisation 
and/or the destruction of information.
329
 
The Tribunal, as a ‘public authority’ within Section 6 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, must 
conduct the proceedings compatibly with the rights protected by the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  This includes, of course, Article 6 (the right to a fair trial). However, whilst Article 6 requires 
that the hearing should normally be heard in public, an exception
330
 is permitted to the Tribunal on 
grounds of national security, as long as there are sufficient procedural safeguards.
331
  When hearing a 
claim involving human rights, the adjudicators must interpret legislation using the methods set out in 
the Human Rights Act 1998.  Under Section 2 of this Act, the Tribunal must take into account any 
judgement, decision, declaration or opinion of the European Court of Human Rights.
332
 Further, 
Section 3(1) of the Act effectively means that, so far as it is possible to do so, the Tribunal must 
interpret the RIPA and the rules compatibly with Convention rights.
333
  Any incompatible provisions 
are ultra vires to the extent that they cannot be read and given effect compatibly with the requirements 
laid down by the Convention and associated case law.
334
   
It has been accepted that the Tribunal will have ‘immense significance as the central mechanism for 
protecting citizens against the abuse of state surveillance powers.’335 For example, in Kennedy v 
UK,
336
 the ECHR found that the ‘restrictions on the applicant’s rights in the context of the 
proceedings before the IPT were both necessary and proportionate and did not impair the applicant’s 
Article 6 rights.’337 Indeed, the Court emphasized the ‘breadth of access to the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal enjoyed by those complaining about interception within the United Kingdom and the 
absence of any evidential burden to be overcome in order to lodge an application with the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal.’338   
However, the Tribunal has been criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can merely report its 
conclusions: It cannot report the reason for a decision.
339
  This means, for example, that if the 
Tribunal finds that no warrant or authorisation exists and that, apparently, no surveillance or 
interception is occurring, or that proper authorisation occurs, it will merely inform the claimant that 
the complaint has not been upheld. The claimant is then left not knowing whether in fact surveillance 
or interception is occurring. The problem is that the Tribunal will only decide whether any 
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surveillance that is being carried out is lawful - that it has been appropriately authorised and is being 
conducted in accordance with the applicable rules. If it investigates a complaint and finds that 
surveillance is being carried out but is lawful, it will not confirm to the complainant that they are 
under surveillance, but merely state that their complaint has not been upheld. 
The second weakness of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction concerns the absence of any appeal, and the 
prohibition against questioning the Tribunal and Commissioners before any court of law.  It has been 
argued that the exclusion of any form of judicial scrutiny of the Commissioners’ and Tribunal’s 
findings creates a danger that the rights of the individual will not ultimately be upheld. This lack of an 
appeals system is significant because, in practice, very few complaints have ever been upheld by the 
Tribunal, either before or after the inception of the RIPA.  Indeed in 1998, Lord Nolan pointed out 
that ‘not a single case had succeeded’340 and that ‘this had led to a measure of suspicion about the 
effectiveness of the Tribunal’s work’.341 More recent statistics concerning complaints dealt with by the 
Tribunal are published in the Annual Reports of the Interception of Communications Commissioner. 
In the period 2000 to 2009, only five out of 956 complaints made, have been upheld. 
Given these two weaknesses and the fact that the interception is never revealed at any later time to the 
subject, the chances of any court action being initiated, or abuse uncovered by the Tribunal, may be 
substantially reduced at every stage of the procedure.  Thus, it can be argued that retrospective review 
by the Tribunal and the Commissioner is less than adequate and that, under the present regime, it is 
less likely to spot, or indeed be alerted to, errors than would be desirable.  Thus, the RIPA may fall 
short of providing an effective oversight system.  The law does not offer a single regulatory system, 
even though one was promised by the Home Office.
342
 Furthermore, though the impetus for the 
legislation was the need to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has been 
argued that ‘the Acts appear to represent an attempt to head off future adverse rulings from 
Strasbourg rather than being a meaningful attempt to respect the private life of the individual’.343 For 
example, whilst Article 8 reflects a minimum standard to be achieved, the RIPA may reflect a 
minimalist attempt to achieve it.  Perhaps the statements by the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, that 
under the Human Rights Act, the RIPA is Convention compatible and that ‘it is a significant step 
forward for the protection of human rights in this country’,344 may eventually be proven to be more 
the rhetoric of a politician than the judgment of a lawyer.   
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2.19 Parliamentary Oversight 
A further way in which the security agencies may be held accountable for their activities is by the 
means of Parliament.  It may seem natural, in a democratic nation such as the UK, to look to 
Parliament, and especially the House of Commons, to take on the task of ultimate decision-maker and 
arbiter in setting appropriate security agendas.
345
  Politicians may be the people best placed to address 
the security concerns of the nation because their power is subject to the popular will, as expressed in 
regular and free elections, and because they may be called to account for their actions and policies on 
a continuing basis. 
 
Members of Parliament are required to scrutinise the executive by subjecting the entire conduct of 
government to a continuous process of rigorous and critical inquiry. Such scrutiny has four main 
functions. The first is the education of both the government and the electorate through the publicising 
effects of debate in Parliament. In other words, the electorate will become aware of the issues 
surrounding a particular policy, whilst the reaction of newspapers, commentators and the public to 
debates on proposed legislation will help keep the Government informed of the drift of public 
opinion. The second is the influence on the pre-legislative processes which both backbenchers and 
opposition MP's may have.  The third is the limited amount of improvement and amendment which 
may be made to proposed legislation.   The fourth is the clarification as to the meaning and operation 
of a given piece of legislation, which may take place during debate. 
 
When MP's use the Parliamentary sounding board effectively, the House of Commons may 
legitimately claim to be both a practical democratic safeguard against the abuse of government power 
and an essential vehicle for conveying to the electorate the necessary material to make an informed 
judgement on the Government's competence and fitness to continue in office. For example, 
Parliamentary and public disquiet may have been a major factor in prompting the Government to 
announce its intention ‘to review the most sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism and security 
powers,’ and where possible, ‘to provide a correction in favour of liberty.’346 In terms of the working 
life of Parliament, scrutiny and influence certainly constitute its most demanding function.  It is also 
the function that attracts the most debate and criticism.  At best, debate prevents a Government from 
remaining mute. Ministers are forced to explain and justify particular governmental positions.  They 
may, arguably, want to reveal as little as possible but ‘the Government cannot afford to hold too much 
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back for fear of letting the opposition appear to have the better argument.’347 At worst, the duty to 
scrutinise the executive may be fulfilled in the most superficial of ways, providing no real check on 
executive power.  MP's may place their loyalty to their political party above their rather abstract duty, 
as members of the legislature, to hold the executive to account 
 
How effectively then are debates in which national security, or related issues, dealt with in 
Parliament. Lustgarten and Leigh make the following observation: ‘Far too often, the cry of ‘security’ 
functions in the political world as a sort of intellectual curare, inducing instant paralysis of thought.  
It is such a potent, yet indefinite, symbol that those in positions of power are able to curb criticism 
and shut off debate by conjuring it up and claiming to possess vital knowledge – which of course 
cannot be safely revealed – to support their actions or policies.’348  Thus, instead of receiving fully 
reasoned explanations of national security policy, the public may receive only inconclusive 
justifications which they may be expected to take on trust. 
 
This apparent 'paralysis of thought', if it indeed exists, may in part, be explained by two major factors.  
Firstly, criticisms may be curbed where there is a perceived need for secrecy.  Whilst it is generally 
accepted that every government has areas of operation in which it has a legitimate need for secrecy, 
and that the disclosure of certain information could endanger state defence and national security, too 
much reliance on secrecy will inhibit openness and transparency. Secondly, criticism in Parliament 
may be curbed where there is a general cross-party consensus of opinion or a bipartisan approach is 
taken. This may lead to a lack of determined opposition against the Government’s security policies or 
legislative proposals, and this tends to stifle debate.  Since these two factors will have a significant 
effect on both security related legislative provisions and on security policy, it is necessary to discuss 
them in more detail.  
 
 
2.20 The Potential Effects of Excessive Secrecy on National Security 
 
It has often been claimed that the UK is more obsessed with keeping government information secret 
than any other Western democracy.
349
  A possible justification for maintaining a climate of secrecy is 
that the public interest in gaining access to information may, in certain circumstances, outweigh their 
right to know.  It is claimed that free access to all information held by the government may impede 
                                                             
347 P. Norton, The Commons in Perspective, Blackwell, 1981, p119. 
348 Lustgarten and Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford University Press, p20. 
349 See, for example, G. Robertson, Freedom, the Individual and the Law, Penguin, 1989, pp 129-131 Lustgarten and Leigh, 
In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford University Press, 1994.  P. Birkinshaw, 
Freedom of Information, The Law, the Practice and the Ideal, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, 1996, Ch 3.  John Wadham and 
Kavita Modi, National Security and Open Government in the United Kingdom, Campbell Public Affairs Institute, New York, 
2003. 
effective decision-making and policy formulation. For example, discussions in Cabinet may not be 
uninhibited and honest were they open to public display. Further, The UK’s international standing and 
reputation may also be damaged by revelations which are politically sensitive or where negotiations 
and relations with other countries are involved. The argument most commonly put forward as a 
legitimate reason for withholding information from the public domain concerns national security. It 
has been accepted that imperatives such as: operations by security and intelligence services;
350
 matters 
concerning the movements of the Armed Forces;
351
 war itself;
352
 details of nuclear weapons;
353
 and, 
the general defence of the country,
354
 fall within the ambit of the term ‘national security’. 
 
One example of the consequences of too much reliance on secrecy is that parliamentary committees, 
and other bodies that deal with the security agencies, may be prevented from disseminating their 
findings, or even collecting all the necessary information to make informed judgements.   Thus, for 
instance, whilst The Intelligence Services Act 1994 added an extra layer of Parliamentary oversight in 
the form of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC),
355
 there have been suggestions that this 
body is hampered by demands that its discussions will remain undisclosed.
356
  
 
 
2.20.1 The Intelligence and Security Committee 
 
The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is an independent body which is tasked with the role 
of examining the policy, administration and expenditure of all three intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6 
and GCHQ).
357
 The ISC does not, unlike similar bodies in the USA, provide oversight of actual 
intelligence operations.
358
   Under current legislation,
359
 the Committee produces both annual and 
special reports on issues of particular concern, either on its own initiative or at the request of 
government ministers. To this end, the Committee holds evidence sessions with government ministers 
and senior officials (for example, the head of the Security Service). It also considers written evidence 
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from the intelligence and security agencies and other relevant government departments. The 
Committee may ask the chiefs of any of the intelligence agencies to disclose information.
360
 The 
relevant documents or information must then be either made available, or the Committee must be 
informed that it cannot be disclosed because it is ‘sensitive’ or because the Secretary of State has 
vetoed disclosure.
361
 The Secretary of State may veto disclosure, on the grounds of national security, 
if ‘the information appears to him to be of such a nature that, if he were requested to produce it 
before a Departmental Select Committee, he would not think it proper to do so.’362  
 
That certain information can be withheld from the Committee, by agency heads and by the Secretary 
of State, has been the subject of some controversy.   Indeed, in this respect, Yvette Cooper, a member 
of ISC,
363
 has reported that: ‘In my experience, the ISC has insufficient access to information to hold 
the secret agencies fully to account. Although we are privy to secrets, it is at the discretion of the 
agency chiefs.364 For Cooper ‘that creates a paradox: how can you have effective oversight if the 
people you are supposed to be overseeing are the ones who decide how much information you get?’365 
Whilst, according to Cooper ‘none of this means that the agencies are doing anything wrong,’366 it 
does mean that ISC members  ‘cannot put our hands on our hearts and tell the public, and the Prime 
Minister, that all is well - even if we believe it to be the case - because we are not in a position to 
know.367  The importance of this, according to Cooper, is that: ‘Credibility depends on knowledge, and 
knowledge depends on having the power to investigate and verify’.368 Cooper’s concerns may have 
been reinforced by reports, in 2009, that when reviewing intelligence on the London 7/7 attack, the 
ISC claimed that there may have been a lack of candour of the part of Ministers.
369
 It also cited a 
number of cases in which the Committee found it necessary to revisit earlier inquiries to take account 
of material that was not made available to them at the time of the original investigations.
370
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The ISC is unique inasmuch as it is not a Committee of Parliament. Rather its members include nine 
cross-party parliamentarians appointed by, and reporting directly to, the Prime Minister.
371
  Whilst in 
this capacity, it may have greater powers than a select committee of Parliament in that it is able to 
demand papers from former governments and official advice to ministers
372
 (both of which are 
forbidden to select committees), it has been criticized  because much of the work of the Committee is 
conducted in secret.
373
 Indeed, the members of the Committee are notified under the Official Secrets 
Act 1989.  This effectively means that they will commit a criminal offence if they disclose any 
information, or document, that they obtained as a result of their work, even if the disclosure revealed a 
serious abuse of power or the information was already in the public domain.
374
   
This secrecy may be significant because it has been argued that the existence of the ISC has been used 
by the government to prevent the scrutiny of intelligence issues by parliamentary select committees 
which may have had a legitimate interest in doing do.
375
  Select committee interest in scrutinising the 
intelligence agencies predates the establishment of the ISC. Following the passage of the Security 
Service Act 1989, the Home Affairs Committee persuaded the then Director-General of the Security 
Service, Stella Rimington, to meet the Committee. This was an act, which according to Rimington, 
represented the first formal direct contact between an intelligence agency and Parliament.
376
 However, 
such access is by no means automatic: There been a number of occasions when both the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and other Committees, most notably the Joint Committee on Human Rights,
377
 
have been denied access to intelligence material which they claimed was necessary for the conduct of 
their investigations.    In these cases, both government ministers and the heads of the agencies claimed 
that ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of the agencies is the job of the ISC,378 or that the subject that they were 
interested in ‘had already been investigated by the ISC.’379  
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The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Foreign Affairs Committee were highly critical of this 
response.  The Joint Committee claimed that ‘we do not have any desire to obtain access to state 
secrets, but we do consider it to be a matter of some importance that the head of the Security Service 
be prepared to answer questions from the Parliamentary Committee with responsibility for human 
rights’.380 The Foreign Affairs Committee wrote a separate report on the implications of the 
Government’s lack of cooperation with its Inquiry.381  In this report the Foreign Affairs Committee 
urged Parliament to reconsider the status of the ISC and whether it should become a select committee 
of the House.
382
 A number of scholars, along with the Joint Committee of Human Rights, have also 
concluded that there may be a need for ‘new mechanisms of independent accountability including 
direct parliamentary accountability’,383 and that this may be best provided by a select committee.384 
This debate, to some extent, has been addressed by Justice and Security Bill.
385
 The Bill proposes that 
the ISC’s status as a Committee of Parliament is clarified.  This change has included proposals to re-
name it the Intelligence Committee of Parliament.
386
  Whilst this may seem a minor change, it raised 
issues of secrecy that needed to be addressed during debate on the Bill.  For example, as a Committee 
of Parliament, it is arguable that the ISC should be subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as, 
for instance, joint committees are.
387
  In order to avoid this, it was proposed that an amendment would 
be added to Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to make it clear that its provisions do 
not apply to information held by the ISC, now or in the future. 
388
 Thus, the secrecy of ISC operations 
can be maintained.  
The requirement for secrecy is offset, to some extent, because the Committee is required by law to 
produce a minimum of one annual report to Parliament, which must be submitted to the Prime 
Minister.
389
  However, the Prime Minister may delete text or passages from the report.
390
  He may also 
decide about the timing of the report’s publication: A power which it is argued, ‘may permit him or 
                                                             
380 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge 
Detention, 2006, p43. 
381
 Foreign Affairs Committee, The Implications for the Work of the House and its Committees of the Government’s Lack of 
Cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into the Decision to go to War in Iraq, 2004. 
382
 Foreign Affairs Committee, The Implications for the Work of the House and its Committees of the Government’s Lack of 
Cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into the Decision to go to War in Iraq, 2004. 
383 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge 
Detention, 2006, p80. 
384 See comments in: Phythian, The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability, Intelligence and National Security, 
22(1), pp 75-79. Defty, Parliamentary Scrutiny of the British Intelligence and Security Services: An Examination of the Case 
for a Parliamentary Select Committee, Parliament and Legislatures Specialist Group, University of Southampton, July 2007. 
385 Justice and Security Bill 2012-2013. See also: HMSO, Justice and Security Green Paper, October 2011, Cm. 8194. 
386 See comments in Justice and Security Bill, Hansard, HL, col. 1109, 26th  March 2013. 
387 See comments in Justice and Security Bill, Hansard, HL, col. 1109, 26th  March 2013. 
388 In addition, an amendment will also need to be made to Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act to add it to the list 
of bodies that are exempt under the Act.  
389
 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s10(5). 
390 The ISC’s annual reports have contained many such deleted passages, although none, to date, have been deleted without 
consultation. See comments in Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Democratic Accountability of the Intelligence Services, Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper – No. 19, 2007, p12. 
her to dampen its impact by delaying release until public interest in the relevant events has waned, or 
to synchronise the date of publication with the Government’s prepared response.’391   
The production of these reports may potentially be a significant step forward in the development of 
suitable methods of parliamentary accountability.   It has been noted, for example, that they can 
provide an increased number of opportunities for Parliamentarians to debate intelligence related 
matters on the floor of the House.
392
  Indeed, ISC reports are now the subject of an annual debate in 
both the House of Commons and the House of Lords.   This debate, along with select committee 
involvement has, to some extent, been accepted as evidence that there is some growth in 
Parliamentary interest in intelligence.
393
  
Perhaps another benefit of the existence of the ISC is that there has been an increase in the number of 
Parliamentarians with in-depth knowledge of the work of the security agencies. Indeed, it has been 
argued that this may have a constructive impact on the work of the ISC in that access to information 
is, in part, dependant on the ability to know which questions to ask.
394
 A number of current and 
former ISC members are now in the House of Commons,
395
 and members of the ISC tend to be senior 
ranking - 10 now sit in the House of Lords,
396
 along with former government ministers and 
individuals from senior ranks in the Armed Forces.  These persons have the advantage of direct 
experience of handling intelligence material.  Recent appointments, most notably Pauline Neville-
Jones, the former chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former 
Director General of MI5, may have brought a wealth of expertise to the Upper House.   
However, observers both in Parliament and beyond have identified limitations in the Committee’s 
ability to provide effective scrutiny of the intelligence agencies
397
 For example, a number of scholars 
have criticised the tone of the reports that the ISC produces.
398
 Robertson, for example, was critical of 
the ‘anodyne language and style’ of an early ISC report, which he claimed was clearly designed for 
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consumption by government and was unlikely to be easily digested by those beyond Westminster.
399
  
Gill has asserted that the style of reports has ‘not improved over time’400 and that there is an ‘urgent 
need to make the work of the ISC more accessible.’401 Gill also makes a potentially more serious 
criticism of ISC reports, claiming that the Committee may ‘see itself more as part of the Whitehall 
machine for the management of the security and intelligence community rather than its overseer.’402 
The consequence of this, Gill argues, is that ‘ISC reports read more like those from management 
consultants than parliamentary critics.’403 
Overall then, whilst the ISC does not provide parliamentary oversight as it is generally understood, its 
establishment may have some distinctive benefits.
404
   For example, it has been accepted that, in spite 
of some of its shortcomings, the establishment of the ISC represents a positive move forward in the 
development of the parliamentary oversight of the British intelligence and security agencies.
405
 
However, concerns that parliamentarians do not debate intelligence issues with enough rigour 
continue to prevail.
406
  Thus it is argued that, with very few votes or debates, and consequently little 
opportunity for personal recognition or political advantage, there is little incentive for 
parliamentarians to take an interest in matters relating to intelligence.
407
 Moreover, since the ISC 
operates in a ring of secrecy, it is still very difficult to assess whether or not it serves to make the 
intelligence agencies more accountable. Whilst few may argue that the government has areas of 
operation in which it has a legitimate need for secrecy, unwarranted secrecy may hamper the goals of 
transparency and openness in government. Information is vital if MP's in Parliament are to preserve 
democratic accountability and ensure public involvement in the democratic process.  
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2.21 The Wider Issue of Secrecy  
The issue of secrecy is not unique to the debates concerning the ISC. Rather, it may be symptomatic 
of parliamentary scrutiny on a general level.   For example, Birkinshaw argues that the ability to 
scrutinise the actions of ministers and create a check on government, during Parliamentary debates, 
has been hindered by an excessive reliance on traditions of secrecy.
408
  Others have agreed, claiming 
that: ‘There is a culture of secrecy in the United Kingdom which is unlike that in most other 
democratic nations,’409 and that: ‘it surpasses the level of discretion necessary to safeguard national 
security, or other vital interests, to become a default position: An unthinking reliance on secrecy.’410  
Lustgarten and Leigh comment that: ‘Information about the government’s activities, and the basis of 
its decisions, is thought to be, literally and metaphorically, the property of the government itself to be 
distributed to the wider public as and when it thinks proper or necessary.’411  
 
The problem with operating within too tight a ring of secrecy is that it may run the risk of 
‘encouraging or providing cover for illegally or ethically dubious practices on the part of the 
agencies involved.’412  Perhaps nowhere has this been truer than in the case of Binyam Mohamed.  In 
this case, critical passages where originally removed from a High Court Judgment,
413
 which was 
examining claims that the UK intelligence agencies were complicit in the torture, degrading and 
inhumane treatment of Binyam Mohamed, who was held incommunicado from April 2002 and was 
interviewed by US interrogators.   
 
Binyam Mohamed alleged that charges of terrorist offences in the United States were based on 
confessions that he made whilst detained as an enemy combatant.  Mohamed alleged that he had been 
subjected to torture whilst in US custody, consisting of genital mutilation, deprivation of sleep and 
food, being held in stress positions for days at a time, and being forced to listen to loud music and 
screams from other prisoners.
414
 
 
In May 2008, in order to assist his defence against terrorism charges in the US, Mohamed made an 
application to the High Court requesting the UK Government to disclose 42 documents provided to it 
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by the US Government.
415
 These documents included details of his treatment by US authorities.   The 
High Court ruled that Mohamed was entitled to the documents because they concerned wrongdoing 
by a third party with which the UK Government had been involved.  However, The UK Government 
issued a Public Interest Immunity certificate claiming that disclosure of the documents, along with 
seven paragraphs of the High Court’s judgment which summarised them, would not be in the public 
interest.  The Foreign Secretary identified a potential risk of serious harm to the national security of 
the UK on the grounds that disclosure may breach the Control Principle.
416
  This principle is 
concerned with a diplomatic rule that intelligence provided by one government to another should not 
be disclosed without the consent of the government which provided it.
417
  On these grounds, the 
Foreign Secretary warned that the US might review its intelligence relationship with the UK and that, 
as a consequence, any compromise in confidentiality could result in severe disadvantage to the UK’s 
intelligence operations.   
 
Mohamed subsequently obtained the documents from the US authorities and charges against him in 
the US were dropped.  Nevertheless, the UK Government continued to resist publication of the seven 
paragraphs of the High Court’s judgment.418  However, the Court of Appeal decided, on 10th February 
2010, that the seven paragraphs should be published. The Court reasoned that to withhold the redacted 
paragraphs would ensure that ‘the parties to this litigation would not be treated equally.419  In 
response to this judgment the Government’s counsel made a request to the Master of the Rolls to 
delete one paragraph of this judgment.  After receiving further submissions on the issue, the Master of 
the Rolls rejected the Government’s request and published the disputed paragraphs with only minor 
alterations.  The passages included the comment that ‘at least some SyS (Security Service, MI5) 
officials appear to have a dubious record when it comes to human rights and coercive techniques, and 
indeed when it comes to frankness about the UK’s involvement with the mistreatment of Mr Mohamed 
by US officials.’ 
 
In reaching its determinations in these cases, the Court took several factors into account.  Firstly, the 
Court considered the balancing test laid down in R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands, Ex parte 
Wiley.
420
 This case determined that a claim to Public Interest Immunity can only be justified if the 
public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the document outweighs the public interest in 
securing justice.  Thus, the Court considered both the need to bring information into the public 
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domain through open judgments and the potentially conflicting need to protect state interests in 
confidentiality.
421
   A second factor in the Court’s analysis of Public Interest Immunity concerned the 
principles established in the Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners.
422
  This 
case imposes a duty to right a wrong on a person who knowingly or unknowingly facilitated its 
perpetration.
423
  In this respect the Court of Appeal found an obligation to disclose information under 
this principle according to the participation of the British Government in the alleged wrongdoing in 
this case.
424
  Finally, the analysis in the case was also heavily influenced by the Control Principle. The 
Court concluded that it is ‘integral to intelligence sharing agreements that intelligence provided by 
one country to another remains confidential and that it will never be disclosed without the permission 
of the provider of the information.’ However, the Court of Appeal held that the Control Principle was 
not absolute, and restored the seven paragraphs in open judgment with an acknowledgment of the 
potential consequences to the intelligence relationship with the US.
425
  
 
In the event, the final draft of the contested passage included a comment that ‘the record of security 
service officials, regrettably, but inevitably, must raise questions of whether any statement in the 
certificates or on an issue concerning such treatment can be relied on. ...Not only is there an obvious 
reason for distrusting any UK Government assurance based on SyS (security service) advice and 
information...but the Foreign Office and the SyS have an interest in the suppression of such 
information.’ Thus the judges took the unprecedented step of waiving confidentiality and reading out 
previously unpublished remarks about the conduct of MI5. 
 
On release, the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, rejected suggestions that MI5 had misled 
Parliament over the torture allegations.
426
  The Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, said: ‘We totally reject 
any suggestion that the security services have a systemic problem in respecting human rights. We 
wholly reject too that they have any interest in suppressing or withholding information from ministers 
or the courts.’ 427 The Prime Minister also claimed that ‘it is in the nature of the work of the 
intelligence services that they cannot defend themselves against many of the allegations that have 
been made. But I can, and I have, every confidence that their work does not undermine the principles 
and values that are the best guarantee of our future security.’428  
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However, the case raises questions regarding whether the UK Government is applying Public Interest 
Immunity ‘in a manner in line with its creation, or if it has been used merely to deny wrongdoing on 
behalf of the state.’429  Thus, whilst it has been argued that the state interest in preventing future 
terrorist attacks is necessarily strong, the use of the Control Principle must be questioned in a case 
where an equally involved court system reasons that ‘a democratically elected and accountable 
Government should have no rational objection to the release of the information at issue.’430 
 
The findings in this case underline the argument that a culture of secrecy may make it possible for the 
Government to withhold information about security agency activities or procedures that are legitimate 
matters of debate.  Thus, it is claimed that there is an, albeit delicate, balance to be drawn between 
ensuring proper democratic control of the intelligence and security sector and the distortion of 
intelligence findings which may support an expedient political option.
431
  
 
In the final analysis, therefore, perhaps oversight or scrutiny of the intelligence agencies cannot 
remain the preserve of the Government alone without inviting potential abuse.  Aside from their role 
in setting the legal framework, it is commonplace for parliaments to scrutinise all areas of state 
activity, including the security and intelligence agencies.  Parliamentary involvement gives legitimacy 
and democratic accountability.  It may also help to ensure that intelligence organisations are serving 
the state as a whole and protecting constitutional ideals, rather than narrower political or sectional 
interests.    
 
 
2.22 The Potential Effects of a Lack of Determined Opposition in Parliament 
 
The principle responsibility for laying bare the flaws in government policy lies with the parties in 
opposition. A well-led and organised opposition may do much within the existing system to insist on 
government accountability for its actions to the elected chamber. For example, effective use may be 
made of Question Time, which is a regular occasion upon which the government is formally and 
constitutionally required and obliged to account to Parliament for its management of the nation’s 
affairs. However, dissenting MP’s in a government's own party may also affect the decisions of 
ministers. Divisions in the ruling party make the government's management of the House much more 
difficult and the signs of disunity may affect its reputation in the country. As a consequence of these 
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combined forces, ministers may be influenced by comments made in debate. For example, a minister 
faced with a baying opposition and little support from his own party ‘may be unnerved and realise 
that he is not carrying members on either side with him.’432  This may cause him to moderate his 
approach or, in extreme cases, to reverse his position. On such an occasion ‘the debate-vote 
relationship may become important; the fear of defeat concentrating the minds of ministers.’433  The 
ruling party may wish to avoid defeats in the House, particularly where this would incur extensive 
publicity and adversely affect their standing in the eyes of the electorate. 
 
These mechanisms for effective parliamentary scrutiny rely on the notion that there is distinct and 
decisive opposition to any given measure.  However, where measures are taken in the name of 
national security, there is often a cross-party consensus of opinion. The problem here is that the result 
of a lack of resolute opposition means that Parliament has quite frequently shown a ‘readiness to 
accept a number of proposed statutory measures,’434 and that such measures, ‘did not in general 
encounter any determined criticism from the opposition.’435  It has been argued, for example, that the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, passed through Parliament relatively unhindered despite 
concerns that parts of it were likely to represent a major infringement of civil liberties.
436
  This Bill 
allowed for the indefinite detention, without trial, of suspected international terrorists.  In its original 
state, it also included measures that may not have been specifically terrorism related, such as 
proposals to create a new offence of incitement to religious hatred and new provisions for the police 
to compulsorily photograph criminal suspects – not just suspected terrorists. The Bill was a lengthy 
one – 126 clauses and eight lengthy schedules. It took the Government two months to prepare.  
Nevertheless, it has been claimed that it was ‘rushed through Parliament with almost indecent 
haste.’437  MP’s accepted a timetable of only 16 hours in which to scrutinise the Bill, and then they 
did not impose a single defeat on the Government.  The Common’s alleged ‘spineless performance’438 
in  relation to this Bill caused one commentator to remark: ‘In a long record of shaming fealty to 
whips, never have so many MP’s showed such utter negligence towards so impressive a list of 
                                                             
432 P. Norton, The Commons in Perspective, Blackwell, 1981, p119. 
433 P. Norton, The Commons in Perspective, Blackwell, 1981, p119. 
434 Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September, The 
Modern Law Review, Sep 2002, Vol. 65, Issue 5, p724-762. 
Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Cavendish, 2002, p96. 
435 Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September, The 
Modern Law Review, Sep 2002, Vol. 65, Issue 5, p724-762. 
Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Cavendish, 2002, p96 
436 Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September, The 
Modern Law Review, Sep 2002, Vol. 65, Issue 5, p724-762. 
Helen Fenwick, Public Law and Human Rights, Cavendish 2003, p270. 
437 Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, A Proportionate Response to 11 September,  The 
Modern Law Review, Sep 2002, Vol. 65, Issue 5, p724-762. Helen Fenwick, Public Law and Human Rights, Cavendish 
2003, p270. 
438 Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September, The 
Modern Law Review, Sep 2002, Vol. 65, Issue 5, p724-762.  Helen Fenwick, Public Law and Human Rights, Cavendish 
2003, p270. 
fundamental principles.’439 Indeed, in the event, it was the House of Lords (the political and the 
judicial wing), which finally challenged the proposals.  During its passage through Parliament, the 
Lords made 70 amendments to the Bill, several of which represented significant defeats for the 
Government.  Although most of these amendments were reversed when the Commons considered 
them, some last minute compromises were made.  For example, the original intention of the 
Government to extend Section 17 of Part III of the Public Order Act, which prohibits incitement to 
racial hatred, to include religious groups, was not included in the final Act of Parliament.
440
  With 
regard to judicial intervention, a later challenge to the Part 4 provisions which allowed the Secretary 
of State to detain, indefinitely and without trial, certain suspected foreign terrorists, was declared to be 
incompatible with the Human rights Act.  This was in spite of the fact that Parliament had declared 
these same provisions to be compatible with the Human Rights Act under Section 19, with very little 
opposition or debate.   
 
The reluctance of MP’s to challenge such legislation may be explained by the expectation that, in 
times of emergency, they should prefer the interests of the nation rather than more sectional causes. 
Events, such as the terror attack in the U.S. on 11th
 
September 2001, or the London bombings of 7th 
July 2005, may be interpreted as a national crisis in which, ‘central values are perceived to be at 
stake; that time is short; and that extraordinary measures are justified.’441  In these circumstances 
there may be an unwillingness of opposition parties to seem ‘soft’ on national security issues or 
disloyal to the UK’s best interests. Whilst the Government of the day may wish to be perceived as 
acting quickly and decisively in the face of a perceived national crisis, members of the opposition 
parties, mindful of their popularity, may not wish to oppose measures adopted in the name of security. 
Indeed, Leigh and Lustgarten note that critics opposing a particular measure involving national 
security may be placed at a deep disadvantage and can easily be either branded as unpatriotic or as 
actuated by hidden motives.
442
 
 
The obvious disadvantage of inter-party co-operation is that effective debate tends to be shut off and 
suitable legislative or policy alternatives may not be adequately considered. Un-debated national 
security legislation, and policy, may confer considerable leverage to the ruling party in Parliament, 
allowing them to cultivate hostile images at home and abroad in order to justify actions which may 
otherwise be more vigorously contested.  For example, Buzan notes that the call of national security 
may offer scope for power maximising strategies, such as a shift in resources to the military or 
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intensified political surveillance, which could have deep implications for the conduct of domestic 
political life.
443
  However, the debate on security matters has been recently re-opened.  The 
Government is considering possible amendments to six key counter-terrorism and security powers. 
These amendments include: reducing the length of time that a terrorist suspect can be detained before 
charge to 14 days;  preventing the alleged ‘indiscriminate use’444 of Section 44 stop and search 
powers; and limiting the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by Local Authorities 
by requiring that investigations be approved by a Magistrate. However, not all the proposals reflect a 
genuine commitment to liberties.  The Government also intends to extend the use of the controversial 
‘Deportation with Assurances’, which allegedly guarantee that deportees will not suffer inhumane 
treatment contrary to Art 3 of the European Convention on Human rights, by ‘actively pursuing 
deportation arrangement with more countries.’ 445 
 
 
2.23 Conclusion 
 
The functions of the security agencies are now based in statute. Under the Security Service Act 
1989,
446
 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the security agencies are tasked to protect the UK’s 
national security and foreign policy from threats emanating from espionage, terrorism, sabotage, 
subversion, serious criminal activity and the proliferation of WMD. The security agencies are also 
charged with protecting the UK’s economic well-being from potential or actual damage. The 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 has defined the different types of surveillance and the 
authorisation procedures that govern them.  These Acts were enacted in response to the growth in 
technological capabilities, and the need to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
They were also intended to alleviate public alarm that the security agencies were not adequately 
regulated in the wake of Peter Wright’s allegations that MI5 had ‘bugged and burgled its way around 
London.’447 
 
Defining and regulating the security agencies may serve two important functions.  Firstly, it sets 
boundaries that define when the security agencies may legitimately collect information and the 
measures that they may take to deter or neutralise threats to security. Since, no investigation or 
surveillance may be undertaken in relation to those who do not fall under the remit of the legal 
mandate, it follows that the narrower the mandate, the more limited the circumstances in which 
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individuals or groups may come under investigation. However,  it has been argued that neither the 
Security Service Act 1989, the Intelligence Services Act 1994, or the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000,  provide clear principles for the operation of the security agencies. Rather, it has 
been claimed that Britain has adopted a standpoint that has attempted to keep the legal mandate as 
unrestricted as possible.
448
  The result of a wide and ambiguous remit may be to leave the 
interpretation of the legal mandate to the security agencies, with little or no oversight into how 
decisions are made or investigations conducted.  This may give rise to the potential for officials to 
define their own power and could lead to abuses.  
 
The second important element of a suitably constricted legal framework is that it may provide some 
protection for the agencies themselves.  They may use the legal restrictions as a shield when pressured 
by others, particularly Ministers, to operate improperly.   However, there have been concerns that 
intelligence emanating from bodies, such as the JIC, may have become overly politicised. This 
possibility has been compounded by the way in which the Government used the JIC dossier to help 
inform domestic and international understanding of the need for stronger action in Iraq.  It is certainly 
worth noting that the JIC had never previously produced a public document, and no Government case 
for any international action had previously been made to the British public through explicitly drawing 
on a JIC publication.  For example, Michael Herman recalls the public profile on the last action to 
divide public opinion so sharply: The Suez Expedition of 1956.  Herman reports that ‘it never 
occurred to anyone…to quote the JIC in defence of policy or for critics to enquire what its threat 
assessment had been.’449 Of course, the antidote to this might be that the JIC operates within a much 
tighter ring of secrecy that prevents its material from being publicly utilised.  However, many would 
claim that democracy is better served where citizens understand the government process, as fully as 
possible, so that they can assess government decisions in the light of all the available facts. 
 
It seems, on the whole, that these two benefits are only real where the legal remit is clear in its 
objectives and scope so that it effectively defines the extent of security agency power. In this respect, 
it does seem that a number of key terms in the relevant Acts can be interpreted very widely.  
However, the security agency justification for a widely defined remit is that they face their tasks in an 
environment of constantly changing threats.   They also face them in an era where new technologies 
have vastly increased the capacity for the collection of information in many forms. The intelligence 
services are expected to provide timely information on all threats to national and international 
security. When they do not, they are accused of failure, and are often subjected to intense public 
scrutiny.  In the light of this, amendments that were proposed during the transition of the Acts through 
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Parliament, which were designed to pin down a more definitive definition, may have been justifiably 
resisted. As the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, claimed, ‘The definition has to be comprehensive.  
The House of Commons would not want to establish a description of functions that did not cover all 
areas in which the Security Service might, now or in the future, have to become involved.  If the 
House did that, it could create an intolerable position where the Security Service would be powerless 
to defend us or where there might be great pressure, and therefore, strains on the way the legislation 
was interpreted and understood.’450 
 
However, whilst it may necessary to define security in such a way as to provide a purposeful response 
to genuine threats to the nation’s security, opponents of these Acts have claimed that the mechanisms 
of accountability, which may limit the power of the security agencies, are inadequate. For most of 
these critics, the problem is that covert surveillance operations, conducted by the security agencies, 
may undermine key civil liberties and human rights, such as the right to privacy.  For these thinkers, 
the security of the citizen is only fully protected where there are suitable constitutional and legal 
safeguards in place that can ensure that the security agencies are prevented from abusing their powers. 
Indeed, it is claimed that without these safeguards: ‘Public trust in law enforcement, and in 
government more generally, will be eroded.’451  
Overall then, it appears that the question of whether these Acts are beneficial to the security of UK 
citizens may depend largely on the underpinning ideologies of those expressing a view on it.  For 
some, the Acts afford the security agencies an extensive and important remit, to protect the UK from 
genuine threats to its national security.  For others, the Acts may legalise arbitrary, and sometimes 
unnecessary, incursions into the lives and choices of individual citizens without suitable oversight 
mechanisms.   The following chapters will consider these underpinning ideologies in more detail in 
order to better understand the ideals that drive and shape the security discourse in the UK. The 
chapters will argue that neither of these one-sided perspectives takes full account the threats that face 
UK citizens.    
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CHAPTER THREE: LIBERAL APPROACHES TO DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will seek to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the civil liberties and human rights 
agenda as seen through the eyes of certain academic and human rights lawyers who promote the 
beliefs associated with classic liberalism.  It is important to understand the perceptions of these 
writers. In just the same way that politicians, the security agencies and their associated bodies, may be 
accused of being over-zealous in their ambition to protect the security interests of the UK, so may 
those who are passionate about liberal values, such as the protection of liberty and choice, be guilty of 
allowing their views to prejudice their outlook.  The point is that, when debating the perceived need to 
make the security agencies accountable for covert activity, those promoting the civil liberties agenda 
may tend to carry into their writings certain pre-determined assumptions and perceptions.  The 
consequence of this is that all subsequent information may be filtered and processed through these 
assumptions and the resultant belief is likely to reflect this strongly.  
 
In order to fully understand the ideologies of many civil libertarian thinkers, it is first necessary to 
examine and understand their core and overlapping value system. This chapter will examine the key 
principles that may underpin typical forms of liberal thinking, and more particularly, those principles 
which may influence, or be influenced by, the operations of the intelligence agencies. However, it is 
worth noting from the outset that liberalism is not one simple, undifferentiated doctrine.  As with 
other doctrines and ideologies, there are many varieties of liberalism.  For example, although liberals 
tend to agree on certain fundamental principles, such as the primacy of individual freedom and 
individual choice, the application of that idea has not remained fixed or immovable over the years.  As 
liberals have perceived new and different challenges to their notions of liberty, so they have tended to 
change their perspective and emphasis.  Initially liberals concentrated on securing the liberty of the 
person and basic legal rights,
452
 moving later to freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and 
freedom of association.  The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of the so called 
‘new liberalism.’  Some liberals began to see a perceived need to promote the cause of liberty in the 
area of social and material conditions and to work for freedom from poverty, disease and poor 
physical surroundings.
453
 Most recently, the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
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incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, may have ensured that 
liberal concepts of freedom are undergoing a period of major change and expansion in the UK.   
 
Since liberalism has been expressed in a variety of ways over the years, it is necessary that this 
chapter confines itself to the areas of liberal thought that are affected by the formation and expression 
of the security agenda. To this end, whilst the chapter will begin with an analysis of the general liberal 
principle of free choice, the remainder of the chapter will concentrate on liberal perceptions regarding 
the nature of the relationship between the individual and the institutions of state, such as the security 
agencies. The chapter will analyse the twin concepts of negative and positive liberty.  It will also 
describe the constitutional guarantees, such as adherence to the rule of law, which liberals perceive as 
being essential for the exercise of good governance.   
 
 
3.2 Liberalism and the Individual 
 
Perhaps, the core for classical liberalism is a belief in individual freedom as the most effective means 
of catering for the social, economic, cultural and political health of a country and especially its 
citizens. Liberalism, therefore, tends to embody a viewpoint which assigns supreme importance to 
personal liberty and individual choice and responsibility.  This, it seems, includes the rights of 
individuals to choose how to live their lives; to exercise personal autonomy; and to follow their own 
conceptions of the greatest good.  For example, Mill in his essay ‘On Liberty,’454 develops and 
defends the ideal which he describes as that of ‘the free development of individuality.’455  Mill was 
particularly concerned with the freedom of the individual to make personal choices. In making 
choices the distinctively human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental 
activity and moral preference are exercised.  Mill asserted that: 'He who chooses his plan for himself 
employs all his faculties.  He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, 
activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness 
and self control to hold to his deliberate decision.’456 Men who make choices develop what Mill calls 
a 'character': their desires and feelings are the products of their own conscious choices and are not the 
passively generated products of external factors.
457
  For Mill, those who are unable, or who refuse to 
exercise their human capacity for choice have lost or surrendered that which is distinctively human. 
Mill compares such people with apes, cattle, with sheep, and with steam engines.   
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 Mill’s concept of individuality is opposed to the blind submission of oneself to the customs and 
traditions of one's society. The right choice for each individual depends upon the sort of person he is, 
and hence it may vary from individual to individual. Thus, Mill asserts, ‘The individual is not 
accountable to society for his actions, insofar as these concern the interests of no person but 
himself.’458  In this way, liberalism claims to accord pluralistic and non-judgemental tolerance of any 
lifestyle or group preferences.  It tends to be strongly opposed to a determinist view of life. Rather, it 
holds that men and women are morally free and are able to influence events for good or ill through 
their freely held ideas.  As Jo Grimond puts it, liberalism ‘must start from the position that only the 
actions and states of mind of individuals voluntarily arrived at can have value.’459  Liberty then, is a 
condition of self-rule in which thought and behaviour are supposedly governed by reason and 
conscience rather than by blind obedience to externally imposed authorities or slavish obedience to 
habit prejudice or custom.  
 
 
3.3 Liberal Individualism and its Effect on Security Measures 
 
In a liberal climate of individual free choice, attempts by Government, its agencies or by society to 
suppress the opinions of others, no matter how odious or repugnant, may be considered undesirable 
where they do not result in harm or injury to others.
460
 Thus, it is typically argued that it is not for the 
security agencies or politicians to impose their political and moral will upon the citizen.
461
 The rights 
of individuals to choose how to live their lives and exercise personal autonomy should be essential 
considerations within the security policy and decision making context.
462
 Liberals tend to resist all 
attempts by the state or society to impose supposedly higher standards that are in the 'best interests' of 
individuals that may contradict their own preferences.
463
  Instead, liberals encourage argument and 
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debate in order to seek the widest possible dissemination of ideas and opinions.  There is a conviction 
that out of free debate each person will find his own personal truth. 
464
   
 
In practice, the drive towards free debate means that liberals may be much less inclined than the 
security agencies or politicians to perceive non-violent political activity, for example, subversion or 
public protest, as a potential threat to security.
465
 For liberals, supposed subversives may merely be 
seeking to bring forward their own aspirations for political and social change and should not be 
subject to state interference.
466
 As Leigh and Lustgarten suggest, however bizarre and unusual the 
vision of certain domestic groups may be, they are ultimately concerned with what is good for their 
fellow citizens, and therefore, ‘All forms of domestic political activity, free of violence, should be kept 
firmly outside the remit of the security institutions.’467 This outlook suggests that even political 
campaigning, which may be widely interpreted by the  public or governmental bodies in terms of civil 
disobedience, is unlikely to be seen in this way by libertarian thinkers. For example, libertarian 
groups, such as Liberty, claim that a ‘person does not give up their fundamental rights even by 
committing a crime that warrants a custodial sentence.’468  Whilst Liberty accepts that crime may 
necessitate forfeiture of the right to liberty, other rights including the right to a fair trial, and the 
prohibition on cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, are thought to be absolute and should be 
upheld without bias by decision-makers.
469
  For liberals, the government should be both bound by the 
rule of law and limited in scope.
470
  Its role is merely that of an ‘umpire,’471 which upholds an 
impartial framework of law and order within which individuals may safely pursue their private 
concerns.
472
 
 
Concerns regarding the impartiality of decision-making procedures within the security agencies rose 
to the surface in the 1980’s. These concerns may have come in response to a series of revelations 
about MI5 activity that suggested that the Service was contravening the Maxwell-Fyfe order to be 
'absolutely free from political bias', and that its choice of targets included individuals and groups that 
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were merely opposed to government policy.
473
 Whilst much of the controversy surrounded Peter 
Wright’s allegations that MI5 ‘bugged and burgled its way around London,’474 it is noteworthy that 
others in the Service were also making similar claims. In April 1984, Michael Bettaney, a young 
officer in the counter-espionage branch, was found guilty of attempting to pass secrets to the 
Russians.  Following his conviction, Bettaney used a prepared statement which, amongst other things, 
alleged that MI5 cynically manipulated the definition of subversion so as to investigate and interfere 
with the provisions of legitimate political parties, the Trade Union Movement and other progressive 
organisations.
475
  Whilst the statement, which was full of pseudo-soviet rhetoric, was widely 
discounted as an attempt by Bettaney to justify his attempted treachery, the debate led two of 
Bettaney's former colleagues to complain that he was not alone.  One of these was Cathy Massiter, 
who claimed to have left MI5 ‘after becoming increasingly at odds with myself over the nature of the 
work and its justification.’476  Massiter alleged that she and other MI5 officers had been violating the 
rules against political bias in the Service in an operation against the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND). It transpired that in March 1983, Michael Heseltine, the Defence Secretary, had 
set up an organisation called Defence Secretariat 19 (DS19), to counter CND unilateralist propaganda.  
The unit approached MI5 for information on CND activists, and Massiter was ordered to help it.  
Massiter claimed that it began to seem like ‘what the Security Service was being asked to do was to 
provide information on a party political issue.’477  The Labour Party had, at that time, adopted 
unilateral disarmament as a policy, and a general election was due. In addition to these allegations, 
Massiter also described how any union taking strike action would routinely be subjected to MI5 
surveillance.  She further claimed that two prominent members of the National Council for Civil 
Liberties, Harriet Harman and Patricia Hewitt, who both later became leading Labour politicians, had 
been subject to an MI5 investigation.   
For many civil libertarian thinkers, surveillance measures should not be used to secure political 
goals.
478
 Rather, liberals may argue that legislation and policy, even that which may be considered to 
be imperative for security reasons, should ensure that the law and the manner in which it is enforced is 
in keeping with the tenets of the rule of law.
479
  The problem, they claim, is that whenever the security 
agencies initiate covert investigations, then certain fundamental political freedoms, such as the right to 
peaceful protest and freedom of speech, may be violated along with the right to privacy.
480
 In the eyes 
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of these thinkers, such rights are generally considered to be absolute and should not be undermined by 
government, particularly for party political reasons, rather than for investigating crime or violence.
481
  
The result of this thinking is that legislative and operative measures introduced in the name of security 
have sometimes been criticised by civil libertarians on several grounds. Firstly, civil libertarians may 
claim that the measure does not contain sufficient safeguards and mechanisms of accountability.  For 
example, measures allowing for an increase in special police powers, such as surveillance measures or 
extended detention powers, are often claimed to have a detrimental effect on judicial safeguards such 
as the presumption of innocence; the right to a defence; and the right to be tried by an independent 
and impartial tribunal.
482
  With regard to surveillance measures, civil libertarians may argue that the 
legislative or operational method used should be proportionate to the gravity of the threat posed, and 
the probability of its occurrence. This effectively means that the necessity of the planned action 
should be weighed against possible damage to civil liberties, including the right to political dissent, 
and the extent of the proposed action should be kept to a minimum.
483
  Even where surveillance action 
is genuinely appropriate, it should fully comply with the rule of law.  Therefore only the least 
intrusive technique should be adopted - the more intrusive the surveillance technique, the higher the 
authority that should be able to approve its use.
484
   
Secondly, civil libertarian thinkers may argue that legislative measures are drafted too widely.  They 
may claim that it is crucial that any enabling legislation should be precise and clearly framed since 
those defined as a security risk may be subject to a raft of control and surveillance measures.
485
 Helen 
Fenwick, for example, has noted that the recent widening of the definition of terrorism, under the 
Terrorism Act 2000, may mean that law enforcers have gained increased powers to target certain 
forms of lawful dissent and protest for investigation.
486
  The 2000 Act provides that terrorism means 
the use or threat of action ‘for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’ or 
action ‘designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public.’487  
For Fenwick, political, religious or ideological causes may arise in the context of a wide range of 
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demonstrations and other forms of legitimate protest, such as industrial action.
488
  Moreover, since the 
definition expressly covers threats of serious disruption or damage to, for example, computer 
installations or public utilities, there is no specific necessity that the action is violent, or even that it is 
a threat only to the public. Thus, Fenwick claims that control and surveillance can potentially be 
directed against dissenting individuals who merely pose a threat to the election chances of the 
government of the day.
489
    
Overall, the problem for these thinkers is that an expanse of security related legislation, along with an 
unclear definition of, for example, terrorism or subversion, may leave too much to the discretion of 
the security agencies and other law enforcers.
490
  It may be claimed that where the security agency 
remit is too broad, there exists the potential for abuse, either by parliamentarians seeking to apply 
pressure to the security agencies or by the security agencies themselves. They argue that as legal 
definitions of the types of activity which may prompt a covert investigation become wider, the range 
of targets may tend to grow correspondingly.
491
  It is fair to say that such claims may not be without 
foundation. There have been occasions where surveillance measures may have been introduced with 
seemingly little consideration of any safeguard to prevent their misuse.   
Since it is claimed that the current legislative programme for preventing terrorism and violence does 
not always provide adequate safeguards against government abuses of power, civil libertarians may 
call for an increased resort to traditional liberal principles. These principles may require that the 
security agencies adhere to the rule of law and effect adequate control and oversight mechanisms. For 
liberals, constitutional principles such as the rule of law are fundamental tenets of a just society.
492
  
The point is that, in the liberal ideal, legislation should be drafted in a manner which is clear, 
ascertainable and prospective and the power of the state should be limited. 
493
  
    
The remainder of this chapter will explore liberal perceptions of the state.  The discussion will include 
an examination of the liberal concept of negative liberty, in which the state’s role in the lives of 
individual citizens is to be kept to a minimum. It will also examine the relationship between liberalism 
and democracy and the rule of law.   
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3.4 Liberalism and the Limits of the State  
 
Many political thinkers, including liberals, regard the state and some form of government as a 
worthwhile or necessary association.  They have, however, profoundly disagreed about the exact role 
that the state should play in society.  For liberals, whilst civil society may embrace those areas of life 
in which individuals are free to exercise choice and make their own decisions, the state may 
necessarily reflect sovereign, compulsory and coercive behaviour.
494
 Thus, liberalism has historically 
been a continuous protest against restrictions on the self determined actions of individuals, in which 
the state’s proper role is restricted to the maintenance of domestic order, the enforcement of contracts, 
and the protection of society against external attack.
495
  It has been characterised by an insistence on 
the rights of the individual against attempts by government to interfere with religious, moral, cultural, 
economic or political choices and actions, provided that those actions were performed within an 
agreed framework of rules, which applied impartially to all and which, though they guaranteed 
procedures, were neutral as to substance or ends. 
496
  
 
Liberals have tended to justify this challenge to excessive government power by appealing to 
universal principles.  Individuals are claimed to come into the world with certain inalienable and 
natural rights in that they are endowed with an innate capacity to manage their economic, religious 
and other affairs. John Locke, for example, claimed that human beings are born ‘in a state of perfect 
freedom, to order their actions and dispose of their possessions, as they see fit.’497  Liberals have 
traditionally emphasised that human beings are essentially self-interested and largely self-sufficient 
and, therefore, as far as possible, should be responsible for their own lives and circumstances.
498
  
Rights such as freedom of speech, religious worship and assembly, constitute a ‘private sphere’ which 
should be untouched, particularly by government.
499
  Thus, actions, such as covert surveillance 
operated by the security agencies, which may impinge of this ‘private sphere’, may be viewed with 
suspicion by some liberals.
500
  Rather, in order to prevent unnecessary interference, the liberal 
doctrine tends to favour a system of minimal intervention into the lives and choices of individuals and 
one in which liberty is understood in terms of negative freedoms.  
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 3.5 Negative Liberty 
 
Hobbes may have been the first to present an unequivocally negative concept of freedom.  Hobbes 
defined liberty as the absence of external impediments to motion,
501
 and as 'a silence of the laws.’502  
However, the classic formulation of the doctrine may be found in Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of 
Liberty’.503  Berlin defined negative freedom as ‘an area within which a man can act unobstructed by 
others.’504 In Berlin’s words ‘Liberty in the negative sense involves an answer to the question: What is 
the area in which the subject – a person or groups of persons – should be left to do or be what he is 
able to do or be?’505  For Berlin, the answer to this question is that there should be a private zone that 
is marked out or set aside in which a person can exercise personal liberty and individual autonomy. 
The individual is to be left alone to exercise his own desires and choices without external coercion.  
Thus, in Berlin’s conception, freedom is a property of individuals and consists of a realm of 
unimpeded action. A person is free to the extent that he is able to do things as he wishes – speak, 
worship, travel, marry – without these activities being blocked by other people.   For Berlin, an 
individual is unfree if he ‘is prevented by others from doing what he would otherwise do.’506  
 
One major justification for minimising intervention into the lives of individuals, for liberals, may be a 
fear of a possible ‘tyranny of the majority’,507 including a majority religious or moral view.508   Mill, 
for example, was conscious of the damage that could be done by an over mighty state.  Public power, 
for Mill, had to be limited by absolute natural rights, which pre-dated any particular consensus or 
majority view.  Here, rights may be defined as a ‘protective buffer or shield’, that operates between 
the private zone of individualism and free choice, and the public zone of state intervention, which is 
often seen as a source of intrusive, arbitrary and bureaucratic action.  
 
In his essay ‘On Liberty’, Mill listed three major objections to government intervention. Firstly, that 
generally speaking, those people personally interested in any business were the best people to manage 
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it. Secondly, that even where something could not be handled better by individuals than by the 
government, it was preferable that it should be done by the individual, as a means to their own mental 
education. And thirdly, that ‘every function superadded to those already exercised by the government 
causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts the active and 
ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government.’509 For Mill, therefore, the state 
should not impose on its citizens a preferred way of life, even for their own good, because doing so 
will reduce the sum of human happiness.   
 
Mill’s arguments suggest that the case for minimal intervention is based very firmly upon faith in the 
human individual and, in particular, in human rationality.  Free from interference, coercion and even 
guidance, individuals are more able to make their own decisions and fashion their own lives.
510
  The 
result of this may be, as Bentham argues, the greatest happiness for the greatest number, simply 
because individuals are the only people who can be trusted to identify their own interests.
511
 Any form 
of paternalism, however well intentioned, may rob the individual of responsibility for his or her own 
life and so may infringe upon liberty. This is not to argue that left to their own devices individuals 
will not make mistakes, both intellectual and moral, but simply to say that if they are in a position to 
learn from their mistakes, they have a better opportunity to develop and grow as human beings.
512
  In 
short, morality can never be taught or imposed: it can only arise through voluntary action. Indeed, 
where moral principles are enforced over personal desires, Berlin describes the individual as 
potentially coerced or even enslaved.
513
   
 
Coercion in a citizen's life or liberty may come from individuals or groups wishing to force (rather 
than persuade) other free individuals to adopt a particular dogma or viewpoint. It may also come from 
the state and its institutions, including the security and intelligence agencies. These agencies employ 
various devices and techniques of covert surveillance that may necessitate intrusion into the personal 
and private lives of individuals. Whilst liberals may accept that the state has a duty to preserve 
national security and to prevent and detect serious crime, they may argue that respect for the value of 
individual privacy is a central principle in a democratic society.
514
  For liberals, a private sphere of life 
may allow the individual the ability and space to make rational choices free from state 
encroachment.
515
 For example, the internal affairs of ideological protest movements, business, unions 
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and a variety of other groups and movements may require privacy to protect their organisational 
life.
516
  Unless such groups have wide scope to formulate and test their ideas without intrusive 
surveillance by the government, the police and the security agencies, an essential precondition for 
effective democratic society may be destroyed.  The point is that when individuals fear that their 
personal space may be invaded by the state, it may provoke an atmosphere in which people practice 
self-censorship. For example, Leigh and Lustgarten maintain that ‘the knowledge, or even widespread 
belief, that one’s words will be heard by someone else other than those to whom one wishes to speak 
is stultifying and may create a society of timid, furtive creatures.’517   Such interference raises the 
spectre of the 'big brother' state and as Leigh and Lustgarten argue:  ‘No more odious a society can be 
imagined than one in which no one dares to speak his or her true thoughts, even in private, for fear 
that state officials will learn of them.’518  
 
Whilst liberals may agree that a ‘big brother’ state should be avoided, the traditional ideal of minimal 
intervention has been criticised by some modern liberals who advocate a ‘positive’ model of rights 
protection.
519
 Those advocating positive freedom have argued that, when individuals are simply ‘left 
alone’, they may fall prey to economic misfortune or to the arbitrary justice of the market. This would 
leave them in no position to make rational and informed choices.  Lack of material resources may 
amount to the ‘freedom to starve’. For some modern liberal thinkers this has provided a justification 
for social welfare.  The welfare state may be seen as enlarging freedom by empowering individuals, 
and freeing them from the social evils that blight their lives - unemployment, homelessness, poverty, 
ignorance, disease and so forth.  Amongst the first to adopt this view was T.H. Green.  He defined 
freedom as the ability of people 'to make the most and the best of themselves.’520  This freedom 
consists not only in being left alone but in having the effective power to act.  Such a conception shifts 
the attention towards the opportunities available to each individual, and is more concerned with the 
distribution of material and economic resources that are linked to welfarism and state intervention.   
 
However, the positive conception of freedom may be diametrically opposed to the liberal strategy of 
non-interference because the guarantee social and economic safety valves may necessitate the 
forfeiture of certain rights of free choice and privacy.  For the state to administer welfare objectives 
effectively, it needs to collect information about its citizens with which to facilitate some of its 
functions, and this may impinge upon the right to privacy. Whilst liberals may accept that there is a 
public interest in the fair and accurate recording of information that would protect the efficient 
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running of public services, such as the NHS, they may be less enthusiastic about the creation and 
storage of files held by the security agencies, or the introduction of ID cards.
521
  Some indication of 
the number of active files operated by the security agencies is found in the annual reports produced by 
the Intelligence Services Commissioner.  According to the Commissioner, a total of 2032 warrants 
and authorisations were approved across the intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence in 
2014.
522
  It is also noteworthy that the number of other personal files, used for general law 
enforcement purposes, has grown significantly in recent years. For example, in 2013, the police held 
the profiles of 5,716,085 individuals on the National DNA database.
523
  Many of these profiles have 
been obtained from citizens with no criminal record.
524
 The contents of such files and databases may 
potentially be used against the individual’s interest. For example, the information could be used to 
affect career choices. In the past, files held by the security agencies have played a significant role in 
certain security vetting procedures which may affect a wide range of jobs in the UK.  Security vetting 
applies to senior staff in a range of government departments and to some private sector employees 
working on government contracts.
525
  
 
For these reasons and others, some liberal academics
526
 and politicians
527
 may reject the ‘positive’ 
conception of rights protection, preferring individuals to make their own decisions and to expand the 
realm of personal responsibility.
528
  For others, state intervention tends to be viewed as only necessary 
when it ‘helps individuals to help themselves.’  Once social disadvantage and hardship are abolished, 
citizens should be left alone to take responsibility for their own lives.  In this way welfarism can be 
embraced, whilst the liberal preference for negative liberty, secured by minimal intervention, still 
stands.
529
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3.6 Negative Liberty and Security 
 
Perhaps the result of limiting the state to a minimal role is that it may be confined to a ‘night 
watchman’ type function, whose services are only called upon when orderly existence is threatened. 
This leaves the state with only three important functions. Firstly, the state must maintain domestic 
order, in effect, protecting individual citizens from one another.  Thus, states must possess some kind 
of machinery for upholding law and order. Secondly, it is necessary to ensure that the voluntary 
agreements or contracts, which private individuals enter into are respected, which requires that they 
can be enforced through a court system.  Thirdly, there may be a need to provide protection from the 
possibility of external attack, necessitating some form of armed service. 
 
To the extent of protecting these imperatives, liberals may express a preference for the continued 
existence of the state – the state is no longer a threat to individual rights and free choice – it is a 
container for security which protects its citizens from internal violence and external invasion. In other 
words, the state provides for the physical survival of its citizens by shielding them from what Hobbes 
described as a life ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.’530  However, in addition to protecting 
citizens from hostile forces, liberals may add two further elements which they allege are vital 
components of security for the citizen.  Firstly, ‘that the governing institutions be those of a 
constitutional democracy,’531 and secondly, ‘that the basic human rights of the citizens are 
respected.’532 For liberals, the state and its institutions should not merely consist of ‘any machinery 
capable of exercising control over the population at a particular time,’533 because that would ‘permit 
government by decree and torture chamber to be included.’534 Rather, for liberals, the citizen may 
only enjoy personal security within the framework of life in a nation which can maintain a number of 
fundamental preconditions. These, it seems, must include a constitutionally limited government, 
which upholds civil and political rights, including free speech and privacy, along with due process 
rights within the legal system.
535
 Thus, whilst liberals may accept that there is a need to meet national 
security imperatives, they may claim that measures taken in pursuit of these imperatives, whether 
legal or operational, must be compatible with established definitions of fundamental rights.
536
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For those associated with the civil liberties agenda, the human rights values and safeguards for basic 
liberties, which are embodied in domestic and international laws,  are often claimed to possess a 
universal value - they are a predetermined and unchanging collection of standards that should not be 
subject to adaptation or modification.
537
  On this basis, it is argued that the protection of civil liberties 
should not be compromised, even by those legal, administrative and institutional measures that, at a 
political or even civilian level, are claimed to be urgently necessary to combat threats such as 
terrorism.
538
 Thus the government and the security agencies should justify and legitimise their 
activities and powers. For liberals, this may be better achieved where they exercise constitutional 
propriety, adhere to the rule of law and effect adequate control and oversight mechanisms.
539
  Such 
values demand that the citizen should be able to feel confident that surveillance and interception by 
the state, is undertaken for appropriate ends, by proportionate means, and with respect for privacy.
540
  
Liberal appeals to the rule of law are intended to ensure that issues relating to national security are 
decided on the basis of objective rules that hold the government to account. 
 
 
3.7 The Rule of Law and Security:  A Liberal Conception 
 
The rule of law may be interpreted either as a ‘philosophy’ or a ‘political theory’, which lays down 
fundamental requirements for law, or as a ‘procedural device’, by which those with power rule under 
law.   The essence of the rule of law is that of the sovereignty or supremacy of law over man.  The 
rule of law insists that every person – irrespective of rank or status in society – be subject to the law.  
For the citizen the rule of law is both ‘prescriptive’ – dictating the conduct required by the law, and 
‘protective’ of citizens – demanding that the government act according to law. In liberal democracies 
the general assumption is that adherence to the doctrine requires more than simply government 
according to law.  The concept of the rule of law implies an acceptance that law itself represents a 
‘good’: That law, and its governance, is a demonstrable asset to society. In other words, the rule of 
law is only meaningful in a society which exhibits the features of a democratically elected, 
responsible – and responsive – government, and a separation of powers that will result in a judiciary 
which is independent of government.  From the vantage point of liberal thought, the rule of law is 
seen as ensuring the minimum rules in society to enable man to fulfil his life plan according to law, 
but with the minimum interference of law. 
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A classical British conception of the rule of law may be found in Dicey’s ‘Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution.’541  Dicey’s view of the rule of law emphasises liberal assertions that 
government power should be restrained - The government should not possess discretionary power and 
no-one, including state officials, should be above the law. Rather, there should be legal controls, 
which prevent the abuse of power, including adequate redress in the courts where official discretion or 
legal rules have been misused or unlawfully applied.  The ensuing paragraphs will illuminate the 
meaning Dicey’s conception of the rule of law in the light of the way in which it may affect liberal 
conceptions of security.   
 
 
3.8 The Absence of Discretionary Power.  
 
The first aspect of Dicey’s conception of the rule of law is that, 'Englishmen are ruled by the law and 
the law alone; a man may… be punished for a breach of law, but he may be punished for nothing 
else.’542  In other words, penalties should only be imposed on an individual where a breach of an 
established legal rule has been proved in the ordinary courts of law.  Achieving this, it seems, 
requires: ‘The absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law, as opposed to the influence of 
arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the government.’543 In this conception, the government should 
not have any right to create secret, arbitrary or retrospective penal law, nor should public officials be 
allowed a wide degree of choice in terms of when and how powers should be used.
544
  
 
Raz, for example, advocated that there should be clear rules and procedures for making laws.
545
  Raz 
claimed that laws should also be prospective, stable and clear.  In other words, laws should not be 
changed too frequently, because lack of awareness of the law prevents one from being guided by it.  
For these thinkers, governmental activities are to be confined as narrowly as possible, whilst the 
individual is left to pursue his or her own destiny with the minimum of regulation and interference. 
Excessive governmental power may represent a potential threat to the traditional personal and 
proprietary rights of the individual, and as John Locke claimed, ‘where law ends, tyranny begins.’546  
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Whilst it is clear that the modern state could not function efficiently without a wide range of 
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over the extent to which such powers are subject to adequate parliamentary and judicial controls. 
Perhaps even those who accept a more dominant, influential, or even authoritarian role from 
government, may seek effective controls by which to prevent the abuse of discretion, and ways in 
which to ensure that official power is exercised fairly.  Thus, in recent years there have been concerns 
that powers of surveillance and communications interception are routinely used to detect even the 
most trivial of offences, such as dog fouling and littering, rather than protecting the public from 
serious crime and terrorism. For example, Sir Paul Kennedy
547
  reported that 122 local authorities had 
sought communications records to identify offenders such as rogue traders, fly tippers and 
fraudsters.
548
  Kennedy has not been alone in his concern. Sir Christopher Rose, the Surveillance 
Commissioner, has also reported a rise in the number of public authorities using their powers of 
surveillance,
549
 including trading standards and those dealing with antisocial behaviour.
550
 Finally, 
John Major has expressed concerns regarding his perceived ‘down grading of personal privacy,’551 
and the ease in which warrants for surveillance are issued. He reminds us that ‘these days, a police 
superintendent can authorise bugging in public places. A chief constable can authorise bugging in 
our homes or cars. The Home Secretary can approve telephone tapping and the interception of our 
letters and e-mails.’552 
Indeed, such has been the concern regarding the way in which the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 may have been misused, the Government has been prompted to introduce legislative change.  
The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, to 
ensure that Local Authorities seek judicial approval from a Magistrate before obtaining and disclosing 
communications data.553  The Act also contains provisions instructing the Secretary of State to prepare 
a code of practice on the use of closed-circuit television.(CCTV)554  This code of practice is to include 
guidance on a range of considerations including: the development of CCTV cameras; the means of 
access to, and disclosure of, the information obtained; and guidance for procedures on complaints.555  
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In response to the introduction of the measures, Liberty stated that it was ‘pleased to see restrictions 
on the disproportionate and intrusive use of surveillance powers.’556 However, whilst liberty accepted 
that these developments in the law may represent a significant step forward, they have claimed that 
more still needs to be done to enable the Act to ‘live up to its ambitious title.’557 Liberty expressed 
particular disappointment that the Act did not do more the remedy the use of the ‘mosquito device.’558 
This device gives off a high-pitched noise that is designed to be uncomfortable and unpleasant. It can 
generally only be heard by children who are more sensitive to high pitched sounds.  It seems that 
whilst the device was originally produced to scare off vermin, ‘it is now used by some shopkeepers 
and councils to drive off children and teenagers.’559 For libertarian thinkers, excessive surveillance or 
other measures used to combat crime or public nuisance, may represent an abuse of discretionary 
power in that they are both disproportionate and that they may affect those that are not committing 
any criminal offence. For civil libertarians, such measures should be declared unlawful either by 
statute or by the courts.   
 
 
4.9  Equality Before the Law  
 
The second element of Dicey's analysis of the rule of law concerns the notion of ‘equality before the 
law’, and ‘the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land as administered by the 
ordinary law courts.’560 As Thomas Paine puts it: ‘the law is king’.’561  For these writers, the rule of 
law has universal application.  There should be no one to whom the law does not apply, or who can 
ignore its constraints.  All should be bound by the law, and held rigorously to account in accordance 
with the law, when they do not uphold it.  This emphasises the notion that everyone, irrespective of 
rank, whether official or individual, is to be subject to the law and to the same courts.  This suggests, 
of course, that the government itself is bound by the ordinary law and that the courts should not 
unduly favour the government over the citizen.  
 
However, it may not be true to say, either then or now, that English law treats those in government in 
exactly the same way as private citizens. The idea of equality before the law, irrespective of status, is 
subject to many exceptions.  Thus, so far as equal powers are concerned, liberals may recognise that 
the government and its organs, including the security agencies, have legal authority to exercise 
powers over and above the citizen. This will include instigating covert surveillance methods and 
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accessing personal data files that would not be available to the ordinary citizen.   In addition, the 
Crown enjoys immunities under the law, and the Government acting in the name of the Crown, may 
exercise prerogative powers which may defeat the rights of individuals.
562
 Perhaps then, what a 
constitutional guarantee of equality before the law may achieve is to enable legislation to be 
invalidated, or changed, if it distinguishes between citizens on grounds which are considered 
irrelevant, unacceptable or offensive. For example, improper discrimination on the grounds of race, 
sex, origin or colour.  However, Dicey had no such jurisdiction in mind.  The specific meaning that he 
attached to equality before the law is that all citizens (including government officials) were subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts should they transgress the law which applied to them, and that 
there should be no separate administrative court.  
 
However, Dicey’s conception of the rule of law has been the subject of a number of criticisms.  
Perhaps, the problem is that Dicey’s understanding of the rule of law is distinctive to the British 
system of government and it has been argued that Britain offers a particularly poor example of the 
rule of law. Firstly, as noted above, parliamentary supremacy, which is a core principle of Britain’s 
un-codified constitution, may violate the very idea of the rule of law.  It is difficult to suggest that the 
law ‘rules’ if the legislature itself is not bound by external constraints. Secondly, the absence of a Bill 
of Rights also means that individual liberties may not enjoy the protection afforded to citizens in 
countries where there is a written constitution. Finally, an unclear separation of powers, and a 
seeming growth of executive power, may mean that state officials have more choice about when, and 
on what terms, powers are used. The UK’s constitutional arrangements affect the way in which 
security related legislation is dealt with by Parliament and the security agencies. Therefore, this topic 
needs to be analysed in more detail.    The discussion will trace some typical liberal thoughts 
regarding the nature of parliamentary power.  It will then be possible to examine some of the modern 
ramifications of the supremacy doctrine, particularly where it affects civil liberties and security 
related legislation.   
 
 
3.9.1 Parliamentary Supremacy  
 
Dicey claimed that Parliament has the power to make or unmake any law whatsoever; that Parliament 
cannot be bound by its predecessors, nor can it bind its successors, and that there is no court which 
can question the validity of an Act of Parliament.
563
  Thus, it is claimed that Parliament enjoys a 
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‘comprehensive and exclusive power of lawmaking’564 and that ‘its laws are not to be changed or 
unmade.’565 
 
Dicey, argued that the power of Parliament is justified because its supreme power to create law is 
‘firmly embedded within a conception of self-correcting majoritarian democracy.’566 Dicey believed 
that, whilst Parliament is the legal sovereign, political sovereignty rests with the electorate, who may 
dispense with a ruling party that fails to implement popular law and policy. Thus, whilst Parliament 
has supreme law making capacity, it is not truly unlimited. Firstly, new ‘power giving’ legislation 
must be passed through Parliament where it can be subjected to scrutiny, debate and possible 
amendment. Secondly, Parliament is to be equal before the law – it must subject itself to the law that 
it has created, at least to the extent that it has not enacted changes or repeals. Thirdly, Parliament must 
also subject itself to a system of democratic accountability in the form of elections.
567
 
 
However, it has been argued that Dicey’s views were premised upon certain assumptions concerning 
representative democracy, which were misconceived and which failed to take account of important 
political developments occurring, even at the time he was writing.
568
  Whilst Dicey’s principle of 
government according to law stresses the importance of legal authority and form for the acts of 
government, the British system is one in which, as Dicey himself put it, Parliament can ‘make or 
unmake any law whatsoever.’569 Since a valid Act of Parliament may not be questioned by the 
Judiciary, seemingly unconstitutional legislation cannot be over-turned in the courts. In the absence of 
constitutional guarantees for individual rights, the need for legal authority does not necessarily protect 
individual rights from legislative invasion. As Jennings asserts, ‘in England, the administration has 
powers limited by legislation, but the powers of the legislature are not limited at all.  There is still, it 
may be argued, a rule of law, but the law is that the law may at any moment be changed.’570    
 
This ability of Parliament to enact or repeal ‘any law whatsoever’571 may have been exacerbated by 
the dominance of the executive in Parliament.  Indeed, in this respect, it has been suggested that the 
UK Parliamentary system is akin to an elected dictatorship.  The term ‘elective dictatorship’ was 
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made famous by Lord Hailsham
572
 in the Richard Dimbleby Lecture in 1976.
573
 The term refers to the 
fact that the legislative programme of Parliament is determined by the Government, and Government 
Bills virtually always pass the House of Commons because of the nature of the majoritarian ‘first past 
the post’ electoral system, which almost always produces a strong Government.  This executive 
dominance, claimed Hailsham, is compounded by the Parliament Acts
574
 and Salisbury Convention
575
 
which can circumscribe the House of Lords and their ability to block Government initiatives.  Thus, 
the absence of a codified constitution and the imposition of party discipline, which often ensures a 
loyal vote for the ruling party in Parliament, may mean that Government initiated policy or legislation 
is rarely adequately challenged, and Parliament is dominated by the executive.   
 
The point is that, the rule of law may have less value if the Government is able to obtain the requisite 
power to ‘do as it pleases’ from a compliant legislature. Indeed, in recent years, the Government has 
introduced a sizeable amount of legislation into Parliament that may, arguably, undermine liberties 
which are considered to be universal and non-negotiable by liberals. For example, Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures, which were introduced in 2011 to replace ‘Control Orders’, 
may still impinge upon freedom of association, movement and speech; the proscription of 
organisations and the restriction of financial flows to terrorist groups may undermine property rights; 
and measures allowing for an increase in special police powers, such as extended detention powers, 
may affect judicial safeguards, including the presumption of innocence, the right to a defence, and the 
right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal.
576
 Indeed, measures such as these have led 
many liberals to argue that the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy does not always provide adequate 
safeguards against government abuses of power. For some liberals, this has led to calls for an 
entrenched Bill of Rights. 
 
 
3.9.2 A Bill of Rights: The Rule of Law and National Security 
 
A Bill of Rights is a document which provides a summary of fundamental rights that are considered to 
be essential to the nation, and which must be protected against infringement by public authorities. In 
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most liberal democratic jurisdictions, an official Bill of Rights holds more authority than the 
legislative bodies alone. Therefore, Acts passed by the legislature may be invalidated if they are 
deemed to be unconstitutional. However, in the UK, fundamental rights are not entrenched in law; 
rather they are contained in ordinary Acts of Parliament, which, at least on a technical level, can be 
amended, or even repealed. The effect that a lack of an entrenched Bill of Rights has on the rule of 
law is that, arguably, the safeguards against government abuses of power are less comprehensive and, 
perhaps less effective. Thus, Dicey’s argument that the rule of law is upheld because, ‘the right to 
personal liberty is … the result of judicial decisions’ may be out-dated and, in fact, the rule of law 
occupies a much more precarious status in the UK. 
 
In recent years, the issues raised by the lack of a Bill of Rights have been overcome, to some extent, 
by the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. This Act incorporates the European Convention on 
Human Rights into UK law.  The concept of the rule of law is infused into the Convention.  It is 
described in the preamble of the Convention as part of the 'common heritage', which the signatories 
share, and is one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society. A national rule will not 
constitute a law for Convention purposes unless it has appropriate qualities to make it compatible with 
the rule of law.
577
 States may limit citizens’ liberties or curtail their freedoms, but such measures must 
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  Legitimate aims include restrictions in the interests of 
national security, public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.  In assessing proportionality 
in relation to the aim of national security, the Court has allowed a very wide margin of appreciation to 
the State.
578
 Thus, the security agencies may be afforded more extensive powers under the Convention 
than other public authorities.  However, a legitimate aim and a proportionate response alone are 
insufficient to justify limiting a right.  In Convention jurisprudence, limitations must also have an 
ascertainable legal basis.  They must be 'prescribed by law', or 'in accordance with the law'. 
579
 To be 
'prescribed by law' for Convention purposes, the starting point is that there must be a basis for what is 
done in national law.  This embodies the notion that a norm cannot be classified a law unless it is 
accessible and also foreseeable, to a reasonable degree, in its application and consequences.  In other 
words, the law must be available to the people likely to be affected by it, and they must be able, at 
least with the help of a lawyer, to ascertain its likely application to the circumstances of a given case. 
The object which underlies these principles is that it ensures that there is one rule for all, that power is 
not exercised arbitrarily or for an improper purpose, and that minimum safeguards exist against the 
abuse of power. 
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Convention principles have now been incorporated into UK domestic law by virtue of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.  This Act makes it unlawful for any public body to act in a way which is 
incompatible with the rights protected by the Convention,
580
 unless the wording of an Act of 
Parliament means they have no other choice.
581
  The Act also makes available in the UK courts a 
remedy for breach of a Convention right, without the need to go to the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg.  Sections 2 and 3 of the Act require UK judges to take account of the decisions 
of the Strasbourg Court,
582
 and to interpret legislation, as far as possible, in a way which is compatible 
with the rights protected by the Convention.
583
 If it is not possible to interpret an Act of Parliament so 
as to make it compatible with the Convention, the judges may issue a declaration of 
incompatibility.
584
 Whilst this declaration does not affect the validity of the Act of Parliament, in the 
sense that the Act is overridden, the Act contains mechanisms that will allow Parliament to change 
offending Acts.
585
  The Act does not prevent an individual from taking his case to the Strasbourg court 
as a last resort.  
 
Whilst the enactment of the Human Rights Act may have produced a major expansion in the way that 
rights are understood and protected in the UK, it has been argued by liberal thinkers that it has not 
gone far enough.  For example, Helen Fenwick argues that certain statutory regulations, such as the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which were introduced to provide a scheme for 
state surveillance that would meet the demands of the Convention, are more concerned with the form 
than the substance of the law. Helen Fenwick claims that the striking feature of the RIPA is the 
‘determination evinced under it to prevent citizens invoking Convention rights in the ordinary 
courts,’586 rather than its ability to limit state interference or to provide effective oversight 
mechanisms.  For Fenwick, covert surveillance is only made legitimate where the security agencies 
are subjected to stringent legal controls and oversight mechanisms that will ensure that warrants for 
surveillance operations comply with established liberties and freedoms.  For Fenwick, the power of 
government executives to interfere with the lives and choices of individuals should be constrained, or 
at least prescribed by law.  Fenwick, like Dicey, opposes excessive government discretion or the 
introduction of arbitrary, secret or retrospective legislation.  When wide discretionary powers are 
conferred on the executive –whether they be in the form of granting power to a Minister of the Crown 
to ‘act as he thinks fit’, or on civil servants such as the security agencies - it may be more difficult for 
the individual to know what rights he or she has, or to challenge discretionary decisions before a court 
of law or tribunal.   
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3.10 The Rule of Law and the Right to an Independent Fair Hearing 
 
The third and final limb of Dicey's conception was that the general principles of the constitution (For 
example, the right to personal liberty or the right of public meeting), are the result of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts.’587 In 
Dicey's view, civil liberties need not, as in many other countries, derive from a constitutional 
document.  They are, in effect, fundamentally social traditions, which have been recognised by the 
judiciary and given protection by the common law. The rights and liberties of the individual are to be 
embodied in the ‘ordinary law’ of the land so that, where individual rights are violated, citizens can 
seek redress through the courts. This of course necessitates courts which, as Raz claims, are accessible 
so that no man is denied justice.
588
 
 
This conception of the rule of law necessitates courts that are impartial and accessible to all. A major 
aspect of the liberal conception of the rule of law is an insistence upon the guarantee of an 
independent judiciary, whose political independence is intended to act as a safeguard against arbitrary 
rulings in individual cases.  Thus, the rule of law includes concepts such as the presumption of 
innocence, no double jeopardy, and habeas corpus.  An independent judiciary may act as a guard 
against despotism, and as the body that may enforce limitations on the power of government.  Indeed, 
the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus has long been celebrated as the most efficient 
safeguard of the liberty of the subject. For example, Dicey wrote that the Habeas Corpus Acts 
‘declare no principle and define no rights, but they are for practical purposes worth a hundred 
constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.’589  
The right to a fair hearing is now enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Article 6 reads provides that ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly.’590 In the case of criminal proceedings, additional layers of protection are provided.   
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These are that:  
(a) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law;
591
  
(b) he will be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him;
592
  
(c) he will have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;593  
(d) he will be allowed to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing, or if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when 
the interests of justice so require;
594
 
(e) he will be able to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him;
595
 
(f) he will have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language 
used in court.
596
 
These legal provisions enshrine into law the principle that there must be real and effective access to 
the court and that the court or tribunal must be impartial, independent, fair and established by law. 
Indeed, the conception that the judiciary is separate from, and independent of, the government is a 
core constitutional principle for liberals and, as such, is claimed: ‘to be fundamental to the rule of law 
and to democracy itself.’597  For liberal thinkers, such rights are ‘absolute and should not be 
limited’598 in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, such as where the ‘lives or safety of 
identifiable individuals would be put at risk.’599  For groups such as Amnesty International: ‘The 
principles of open and natural justice form a fundamental part of the UK’s common law and have 
traditionally helped to ensure that UK civil proceedings meet or exceed international fair trial 
standards.’600 
 
However, in most countries, the right to a fair hearing can be suspended in times of national 
emergency, and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the USA, is currently being tested in 
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the UK. For example, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and security Act 2001, made it possible for the 
Secretary of State to certify certain suspected foreign terrorists, and to detain them indefinitely 
without a trial. Whilst this provision would deprive the detained person of the protection of a criminal 
trial, the Government claimed that since ‘there was an emergency threatening the life of the nation,’ 
the measures were justified.
601
  The problem for the Government was that although the Immigration 
Act 1971 allows for the deportation of those who are a threat to national security in cases where there 
is insufficient admissible evidence for a criminal trial, a ruling by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Chahal v UK in 1996,
602
 ruled that deportation was not allowed if there were 
substantial grounds for believing that the person would be subjected to torture. The Act also contained 
an ouster clause
603
 aimed at excluding recourse to judicial review and habeas corpus.
604
  This made it 
difficult for those who were certified under the powers to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision 
in the ordinary courts. Instead there was a right of appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC).  The process of appealing to this Commission involved the exclusion of 
detainees, and their legal representatives, from seeing evidence which might compromise intelligence 
methods and operations, or was otherwise sensitive in that it may detriment national security.   In an 
attempt to ensure that Article 6 rights were safeguarded at these times, special security advocates were 
appointed in place of the detainee’s legal representatives.   
 
For civil libertarians, the provisions of the Act did not meet the requirements of due process under 
Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. John Wadham, for 
example, argued that the system of detention without trial may have effectively established an 
informal criminal justice system, without the safeguards of the formal system.  People could be 
deemed a threat to national security, and imprisoned, on the basis of evidence inadmissible in a trial, 
and on a significantly lower standard of proof.  For Wadham: 'Arrests under these powers stamped all 
over basic principles of British justice.’605 Indeed it was claimed that the Act contained some of ‘the 
most draconian legislation Parliament has passed in peacetime in over a century.’606 
 
In the event, 11 detainees appealed to the SIAC seeking to quash a Derogation Order on which these 
measures relied.  In response, the SIAC ruled, on 30
th
 July 2002, that the Act unjustifiably 
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discriminated against foreign nationals, as British people could not be held in the same way.
607
  The 
Court of Appeal later overturned the decision, but the House of Lords ruled, by an eight to one 
majority, in favour of appeals by nine detainees.  In his ruling, Lord Nicholls said: ‘Indefinite 
imprisonment, without charge or trial, is anathema in any country which observes the rule of law.’608  
 
The Government responded to the Court’s declaration of incompatibility, under Section 4 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, by introducing the concept of ‘Control Orders’,609 under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005.   With respect to the right to a fair hearing, what is noteworthy is that a number 
of Control Orders have been made on the basis of closed material.  This effectively means that the 
person subjected to the Control Order has never been given the chance to see the case against them.  
Whilst there are a number of limited but well-recognised exceptions to the open justice principle,
610
 
these closed material procedures, and the use of the common law principle of Public Interest 
Immunity, have been the subject of a considerable amount of controversy in recent years. It is, 
therefore, necessary to examine their introduction and development in more detail.  
 
 
3.10.1 Public Interest Immunity and Closed Material Procedures.   
 
The traditional common law tool to withhold information from the parties to a court case is Public 
Interest Immunity (PII).  PII is a principle of English common law under which the courts can grant a 
court order allowing one litigant to refrain from disclosing evidence to the other litigants where 
disclosure would be damaging to the public interest. The areas of public interest that may be protected 
by PII include: national security, international relations and the prevention and detection of crime. 
The categories of PII are not fixed,
611
 but the courts will not recognise new categories without clear 
and compelling evidence. 
612
 An order that PII applies would usually be sought by the British 
Government to protect official secrets. However, the heads of the intelligence agencies are under a 
statutory duty to ensure that there are arrangements in place to ensure that no information is disclosed 
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by the agencies except so far as it is provided for in statute.
613
 Whilst it is for the government or the 
security agencies to raise a claim for PII, in Conway v Rimmer,
614
 the House of Lords held that the 
courts retained the final decision of whether a PII disclosure should be upheld.  Ultimately then, 
whilst under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, relevant evidence should 
generally be disclosed to the parties, even in civil proceedings,
615
 this right is not absolute and limits 
on disclosure may be justified, for example, in the interests of justice or of national security in order 
to protect the public from harm.
616
   
 
The use of PII has been problematic in that, a claim in which evidence is excluded may be prevented 
from proceeding. For example, in Carnduff v Rock,
617
 a majority of the Court of Appeal found that 
the case could not be litigated consistently with the public interest.  The determination of the claim 
would have required the disclosure of sensitive information such as the operational methods used by 
the police and how they made use of informer information.  In order to investigate and adjudicate 
upon the claim, the Court would have required this information, thus, the case was struck out. In order 
to resolve this problem, Parliament has made statutory provision for a mechanism through which 
sensitive material can be handled by the courts.  This mechanism is known as the Closed Material 
Procedure (CMP), and was first established to facilitate the hearing of national security sensitive 
deportation cases through the SIAC.   
 
The CMP was introduced under the Special Immigration Appeals Act 1997.  The CMP was first used 
in the context of immigration and deportation decisions, following the case of Chahal v United 
Kingdom,
618
 in which the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that reliance on 
confidential information might be unavoidable where national security was at stake.  In this case, the 
court cited with approval a system used in Canada, which suggested that there could be a procedure, 
which would both accommodate legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of 
intelligence information, and yet still accord the individual a substantial measure of procedural justice. 
A CMP will allow the court to examine material which may otherwise be struck out by a successful 
PII application.  The system involves the use of Special Advocates,
619
 who may ensure that closed 
material is subject to independent scrutiny and adversarial challenge. A CMP will have both ‘open’ 
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and ‘closed’ elements.  All the material on which the government is relying - whether open or closed 
– is laid before the Court and the Special Advocate.  The litigant and his legal representatives can be 
present at the open hearings, and see all the open material used in those hearings.  However, the 
litigant cannot be present at the closed part of the proceedings, or see the closed material.  The Special 
Advocate attends all parts of the proceedings and sees all the material, including the closed material 
not disclosed to the litigant.  He can take instructions from the litigant before he reads the closed 
material, and written instructions after he has seen the closed material.  The Special Advocate may 
communicate with the litigant after he has seen the material, provided that he has the permission of 
the court.   
 
Whilst, in certain cases, a CMP will allow the court to proceed in a case that would have been halted 
due to the use of a successful PII application, the Government has noted that the CMP is not always 
available.
620
 For example, in the case of Al Rawi v Security Service,
621
 the Supreme Court was asked 
to consider whether the courts had the power to order a CMP for the whole or part of a civil claim for 
damages brought by former detainees of Guantanamo Bay. The litigants alleged that the UK 
government was complicit in their detention and ill treatment by foreign authorities.  In their defence, 
the defendants wished to rely on material, the disclosure of which would cause harm to the public 
interest, and asked the Court to determine the preliminary issue of whether a court could adopt a CMP 
in such a claim.  A successful claim of PII would have led to its exclusion but this would have made 
the progression of the case more difficult.  The defendants argued that they should be able to defend 
themselves by relying on important evidence in a CMP.  The majority of the Supreme Court held that, 
in the absence of statutory authority, it was not open to the Court to adopt a CMP in such a claim.  A 
number of the judgments took the view that provision of a CMP is a matter for Parliament and not the 
courts.   The result of this case is that the Government has introduced proposals to extend the use of 
the CMP.   
 
One major Government justification for the use of the CMP is that the disclosure of sensitive 
information would breach the ‘Control Principle’.  This principle concerns the use of secret 
intelligence which has been shared with the UK by foreign governments on a strictly confidential 
basis.  The Government maintains that ‘in all intelligence exchanges, it is essential that the originator 
of the material remains in control of its handling and dissemination.’622 This, the Government claims, 
is because ‘only the originator can fully understand the sensitivities around the sourcing of the 
material and the potential for the sources, techniques and capabilities to be compromised by 
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injudicious handling.’623  Since the use of shared intelligence represents a significant proportion of all 
the information that the UK gathers on terrorists, organised criminals and others seeking to harm the 
national security, this information may be necessary to help in constructing a full and detailed picture 
of potential threats. Thus, the Government claims that any non-consensual disclosure of confidential 
information could potentially lead to a reduction in the quality or quantity of intelligence that overseas 
partners are willing to share with the UK. This, the Government claims, could materially impede the 
intelligence community’s ability to do what is asked of it in protecting the security interests of the 
UK.
624
 
 
However, when it comes to CMP’s, civil libertarian groups have tended to claim that the primary 
response of the UK Government should be to ensure that the actions of UK authorities always comply 
with the highest human rights standards.  This, it seems, includes ‘ensuring effective, impartial, 
thorough and independent investigations into all credible allegations of UK involvement in serious 
human rights violations’.625 These investigations, it is argued, should ‘provide the victims with key 
findings and access to the facts about their claims, along with other forms of redress and guarantees 
of non-repetition.’626  In the perception of these groups, the use of secret evidence in the UK courts 
may undermine justice because ‘it is unreliable, unfair, is damaging to the integrity of the courts and, 
in any event, it weakens, rather than strengthens security.’627   It is claimed to be unreliable because it 
may be unchallenged in that the material produced by the intelligence agencies is not necessarily the 
product of a criminal investigation, which would normally be conducted employing appropriate 
safeguards regarding the production of evidence of criminality.  These groups note that intelligence 
material comes from a variety of sources including second and third hand hearsay; information from 
unidentified informants; information received from intelligence sharing partners; data mining; and 
intercepted communications.  The use of this information could potentially mean that some of the 
evidence is based on the hypothesis and conjecture of the intelligence agencies and this would not 
ordinarily be admissible in court. Secret evidence is claimed to be ‘damaging to the integrity of the 
courts’ because such integrity may depend on the public perception that our judges have adopted a 
fair and independent process to reach their conclusions.  Thus, whilst it may be possible to have a fair 
hearing behind closed doors, it is argued that all the parties should have an equal opportunity to make 
their case.
628
  It is claimed that the use of closed material may weaken security because any public 
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perception that people are being unfairly treated by the courts may breed resentment and this could 
undermine the sources of intelligence. Finally, it is argued that inaccurate conclusions in cases which 
allege serious wrongdoing may allow unlawful, and perhaps dangerous behaviour, to go unchecked. 
In the case of investigations involving allegations of terrorism, this could mean that offenders go 
unpunished.  In the case of civil claims involving allegations against government agencies, it may 
allow the cover-up of serious wrong-doing and misconduct by officials and agents.
629
   
 
Overall then, for civil libertarians, the rule of law embodies the notion that there should be ‘due 
process of law’: It imposes significant constraints upon how the law is made and how it adjudicates.  
For example, it suggests that all laws should be ‘general’ in that they apply to all citizens and do not 
select particular individuals or groups for special treatment, good or bad. The principle of the rule of 
law effectively means that laws should be precisely framed and accessible to the public. Thus, the law 
is not to be seen as a constraint upon the individual, but as an essential guarantee of his liberty. The 
supreme virtue of the rule of law, for liberals such as Dicey, therefore, is said to be that it serves to 
protect the citizen from the state in that it ‘ensures a government of laws and not of men.’630   
 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that liberalism refers to a broad array of related ideas and theories of 
government that tend to consider individual liberty and equality of opportunity to be amongst the most 
important political goals.  Different forms of liberalism may promote very different policies, but 
liberals are generally united by their support for a number of principles. These principles include: 
freedom of conscience and speech; limitations on the power of government; adherence to the rule of 
law; the free exchange of ideas and a transparent system of government. In the liberal perception, it is 
the individual citizen that truly represents the basis of law and society and therefore public institutions 
should exist to further the ends of individuals, without showing favour to those in higher social ranks. 
Thus, from a political standpoint, liberalism tends to stress the social contract ideal under which 
citizens make the laws and agree to abide by those laws. This ideal tends to be underpinned by a 
belief in minimal interference by the state. Liberals typically argue that the only purpose for which 
power can be rightly exercised over a member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.  In the ideology of liberalism, individuals know what is best for them. Unnecessary 
governmental limitations on civil rights, even when introduced to protect the moral health of the 
citizen, do not necessarily justify government interference into the lives and properties of individuals. 
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 The impact of liberalism on the modern world has been profound.  The ideal of individual liberties; 
the transparency of government; limitations on government power; popular sovereignty; national self-
determination;  the rule of law; and fundamental equality, are some of the benefits that are often 
accepted as essential policy goals by many Western governments and citizens.  Indeed, the concept of 
the liberal democracy, in its typical form of multi-party political pluralism, has spread to much of the 
world to become the standard constitutional and democratic composition of many nations, even if 
there is a wide gap between statements and reality.     
  
However, whilst the liberal justification for civil rights tends to be centred on the conviction that 
matters of moral choice should be left to the individual, this view has been criticised because it may 
rest on an overly optimistic view of human nature. Liberals may presuppose that most people are, at 
least potentially if not actually, influenced more by reason and argument than by prejudice and 
convention.   It is argued that the danger of a position in which diversity is not adequately restricted, is 
that it could potentially create a society devoid of moral structure and incapable of restraining greed 
or egoism.  Individuals may end up knowing only their rights and may not acknowledge any duties or 
responsibilities.  Indeed, a wide range of political thinkers - socialists, conservatives, nationalists and 
fascists have, at different times, styled themselves as anti-individualists.  In many cases, anti-
individualism is based upon a commitment to the importance of the community and the belief that 
self-help and individual responsibility could be a threat to social solidarity. Conservative critics, for 
example, argue that individuals seek the security and stability which only a community identity can 
provide. For these theorists, if individualism promotes a philosophy of ‘each to his own’, it could 
simply lead to ‘atomism’ and produce a society of vulnerable and isolated individuals.  Consequently, 
some conservative thinkers are reluctant to leave moral questions to the individual. They tend to 
prefer a system in which society protects itself by upholding a set of shared beliefs and values, and 
where both public order and moral principles are defended, by force of law if necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  NATIONALIST AND CONSERVATIVE APPROACHES TO DEFINING 
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to develop a critique of the core assumptions that underpin academic and political 
debate in the area of protecting national security.  
 
The chapter will argue that the view of security which is often taken by politicians and the security 
agencies, may reject, or at least impose limits, upon the liberal assertion of individual liberty as an 
absolute and universal right. Rather, from an ideological standpoint, security agenda setting in the UK 
tends to be dominated by a conception of ‘nationalism’ and ‘one nation conservatism’ that prioritises 
the preservation of the existing social and political order over and above the individual desires of 
citizens.  The effect of this is that there may be a more conservative emphasis on the interests of 
collective security and defence from perceived common threats.  In this conception of security, the 
individual tends to be seen as part of an organic whole, which cannot be understood except through 
the whole organism. Political rights and civil liberties, such as the right to privacy, may not be viewed 
in the same way as those of liberal individualism. For example, although the right to privacy may be 
seen as fundamental, it is not an absolute right, which is located in the individual, rather, it is a right 
that may be acknowledged and conceded by the wider political community.
631
  Freedom, therefore, 
may not be regarded as an abstract liberal freedom – the right to engage in unconstrained or uncoerced 
action.
632
  Freedom tends to be regarded as a legal right which operates within the parameters of a 
specific cultural tradition and is premised on an established institutional life which may, or may not, 
value the rule of law.  Freedom in this context is seen as being relative to the ends of the community 
as a whole. Incessant liberation from the way of life and values of a specific cultural tradition may be 
seen as undermining the fabric of the social order.
633
  
 
However, it is worth noting that whilst both nationalist and conservative thinking may dominate the 
national security agenda, neither of these ideologies offer a clear, systematic body of doctrine that can 
be transplanted and reapplied wholesale from one context to another.  For example, by its very nature, 
the claims of nationalist ideology vary according to the location in which it is found.  Nationalism, 
which has been thought about and practised in many different places, is not so clearly based around 
core themes and propositions as some other political theories.  It is a political doctrine which is 
sufficiently broad to be incorporated into diametrically opposed ideologies and has attracted the 
                                                             
631 See discussion: Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, Second Edition, Blackwell, 2003, p77. 
632 See discussion: Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, Harmondsworth/Penguin, 1980, pp 72-73. 
633 See discussion, Alan Finlayson, Nationalism, Political Ideologies, Routledge, 2003, p110. 
attention of many of the leading political thinkers, including liberals, conservatives, socialists, 
communists and fascists.  Similarly, there is no universal definition of the concept of security.  Indeed 
Roland Paris views security ‘as in the eye of the beholder.’634  National security, whether at an 
international or domestic level, may not primarily depend upon particular beliefs about man and 
society.  What define it are less its intellectual qualities than its instincts, habits and feelings.  
Nevertheless, strong recurrent themes can be detected in security thinking at governmental level in the 
UK.  These themes include an underlying consistency in the aim to protect the nation state from 
hostile aggressors and to protect the existing social and political structures.    
 
This chapter seeks to develop a conceptual framework to facilitate an understanding and explanation 
of the national security discourse as it is experienced in the UK.   The chapter will begin by briefly 
exploring the theoretical underpinnings of nationalism.  However, the main thrust of this chapter is to 
explore how the concept of nationalism plays out in the national security arena.  This is achieved by 
first examining the nature of the security threats facing the UK. It will then be possible to analyse the 
justifications for prioritising risks to the state and its political order over and above the desire to 
promote individualism and civil liberties.   
 
 
4.2  Nationalism: The Supremacy of the Nation State  
  
If nationalism is to be reduced to a straightforward doctrine, Elie Kedourie’s definition may provide a 
useful starting point for examination. According to Kedourie, the doctrine ‘holds that humanity is 
naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be 
ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.’635  
Kedourie’s definition embodies two distinctive but often related concepts; the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’. 
The doctrine of nationalism can be better understood if these concepts are clearly defined and 
distinguished. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Nation 
 
A nation is a cultural entity, a collection of people bound together by shared values and traditions, for 
example, a common language, religion and history and usually occupying the same geographical area. 
J.S Mill offers an analytical definition of a nation based partly on natural sympathies: ‘A portion of 
mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common 
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sympathies, which do not exist between themselves and any others – which make them co-operate with 
each other more willingly than with other people.’636  The effective driving force of Mill’s conception 
is the sense of belonging to, and serving, a perceived national community.  It embodies the notion that 
the carriers of this ideology attribute to their nation a distinctive cultural identity which may set it 
apart from other nations and gives it a special place in the historical process.  This community may be 
identified by a unique set of characteristics allegedly deriving from constitutional, historical, 
geographical, religious, linguistic, ethnic or genetic similarities.   
 
From a security perspective, where a group of people regard themselves as a natural cultural 
community which is distinguished by shared loyalty, perhaps in the form of patriotism, there can be 
distinctive security benefits. Public spirit has a valid purpose – it gives the citizens of a nation a 
common purpose and rallies them to support the government in times of crisis.
637
   For example, in 
specific situations, especially where nations come close to war in either literal or metaphorical forms, 
national identities are often able to organise other competing identities around themselves in order to 
defend the nation from a perceived common enemy.  This was certainly the case during World War II. 
The German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the subsequent declarations of war on Germany by the 
British Empire,
638
 the Commonwealth and France, led to a widespread willingness to fight, and even 
to die, in the service of the nation.   
 
However, patriotism is not without its dangers. For example, some groups may reject patriotic loyalty 
and pride in the nation state and see less reason than other citizens to be proud of it.
639
 Rather, they 
may feel more closely affiliated to alternative political ideologies, such as pacifism or to minority 
religious traditions, such as Buddhism or Islam. In certain circumstances, these groups may feel less 
inclined to demonstrate the unquestioned loyalty to the state that is often demanded of citizens in the 
face of perceived external and internal threats to the nation’s security. Problems may occur because 
any lack of support for perceived national values may lead members of the patriotic majority to make 
accusations that the dissenting group is a threat to social cohesion, national identity and even to 
national security. For example, when it comes to immigration and integration some nationalists have, 
in the past, expressed strong, and even xenophobic, reactions to ethnic minority communities.
640
 
These nationalists may claim that since stable and successful societies are based upon shared values 
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and a common culture, multiculturalism leads to instability and conflict. Thus, some nationalists may 
argue that immigrants should assimilate the traditions and values of the host nation if they are to 
obtain the acceptance, citizenship rights and membership of the national community. In such cases, a 
tyranny of the majority could be practiced in which the patriotic nationalism of a dominant majority 
may lead to a denial of the fundamental rights of the minority.  For example, ethnic minority groups 
may be excluded from citizenship, or if they are formally citizens, they may be treated by the 
indigenous majority as ‘second class’ citizens and not full members of the national and political 
community.
641
 
 
However, in the UK, campaigns favouring multiculturalism, in which diversity is valued, may have 
created a tolerant societal environment in which cultural and religious assertiveness is only rarely 
received as a direct attack on the British identity and way of life. Furthermore, foreign workers form a 
very small proportion of post-war immigrants to Britain. The majority of people belonging to the 
ethnic-minority communities are native-born British citizens who have adopted many of the cultural 
values of the country. 
 
 
4.2.2 The State 
 
The second limb of nationalism is concerned with the self determination of the state.  A state, in 
contrast to a nation, may be described as a political association, which enjoys sovereignty, supreme or 
unrestricted power within defined territorial borders. This tends to occur when nationhood is 
accompanied by the desire for self-government in which, ‘sovereignty is exercised by its elected or 
self-appointed representatives within territorial boundaries recognised by the international political 
community.’642 John Stuart Mill suggested that: ‘Nationalism is, therefore, both a political principle 
and a form of political organisation.  The principle is the right of national self-determination, which 
is realised in the ideal form of political organisation, the nation state.  Each sovereign state should 
encompass a single nation.’643   In other words, political nationalism embodies the belief that the 
nation is the only right and proper unit of government and that the boundaries of government should 
coincide, in the main, with those of nationality. Consequently, nationalism may represent the idea of 
popular self government; the idea that government is either carried out by the people or for the people 
in accordance with the ‘national interest’. It may be said, therefore, that much of nationalist thinking 
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is closely linked with democratic sentiments, and with the idea that ‘the people should have some say 
in their own government.’644   
 
From a security perspective, where there are effective democratic and political mechanisms for 
linking citizens with their governments, the state may become a container for security, ensuring the 
safety of the people within its borders.  Security for individuals is guaranteed by their citizenship – as 
long as the state itself is secure its citizens are secure.
645
 Therefore, the state as a cultural, social and 
political institution, can be worthy of protection from potential security threats because of its 
purported necessity for the individual and collective well-being of its population or nationals. 
646
 
 
However, Buzan claims that the assumption that citizenship confers security is problematic.  He 
argues that ‘the individual citizen faces many threats which emanate directly or indirectly from the 
state; the state can be a threat to its citizens as well as their protector.’647  Firstly, not all residents in 
a state are citizens, and those who are not may be much less secure than the citizens – they can, for 
instance, be expelled.  Secondly, the need to protect social or national security may be advanced by 
the government as a reason to justify the suppression of certain civil rights, or to withhold sensitive 
information, with significant implications for the protection of political and democratic rights.
648
  For 
example, the Terrorism Act 2000
649
 can affect property rights by making it a criminal offence to 
support, financially or otherwise, a proscribed organisation.
650
  Similarly, the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 provided for the creation of ‘Control Orders’ which could be used to impose a range of 
obligations on targeted citizens, including requiring them to reside in particular places and to provide 
advance notice of proposed movements and activities. The point is that some types of nationalism 
may potentially abandon normal liberal democratic principles. Rather, instead of promoting individual 
freedom and choice, some nationalists may promote tight national cohesion and security to the rank of 
an absolute value on which there can be no compromise.
651
  In other words, the politics of nationalism 
can potentially involve the idea that civil liberties and political rights should be sacrificed for the 
national good because the nation is the supreme political unit to which all else must be subordinate.
652
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 4.2.3 The Nation and the State Brought Together 
 
Traditionally, the ultimate goal of the doctrine of nationalism is that the nation and the state should, as 
far as possible, coincide; each nation should possess a political voice and exercise the right of self-
determination.
653
  It embodies the concept of nation building and the foundation of nation-states.  
Nationalists perceive the nation-state to be the highest and most desirable form of political 
organisation.
654
  They regard the nation as a genuine or organic community, rejecting any notion that 
it may be an artificial creation of the political leaders or ruling classes.
655
 Humanity, in the conception 
of a nationalist, is thought to be naturally divided into a collection of nations, each possessing a 
separate identity. 
656
 This implies that ties of nationality are stronger and politically more significant 
than any rival social cleavage, such as social class, race or religion, which may cut across national 
borders.
657
   The nation-state, therefore, is often considered to be the only stable and cohesive form of 
political organisation because citizens are bound together by a sense of both political and cultural 
unity. 
658
  
 
It has been argued that nationalism ‘offers answers to the big questions of social and political life.  It 
makes claim to the basis of human sociality and relationships.  It gives reasons why we should (or 
shouldn’t) feel obliged to others.  It advances a case for what makes the best form of legitimate 
government and suggests something about citizens’ relationship to the state.’659  Indeed, the appeal to 
nationalism may be useful in maintaining national unity by fostering loyalty and pride in one’s 
country. These sentiments may be attractive in that they seemingly uphold established customs and 
practices which individuals can recognise and which they may find familiar and reassuring.
660
 A sense 
of identity and ‘rootedness’ may be promoted as individuals are able to acknowledge, and even 
venerate, the traditional, social and political values of their own nation and state. The nation may be 
portrayed as emerging naturally as an organic community to which we all owe allegiance and which 
collectively desires that human beings should live with others who possess the same views and habits 
as themselves. 
661
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 4.3  The Effect of Nationalism on National Security  
 
The impact of nationalism on the security agenda it that the nation-state is often claimed to be the 
primary object of security.  Where security thinking is focused on preserving the nation-state, this 
may have a significant impact on the way in which security is defined and dealt with.  For example, 
with regard to potential threats emanating from the activities of other states or external aggressors, 
military threats may be privileged as the principal source of insecurity, and military preparation tends 
to become the primary means of achieving security.
662
  In addition, security decision-makers may also 
attach importance to the preservation of the nation’s economic interests worldwide.663  Indeed, since 
the early 1990’s, a number of scholars have argued that the world is entering an age in which the 
economic aspects of security will increasingly dominate the traditional political and military aspects 
of security.
664
   
 
The following paragraphs will explore how nationalism may affect the security discourse in the UK.  
Firstly it will examine the nature of the current threat environment in which the UK intelligence 
agencies, and other security decision-makers, claim they must operate. To this end, the discussion will 
examine how security thinkers may tend to view military, economic and political security. Secondly, 
the discussion will analyse the legitimising factors for a nationalist view of security. On this point, the 
chapter argues that the security discourse in the UK may be heavily influenced by an inherent lean 
towards preserving the existing social and political structure and hierarchy of society.  This, it is 
argued, may effectively mean that, whilst the rights of individual citizens are considered to be 
important, some nationalists may claim that such rights can and should be waived where foreign, or 
even domestic aggressors, are seen as threatening the nation or as undermining the fabric of society.   
 
 
4.4  Military Security 
 
Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of 
states and their perceptions of each other’s intentions.  
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For nationalists, the theoretical starting point of this understanding of security is that nation-states 
exist and interact in an international system that can be described as anarchic.
665
  Anarchy, in this 
sense, means that each state is autonomous and exercises sovereign authority over its own affairs.  
However, states are not free from the influence of others: The actions of one state may conflict with 
the objectives of another. A state may negotiate solutions to possible conflicts but there remains the 
possibility that any state may, at any time, use force to achieve its ends.   The possibility of wars 
makes the anarchic international system, as Hobbes put it, ‘a war of all against all.’666  In these 
circumstances the primary responsibility of a state is to both ensure the survival of the state and its 
people and to further the national interest.  Machiavelli, who is said to have laid the foundations of 
military strategy, saw politics as a struggle for survival between growing and expanding organisms in 
which wars were natural and necessary.
667
  He concluded that the existence of such an organism 
depended on its capacity for war and that political institutions must be organised in such a way as to 
create favourable preconditions for the functioning of the military.
668
  
 
Military preparation has certainly had an impact on security thinking in Western nations. In recent 
years, the dominant perspective on security matters held by the majority of politicians, academics, and 
defence planners may have been largely interpreted by what Michael Klare has labelled the ‘Rogue 
Doctrine’.669  This concerns the characterisation of hostile, or seemingly hostile, Third World states 
with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities as ‘rogue states’ or ‘nuclear outlaws’ bent on 
sabotaging the prevailing world order.
670
  Such regimes are often constructed as harbouring hostile 
intentions towards their neighbours and the United States; as opposing democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law; and as violating global norms regarding nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
proliferation.  In short, rogue states are represented as posing a ‘clear and present danger’ to the 
United States and its allies, including the UK.  In recent years the Government has also highlighted a 
growth in asymmetric warfare in which actors with weaker military resources resort to ‘economics, 
cyber and proxy actions instead of direct military confrontation.’671  As a result, the Government 
notes that the differences between state-on-state warfare and irregular conflict are dramatically 
reducing.
672
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The security agencies are instrumental in obtaining secret intelligence that may be critical to military 
security issues.  In this respect the intelligence community works closely with Defence Intelligence 
(which is part of the Ministry of Defence).  According to MI6, its role is to ‘provide early indications 
and warnings of the intentions of hostile, or potentially hostile, state and non-state actors.’673  Its role 
is also to ‘focus on intelligence collection providing strategic insight and understanding, to inform 
policy and decision-making.’674  Intelligence operatives are instrumental in gathering intelligence 
concerned with arms sales, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and gathering 
intelligence that would be useful to the Armed Forces.
675
 
 
Sir Michael Quinlan has highlighted a number of reasons why intelligence gathering may be useful in 
the international and military arena. Quinlan claims that ‘the central consideration is that we often 
want information about matters in which our interests may diverge from those of others; and such 
divergence inescapably creates an incentive to those others to withhold from us, temporarily or 
permanently, information that we might use in order to advance our interests at the expense to some 
degree of theirs.’676   Thus, whilst large amounts of policy-relevant material may be available in the 
public domain, it would not be realistic to assume that all the information that is needed will be 
readily available. Rather, as Quinlan claims, ‘some of the countries, or other actors, with whom we 
are dealing, or may one day need to deal, may have no...habit of providing information openly on 
matters relevant to our concerns; some indeed may have no dependable or adequate systems for 
providing it systematically even to themselves or their own leaderships.’677  Interestingly, Quinlan 
notes that this situation can apply ‘even in respect of countries whose general character and policies 
are congenial to us – we cannot automatically take at face value everything they may tell us.’678 
 
Whatever the usefulness of intelligence, it seems fair to argue that for these thinkers, the primary 
object of security is the nation-state, which is to be protected from the intentions of hostile foreign 
actors, or from internal aggressors, who may interrupt damage or attack the UK’s economic or 
governmental systems.  Where the object of security is the protection of the existing hierarchy of 
state, then those activities that are a threat to this order may be the most likely to be defined as 
security threats by the intelligence agencies.  Thus, when it comes to defining the object of security, 
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decision-makers may naturally lean towards a conservative bias which favours the preservation of the 
existing social and political order over the desires of individual citizens. The consequence of this is 
that, those persons who are perceived to be a threat to the existence of the state; the maintenance of its 
territorial integrity; its economic well-being; or who threaten the survival of its governing regime, are 
more likely be targeted by security agencies, whether or not they are violent or threaten the safety of 
the public.  
 
 
4.5  Economic Security 
 
Very closely linked, even inseparable from, military and political security is economic security.  
Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain 
acceptable levels of welfare and state power.  At the state level of analysis, there are three broad 
categories of links between security and economics.  Firstly, a strong economy may be a measure of 
power in the international system. The greater a state’s economic potential the greater is its military 
potential.  The economy may provide the material and financial means for the military capability to 
protect national security.  For example, the Government has claimed that ‘we cannot have effective 
foreign policy or strong defence without a sound economy and a sound fiscal position to support 
them.’679  Therefore, it is claimed that a state’s economic interest remains vital to its security interests, 
and military force may still be used.
680
  This may have occurred during the Gulf War where the US 
and the UK deployed forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, arguably, to ensure continued access 
to the oil on which so many Western economies depend.
681
 
 
The second link between economic well-being and security concerns the inter-reliance of 
transnational economics and transactions. It is possible for states to use such transactions to 
manipulate or change the attitudes and behaviour of others in the international field. States may use 
economic instruments to reward, punish, induce or coerce another state to behave in particular ways.  
Among the most common of these tools are: raising or lowering tariffs on imported goods; currency 
manipulations to alter terms of trade; granting loans or extending credit; and the manipulation of 
foreign aid.
682
 Such economic pressures can be a means of exerting state power to achieve political 
ends, just like force. The more powerful a state’s economy, the better able it may be to exercise 
influence on others and to resist efforts by others to influence it.  States with strong economies tend to 
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have a greater range of instruments of influence.  States with weaker economies tend to be susceptible 
to these stronger states.  Weak states, therefore, may be more likely to modify their behaviour in 
response to pressure from stronger states.  The increasingly interdependent international economic 
system may provide states with more opportunities to use economic instruments to sway others, and a 
strong economy may furnish a greater capability to wield these instruments successfully.   
 
A third line of argument broadens the nature of the relationship between economics and security in 
that it adds that a strong or prosperous economy is in itself a security issue.  In other words, economic 
or material means are an essential value to be pursued and protected.  This may occur where 
governments are concerned about providing a domestic environment in which citizens are secure from 
hardship and deprivation, at least to the extent of gaining election victory.   In the post Cold-War era, 
there seems to have been an increasing desire to treat economic desires as matters of national security.  
It has been claimed that: ‘States are now competing more for the means to create wealth within their 
country than for power over more territory.  Where they used to compete for power as a means to 
wealth, they now compete for wealth as a means to power – but more for the power to maintain 
internal order and social cohesion than for the power to conduct foreign conquest or to defend 
themselves against attack.’683  This passage introduces a study limited to developing countries for 
whom poor and deteriorating economic conditions can seriously affect political stability and a weak 
economic position may result in foreign impositions on state sovereignty and action. However, 
Lustgarten and Leigh argue that it may also be suggestive of the policies of national governments 
more generally, including the UK.
684
 Indeed, a recent government report claimed that: ‘In order to 
protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad. ...We should be under no illusion 
that our national interest requires our continued full and active engagement in world affairs. It 
requires our economy to compete with the strongest and the best and our entire government effort 
overseas must be geared to promote our trade, the lifeblood of our economy.’685 Thus, the drive to 
protect the UK’s economic interests abroad is claimed to be linked to our ability to project influence 
onto the worldwide stage.  Where this is the case, it may not be inconceivable that the drive for 
economic success can go beyond mere national interest to become a matter of national security. 
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4.6  Nationalism in the UK – Its Nature and its Justifications 
 
In political, military and economic realms, it is often argued, in varying degrees, that when it comes to 
security, preserving the power of state intuitions should be the natural focal point of national security 
and the resultant decision-making.   However, nationalists, and their political counterparts, may lay 
claim to several palpable benefits which are inherent in this thinking.  A major argument is that the 
state – in the sense of its territorial borders and its political stability - is a container for security in 
which citizens can be protected from hostile foreign enemies and from domestic violence and 
criminality.
686
 A further set of arguments concerns the nation as a body in which citizens enjoy a 
sense of belonging to a perceived national community.
687
  Here it is claimed that the nation, in itself, 
has an intrinsic value because the shared sense of identity, under which citizens co-operate with one 
another, may promote an organic society in which the virtues of the country are extolled and patriotic 
values are promoted.
688
 Taken together, these concepts may, according to some nationalist thinkers, 
provide the best platform on which to base security considerations such as political stability;
689
 the 
means for an effective response in wartime;
690
 a better way of correcting the problems emanating from 
terrorism and criminality;
691
 the means to deal with collective financial crises;
692
 and a means to 
human development, including civil rights and freedoms.
693
   
The following paragraphs will explore these interrelated concepts and ideals in more detail. It will 
examine the material under the following broad headings:   
 
Nationalist perceptions of: 
 The state as an upholder of political rights and civil liberties. 
 The state as a protector of law and order. 
 The state as a defender of traditions, social customs and national values. 
 The state as the only legitimate organisation for war and peace.   
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4.7  The nationalist Perception of the State as an Upholder of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
 
Some strands of nationalism define the nation as an association of people who identify themselves as 
belonging to a nation-state in which citizens have equal and shared political and civil rights.
694
 
Breuilly, for example, claims that the nationalist argument is a political doctrine built on three basic 
assertions: (a) there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; (b) the interests and values 
of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; (c) the nation must be as independent as 
possible.  For Breuilly, nationalism is a term used to refer to political movements that seek to exercise 
state power for the purpose of ensuring that the particular character of the nation is maintained. This, 
it is said, requires at the very least, the attainment of political sovereignty.
695
 Therefore, security tends 
to be about protecting the constitutional order of the state, and its governing regime, including shared 
civil rights and democratic values.
696
   
 
In the UK, our shared political and civil rights are usually taken as those which are in accordance with 
a liberal democracy.  The core democratic ideal in the UK may be that of popular sovereignty – 
society is to be governed by rules that each person as a citizen has contributed to forming, either 
directly or indirectly, through the choice of representatives who rule or take decisions on behalf of the 
citizen.
697
  In addition to democratic accountability, the UK tends to embrace the ideals of a liberal 
democracy. Liberal democratic nations are characterised by certain constitutional and legal 
parameters which seek to both limit the power of government and to define the relationship between 
the government and the citizen.  The power of government is limited because the political tradition 
places a strong emphasis on doctrines such as the rule of law
698
 and the separation of powers.
699
  The 
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relationship between the government and its citizens is defined by a constitutional framework which 
is built on a liberal perception that government organisations should make their preservation 
worthwhile by legitimising themselves through the exercise of good governance.
700
  The essential 
constituents necessary for good governance ought to include respect for constitutional democracy and 
democratic and individual rights.
701
  It is hoped that the citizens will accept the legitimacy of 
government institutions in order to create an implicit contract between the ruler and the ruled.
702
  
Thus, ultimately, it is the people who are sovereign because the authority the governing institutions is 
gained from Parliament who’s power is derived from the ‘will’ of the people as expressed in both 
elections and in the constitutional order. 
  
From a security perspective, protecting these core democratic and liberal ideals may concern 
safeguarding the organisational stability of the state; its systems of government and the ideologies that 
give the state its legitimacy. This has been described as: ‘The whole organisation of the body of politic 
for civil rule and government – the whole political organisation which is the basis of civil 
government.’703 Therefore, political security includes the entire structure of the institutions through 
which society is regulated, protected and governed.  It encompasses: Parliament and the law making 
procedures, including those of the EU and other international bodies; the system of adjudication that 
is upheld by the courts; the democratic procedures of state; the constitutional order; the critical 
national infrastructure and the means of law enforcement.   In addition, protecting political security 
may necessarily involve safeguarding the dominant group of persons that hold power or authority 
within the nation.  These persons have been described by Charles Mills as: ‘Those political, economic 
and military circles which, as an intricate set of overlapping small but dominant groups, share 
decisions having at least national consequences.’704  In other words, it is that class of persons who 
either ‘own’ the system or ‘run’ the system. In the UK, this class broadly encompasses the leading 
politicians, judges, senior civil servants, military officials and the most influential financiers and 
industrialists.   
 
Nationalists may claim that by subscribing to a set of democratic procedures and values, individuals 
can reconcile their right to shape their own lives with their need to belong to a community. For 
example, Renan argued that sharing common ideals is ‘more valuable by far than frontiers’.705 For 
                                                             
700 See, for example, Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 1690.  See also, John Rawls, Theory of Justice, Oxford 
University Press, 1972. 
701 See, for example, Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 1690.  See also, John Rawls, Theory of Justice, Oxford 
University Press, 1972, p12 and pp 137-142. 
702 See, for example, Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 1690.  See also, John Rawls, Theory of Justice, Oxford 
University Press, 1972. 
703 D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1978) AC 171. 
704 Charles Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford Press, p18. 
705 Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ve qu’une nation? Conference Faite En Sorbonne, 11th March 1882.  English Translation: Ernest 
Renan, What is a Nation? Oxford University Press, 1996, pp 52-54. 
Renan ‘the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and, in the future, a shared 
programme to put into effect, ...are things that can be understood in spite of differences of race or 
language.’706 Renan’s conception of nationalism effectively means that where a nation is in 
possession of a rich legacy of memories, and there is present day consent to perpetuate the value of 
the heritage, demonstrated in the desire to live together, an essential condition for being a people has 
been met.  Therefore, it is argued that what holds a society together is not, for example, common 
ethnic roots, as some may claim, but a shared heritage in which national values are extolled, including 
the shared ideals of democratic accountability and constitutional order. Since this character of 
nationalism is maintained by an appeal to democratic tradition, community and history, nationalism 
may become a conservative defence for traditional political institutions and a traditional way of life.    
 
Where nationalism is based on conserving a shared ‘way of life’, it may tend to endure even when a 
state is not directly involved in a crisis situation. Indeed, it is claimed that nationalism in the 
developed Western nations is always present, but in less visible forms than, say, expansionist 
nationalism.  Billag, for example, argues that the idea of nationhood may provide a ‘continual 
background for political discourses.’707  He points out that nationalism is routinely flagged up in the 
media though symbols like flags and language involving phrases like ‘national interest’.708 It is true 
that calls to common and patriotic beliefs may often be used by politicians of all parties to legitimise 
their policies. For example, in speeches concerning the alleged ‘war on terror’, Tony Blair frequently 
talked of a ‘determination to defend national values’,709 and the things ‘that we hold dear in this 
country.’710  The point is that, for nationalists, such declarations may be beneficial because they 
encourage the national community to treasure its national values: they may allow the nation to 
venerate its past and present triumphs and to re-establish a sense of its own identity. This thinking 
encompasses all those customs that are familiar and generate security and belonging. For nationalists, 
sharing cultural values and aspirations may help to break down barriers and build a sense of trust 
between people; it may promote a sense of social cohesion, order and stability.  National values, such 
as political liberty or democracy may be celebrated and past national glories may be commemorated.    
 
 
4.8 The Nationalist Perception of the State as a Protector of Law and Order 
 
A second argument in favour of nationalist or conservative security objectives concerns the state as a 
legitimate upholder of law and order.  Law and order refers to the demands for a justice system that 
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protects individual citizens from crimes, which may be perpetrated against them or against their 
property.  Crime prevention is a recurring theme in political ideologies in the UK, and political 
advocates may attempt to increase their chance of election victory by directing their policies towards 
crime reducing strategies and increased sanctions for those convicted of offences.
711
  Since crime 
prevention tends to require the use of centrally organised enforcement mechanisms, the state may be 
considered the best promoter of law and order.  
 
This thinking is not new. Hobbes, for example, argued that only a strong and authoritative 
government would be able to establish order and security in society.
712
  He was prepared to invest the 
King with sovereign or absolute power, rather than risk a descent into what he termed, a 'state of 
nature’.713   In effect, Hobbes placed the need for order above the desire for liberty. Hobbes’ view 
embodies the notion that the foremost interest in security does not lie with liberal notions of the 
individual and his ‘emancipation from those...constraints which would stop him carrying out what he 
would freely choose to do.’714  Instead, the interest in security lies with the protection of the 
hierarchical systems that protect the individual - ultimately, the focus of the interest in security is the 
state and its governing regime which is to be protected from foreign invasion, internal subversion and 
criminality. Hobbes’ views are echoed in the writings of many conservative thinkers. Burke, for 
example, believed that liberty is only worthwhile when it is properly ordered.
715
  Individuals should 
be free from obstacles to pursue their goals, but only when their goals do not threaten the social order; 
if they do, then individual freedom should be restricted.  Therefore, Burke does not regard 
government as a major obstacle to freedom, and therefore, as a necessary evil.  In Burke’s eyes, the 
very fact that government prevents people from doing just anything they happen to desire is what 
makes ordered liberty possible.  For Burke, without government restraints more people would do 
more things that endanger both themselves and social peace.716  In other words, if humans are not 
restrained or controlled, they will behave in an anti-social and uncivilised fashion. Indeed, Allison 
argues that, hierarchy, authority and coercion are necessary if there are to be: ‘Arts, letters and 
society.’717  Consequently, it may be necessary that government is not afraid to use the force of law to 
uphold the basic tenets of tradition, establishment and the wider social good.  
 
In the context of protecting national security imperatives, protecting the ‘wider social good’ may lead 
the government to claim that the activities of certain groups could undermine the institutions that 
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protect the security and well-being of law abiding citizens.
718
  Thus, in the arena of security, there 
may be an emphasis on the interests of collective security and defence from perceived common 
threats. A typical argument here is that crime and disorder threatens the very fabric of society, its 
solidarity and its cohesion. For example, terrorism may represent a gross violation of the ‘right to life’ 
and security on which all the other civil rights ultimately depend. Thus, legislation, such as the 
Regulation of Investigatory  Powers Act 2000, which may invade privacy by empowering the 
intelligence agencies to gather information by covert means, is claimed to be necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety and the prevention and detection 
of serious crime. Ultimately then, in this view, the right to privacy and freedom from surveillance may 
be replaced by the perceived right of the public to be protected from those who may be planning, 
inciting or carrying out activities which may threaten the public health or national interest. The 
consequence of this is that freedom of association and expression becomes counterbalanced with the 
public's freedom from having to suffer the consequences of acts of violence, or the incitement and the 
glorification of terrorism.   
 
Up to a point, of course, it is legitimate for governments to ‘suppress’ citizens in the course of normal 
policing.  It is a function of the state not only to provide protection against external threats, but also to 
protect citizens from each other by making and enforcing laws.
719
 However, whilst government must, 
at least to a certain extent, constrain society and a certain amount of legal and political control may 
broadly reflect social consensus on an acceptable degree of self-limitation, even democratic states 
may find that mainstream consensus alienates minority groups.  Indeed, in 2009, Stella Rimington, the 
former head of MI5, suggested that the government may be exploiting public fear of terrorism to 
restrict civil liberties.
720
  Rimington criticised the last Labour Government’s plans to introduce ID 
cards and to lengthen the amount of time terror suspects can be held without charge.  The 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has also expressed concerns that a series of emergency 
measures have been brought into the legal framework and that some of these may be counter-
productive.  They argued that the legal mechanisms that broadly existed before 9/11 were ‘sufficiently 
robust to meet current threats’ 721 Furthermore, the ICJ reported that there is some evidence that the 
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intelligence services may ‘effectively enjoy impunity for human rights violations’722 because ‘state 
secrecy and public interest immunity have been used to foreclose civil suits and hence remedies to the 
victims of such abuses.’723  It is certainly widely argued in libertarian circles that under recent 
terrorism legislation, a wide range of previously accepted fundamental rights have been eroded.  This 
has, perhaps had a significant effect on public perceptions of governmental activities in the area of 
law and order and public trust may have been undermined. 
 
 
4.9  The Nationalist Perception of the State as a Defender of Traditions, Social customs and 
National Values.  
 
This understanding of state security is underpinned by the perception that the national community and 
its political order is valuable, in and of itself, since it is only within the natural encompassing 
framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and 
transmitted.  The members of such communities may share special cultural proximity to each other.  
By speaking the same language and sharing various customs and traditions, the members of these 
communities may be typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don’t 
share the culture.  The community, thereby, becomes a network of morally connected agents with 
strong ties of obligation.  Thus, it is often claimed that the national community is essential for each of 
its members to flourish. Given that an individual’s sense of identity depends, at least in part, on the 
notion that he is part of an organic community, the communal conditions which foster the 
development of such personal identity should be preserved and encouraged.  Such thinking may be 
associated with the ideals of patriotism.   
 
The definition of patriotism found in a dictionary reads ‘love of one’s country’.  Whilst this captures 
the core meaning of the term in its ordinary use, it might well need to be fleshed out.  Stephen 
Nathanson defines patriotism as involving: special affection for one’s own country; a sense of 
personal identification with the country; special concern for the well-being of the country; and 
willingness to sacrifice to promote the country’s good. 724  It seems then that patriotism involves pride 
in, or endorsement of, ones country’s virtues.  However, Keller has argued that the patriot’s love and 
loyalty are not focused on her country simply because it initiates a set of virtues.
725
  If that were the 
case, and if a neighbouring country turned out to have such virtues to an even higher degree, the 
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patriot’s love and loyalty would be redirected accordingly.726  However, it is argued that the patriot 
loves that country, and only that country, because it is her country; hers is a love and loyalty in the 
first instance.
727
 Thus, the patriot may be motivated to see her country as blessed by all manner of 
virtues and achievements whether the evidence, interpreted objectively, warrants this or not.  
Accordingly, the patriot may form beliefs about the country in ways that are different from the ways 
in which she forms beliefs about other countries.  
 
One of the implications of a strong sense of national identity is that nationalism may become more 
prominent, and even aggressive, when the sense of national identity is felt to be threatened or in 
danger of being lost. Indeed, academics from the Peace and Conflict Research Centre in 
Copenhagen
728
 have identified ‘societal identity’ as a new focus of insecurity in Europe. According to 
these thinkers, since the middle of the 1980’s, Europe has been increasingly subject to the interplay of 
several enormous political forces. Majoring amongst these is an alleged ‘revival of nationalism and 
xenophobia,’729 which may be caused by both perceived threats emanating from the effects of 
international migration and an ‘an active and growing perception in Europe of a threat from the 
Middle East.’730  It is claimed that these forces may give rise to societal insecurity where competing 
identities are seen as being mutually exclusive. For example, there may be a ‘strong mutual reaction 
of Islamic and Christian communities to each other.  Islamic fundamentalists may be sensitive to the 
penetration of Western ideas, practices and fashions into their own culture, whilst host Western 
communities are often suspicious of Islamic immigrants whose strong, visible and alien culture may 
be seen as a defiance of integration, and therefore, as a kind of invasion.’731  These differences, 
according to the Copenhagen School, may have allowed British right wing movements to use fears of 
Islamic fundamentalism to give the impression that the immigrant and ethnic community is akin to a 
cultural fifth column doing the bidding of foreign or domestic anti-Western forces, and that increasing 
numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers are a source of unacceptable competition for jobs, housing 
and welfare benefits.
732
  It is further claimed that some of these threat images are exacerbated by 
alarmist, and possibly exaggerated, news stories portraying the Middle East as an alien, hostile and 
backward place  Such threatening images include: Islamic fanatics preaching hatred of the West; 
terrorists displaying contempt for human rights and civilised values; brutal dictators often eager to 
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acquire the chemical and nuclear technologies for weapons of mass destruction; and, Muslim masses 
or leaders keen to establish Islamic states, some of whose laws and practices may affront secular 
Western standards of civilisation.  
 
The issue of societal insecurity is a novelty in the field of security studies, and on some essential 
points it goes against the established premises of the field. This new focus of security is not primarily 
on the state, nor is it a concern about military overthrow or political subversion of governments.
733
  It 
is not in any conventional sense about disputed boundaries, or about power rivalries or security 
dilemmas between states.  Rather, it represents an extension of existing security theory in that it offers 
an object of security that operates in addition to the traditional state-centred view. However, Buzan 
and his colleagues at the Copenhagen School do not suggest societal security as a new alternative 
theory to replace all classical security and strategic studies.  Their objective is to ensure that this new 
agenda is carefully inserted into existing security theory as a distinctive object of security alongside 
other sectors, including military and state security.
734
  
 
 
4.10  Nationalist Perceptions of the State as the Most Legitimate Organisation for War and 
Peace  
 
A final argument for preserving the state and its democratic and constitutional institutions is that it 
may be the only legitimate organism that can provide for both war and peace.  When it comes to war, 
security thinkers tend to claim that only a nation-state, along with its governmental systems and 
military capabilities, is realistically able provide an effective response in wartime, particularly when a 
fast and unified response is necessary.
735
 This may be particularly true in liberal democratic nations 
such as the UK.  Research has shown that liberal democratic nations, whilst less likely to enter wars, 
are more likely to win wars than non-democracies.
736
  Of course, there may be several explanations 
for this phenomenon.   One argument is that the tendency to be successful in wartime may be 
attributed primarily to ‘the transparency of the politics, and the stability of their preferences.’  
According to this thinking ‘democracies are better able to co-operate with their partners in the 
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conduct of wars’737 and ‘there is a superior mobilisation of resources’738 along with ‘the selection of 
wars that the democratic states have a high chance of winning.’ 739 Other researchers in this field note 
that the liberal emphasis on individuality within democratic societies means that ‘their soldiers fight 
with greater initiative and superior leadership.’740  
 
With regard to peace, it is often argued by nationalists that liberal democratic nations, founded on 
such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech, elected representation, and other civil 
liberties, are fundamentally against war.  This argument asserts that when citizens who bear the 
burden of war elect their government, war becomes more difficult. It has been noted that there has 
been an absence of war between liberal states for almost 200 years.
741
 It may be true to say, therefore, 
that the outbreak of war between two liberal democratic states, even between two adjacent ones, is a 
low probability event. This is attributed to a whole range of factors including the assertion that, ‘when 
states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states 
wind up all on the same side, despite the complexity of paths that take them there,’742 and that 
‘citizens, who are ultimately able to defeat the government in democratic elections, appreciate that 
the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace.’743  Whilst such characteristics do 
not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant, nor that liberalism is the sole valid 
explanation for peace, they do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberal democratic nations 
have indeed established a separate peace – if only amongst themselves.  This, of course is not to say 
that liberal democratic nations do not go to war.  Indeed liberal nations are often distrustful of 
seemingly authoritarian, totalitarian or seemingly illiberal regimes. In such cases, wars may be caused 
by calculations and miscalculations based on interests, misunderstandings and mutual suspicions, such 
as those that characterised the propaganda and arms race between the West and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold-War or the current troubles with Middle Eastern nations.   
 
Thus, nationalists argue that the state is the ultimate platform under which to protect the territorial 
borders of the nation and its citizens. Without the state apparatus, including the military, but also the 
democratic institutions, there may be an increase in conflict and a decrease in conflict resolution.   
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4.11  Conclusion 
 
Benedict Anderson has written that ‘nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value of our 
time.’744  Certainly the legitimacy of the idea of nationhood manifests itself constantly.  Firstly, the 
actors who constitute the political world – citizens as well as politicians, bureaucrats and activists – 
almost always see themselves as representatives of, or affiliated to, a particular national identity. For 
example, politicians routinely go to the negotiating table in bodies such as the United Nations, the 
European Union, or the World Trade Organisation, to defend or advance their national interests. 
Secondly, the ruling bodies of state often seek to heighten the national consciousness or national 
cohesion by employing devices such as claiming that the voice of the state is also the will of the 
nation.
745
 In other words, these bodies see themselves as working in ‘the national interest’; the state is 
the institution, or the set of institutions, that defends the supreme interests of its citizens.
746
  A third 
demonstration of the prevalence of nationalism, in the modern world, may be evident in the popularity 
of flags, national anthems, public ceremonies and national holidays.
747
  Indeed, such is the level of 
acceptance of the concept of nationalism that many would say that ‘it is the primary way in which the 
world has been conceived.’748 Thus, nationalism has become the language of mass politics and 
popular opinion.  
 
Nationalism certainly creates a sense of belonging amongst its adherents. Thus, whilst the national 
community is not automatically, or necessarily, the only basis for society, it is clear that when 
employed it is an extremely powerful mode of unification which is capable of bringing otherwise 
competing identities together.
749
 Perhaps this is, at least in part, because nationalism represents the 
idea of popular self government; the idea that government is either carried out by the people or for the 
people, in accordance with the ‘national interest’. Much of nationalist thinking is closely linked with 
democratic sentiments, and with the idea that ‘the people should have some say in their own 
government.’750 Nationalism also represents the notion that the members of a nation share common 
sympathies and similar outlooks.   
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In  the security and defence arena, politicians often appeal to perceived common and patriotic beliefs 
by claiming their policies to be in accordance with the ‘nature’ or the ‘spirit’ of the national 
community and, therefore, ‘the voice of the people’.751 For example, the recent Government report  ‘A 
strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’, declares that: ‘Our national 
interest requires us to stand up for the values our country believes in – the rule of law, democracy, 
free speech, tolerance and human rights. Those are the attributes for which Britain is admired in the 
world and we must continue to advance them, because Britain will be safer if our values are upheld 
and respected in the world.’752  What is perhaps most noteworthy about such statements is that the 
appeal to patriotic sentiment, particularly when delivered using rhetorical language, can have 
significant effects on national security thinking and decision-making.  For example, it could be used 
as a device to normalise and legitimise military preparation and emergency preparedness measures, 
which may otherwise encounter strong opposition from the public.  Indeed, with regard to the alleged 
‘war on terror,’ it has been claimed that the use of emotive phrases such as: ‘There should be no 
doubt, we are at war, and it is a world war,’753 and ‘we cannot let our enemies strike first,’754 have 
been employed to promote the alleged farthest reaching counter-terrorism campaign in history, and 
may have come to define the domestic and international political environment.
755
  This includes a 
military dimension involving major wars; the expansion of the UK’s military presence overseas; the 
increasing use of intelligence gathering both worldwide and domestically; possible complicity in 
extreme means of interrogation, including allegations of torture; and the widespread use of coercion 
and foreign aid to enlist the support of other countries.  It may also have led to an idea of security 
which is more concerned with prevention, rather than defence.  The point is that prevention takes 
‘insecurity’, rather than security, as the underlying value of security politics.’756  Thus, ‘whilst 
defence implies protection, safety and trust, prevention operates on the basis of permanent feelings of 
fear, anxiety and unease.’ 757  It is these feelings which could be harnessed by politicians to enhance 
their persuasiveness when introducing security or military measures which may be unpopular. Taken 
along with the assertion that British values are worthy of defence, it can also give the impression that 
the government is upholding a supposed national character or sentiment.   
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However, in recent years, the measures adopted to maintain national security in the face of supposed 
threats to these values has led to ongoing debate, particularly in regard to the appropriate scale and 
role of authority in matters of civil and human rights.  Although national security measures may be 
imposed to protect society as a whole, many such measures can potentially restrict the rights and 
freedoms of individuals in society.
758
  Thus, some thinkers may express concerns that where the 
exercise of national security and power is not subject to ‘good’ governance; the rule of law and strict 
legal or constitutional checks and balances, there is a risk that national security may simply serve as a 
pretext for suppressing unfavourable political and social views.
759
  Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
view contends that measures which may ostensibly serve a national security purpose, such as 
surveillance and law enforcement mechanisms, could ultimately lead to an Orwellian dystopia.
760
   
Thus, tension exists between the preservation of the state in the sense of maintaining political 
stability, self-determination and sovereignty, and the rights and freedoms of individual. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CULMINATION AND REALISATION OF THE CIVIL 
LIBERTARIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDAS 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
The previous two chapters have been concerned with developing an understanding of the values 
underpinning both the liberal agenda and the framework of interpretation that informs the claims 
made by those who support a national security agenda.  This chapter will seek to further elucidate 
both the benefits and disadvantages of each of these two ideologies.  It will achieve this by assessing 
the full impact of each ideology if its standards and norms were ever comprehensively incorporated 
into security policy.  The chapter will ask: what form would security policy take if it were totally 
prescribed by liberal thinkers? Similarly, how would the security agenda operate if an ideal 
conservative or nationalist security agenda were ever fully implemented?  The objective of this 
chapter is to assist in better understanding any discrepancies between the ideological assumptions of 
these two groups and what they actually deliver in practice.   
 
The chapter will begin by examining the key tenets of an ideal liberal security agenda.  To this end, 
the analysis will consider the ways in which security would be interpreted if it were to fully respect 
the human rights and civil liberties of the individual.  The second part of the chapter will depict an 
image of national security policy if it were totally prescribed by nationalist and conservative thinkers 
and, as such, was unaffected by the constitutional and legal constraints insisted upon by liberals.  Both 
stages of the chapter will assess the criticisms that may be levelled at each of these two approaches to 
defining national security.    
 
 
5.2  The Liberal Approach to National Security 
 
In the security arena, the liberal approach to state power may effectively mean that whilst the 
requirement of national security is seen as vitally important, such considerations should not lead to 
arbitrary actions by state officials, such as the security agencies, who may undermine the privacy 
rights of an individual.
761
  Rather, in its ideal shape, the state is constructed by free individuals to 
uphold a framework of law within which they might pursue their own ends to the betterment of 
themselves and society.
762
  Idealistically then, the state is to be characterised by a constitutional 
government which includes a system of checks and balances amongst major institutions, fair and 
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regular elections, a democratic franchise, a competitive party system and the protection of individual 
rights.
763
   
 
With particular regard to the activities of the security agencies, such constitutional principles may 
embody the subsequent four major concepts. Firstly that the exercise of state power, including covert 
surveillance operations, should respect human and civil rights – in particular privacy rights.764  
Secondly, the rule of law would require that warrants for covert action by the security agencies should 
be subject to strict legal limits, and there should be clear legal redress for the citizen in cases where 
surveillance warrants have been granted unnecessarily or unlawfully.
765
  Thirdly, that the powers 
conferred on institutions within a state – whether executive or judicial – should be sufficiently limited 
and dispersed between the various institutions of government so as to avoid the abuse of power.
766
 
And finally, that the government in formulating policy, and the legislature in legitimating that policy, 
are accountable to the electorate on whose trust their power is held.
767
  The subsequent paragraphs 
will elaborate on these core liberal ideals.   
 
 
5.3  The Exercise of State Power Must Respect Human and Civil rights 
 
In the ideal liberal state, the exercise of state power should conform to the notion of respect for the 
individual and his or her human and civil rights.  In other words, the principles that inform security 
policy should optimise the rights of the individual and security legislation should seek to prioritise the 
principle of limited government. Key civil and human rights such as privacy, freedom of religion, 
speech, press, assembly and free markets should be of primary importance.  At its most extreme, this 
approach to security may effectively prioritise the liberation of the citizen over and above the 
traditional state-centric ideals of national security.  For example, Ken Booth argues for an 
understanding of security that places people, rather than states, as the focus of security.  For Booth, 
security means the emancipation of the people.  He states: ‘Emancipation is the freeing of people (as 
individuals or groups) from those physical constraints which stop them carrying out what they would 
freely choose to do. War, and the threat of war, is one of those constraints, together with poverty, 
poor education and political oppression and so on.’768  Booth goes on to explain that: ‘Security and 
emancipation are two sides of the same coin.  Emancipation, not power or order produces true 
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security.  Emancipation, theoretically, is security.’769 Booth’s arguments focus on the individual and 
the security of the state is not the primary object of security.   
 
However, whilst many liberals may support Booth’s arguments that emancipation and security are 
concepts which should be closely linked, liberals may well accept that individuals should not be 
‘emancipated’ from restraint where their actions cause harm or injury to others.770  For many liberals, 
liberty does not mean licence.  It does not represent the freeing of people to ‘do what they like’,771 but 
rather, the enabling of them to make the best of themselves and contribute to the well-being of the 
community.  In the words of Elliott Dodds: ‘True freedom means that opportunity shall be given to 
every man, woman and child...to live out the best that is in them and to develop their faculties for the 
service of their fellows.’772  A similar point was made by Lord Acton: ‘Liberty is not the power of 
doing what we like, but the right of doing what we ought.’773  Thus, whilst liberals may emphasise 
individual rights and freedom, there tends to be recognition that some conduct should be restricted. 
Mill’s, for instance, suggested that where there is harm to others stemming from individual behaviour, 
there is a justification for the state and the criminal law intervening. He asserted that, 
‘the…consequences of his acts do not then fall upon himself, but on others; and society, as the 
protector of all its members, must retaliate on him.’774  However, for liberals, the danger must 
ultimately be a threat to some fundamental aspect of the citizen’s well-being.  Liberals may be 
unwilling to take danger to mean danger to some subjective attribute of society, such as its moral 
health, and may be hostile to characterising the likelihood of shocking or offending citizens as a 
concrete harm justifying the suppression of a right.
775
    Thus, the ideal liberal state may be less likely 
to trade off civil liberties to satisfy the requirements of a national security agenda.  Whilst, in certain 
instances, liberals may accept that violent attempts to influence a nation’s political processes are not 
compatible with the institutions and ideals of a liberal democratic society,
776
 they may believe that the 
exercise of power, even where it concerns national security, should conform to principles of 
accountability, proportionality and due process of law.
777
  The security agencies must ensure that there 
is a basis in law for the invasion of privacy or any other intrusion into the lives of individuals.
778
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These laws should be clear, publicised, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the 
security of persons and property.
779
 
 
In this conception of the ideal state, legislation which would inhibit fundamental political rights, such 
as non-violent protest and free speech, could be declared unconstitutional and subjected to repeal or 
amendment.  Liberals are unlikely, for example, to accept provisions, such as those found in the 
Terrorism Act 2006, which prohibit the praise or celebration of terrorism in a way that makes others 
think they should emulate such attacks.
780
  For liberals, legislation such as this could potentially be 
used against those that resort to legitimate protest, perhaps against a repressive regime or an overly 
authoritarian government.
781
  Civil libertarian pressure groups have frequently expressed concerns that 
law enforcers may misuse residual common law and statutory powers to intimidate protesters.
782
  For 
example, there has been widespread unease about the use of stop and search powers under section 44 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the use of powers under section 50 of the Police Reform Act 2002.
783
 
The 2002 Act makes it a criminal offence to fail to give a name and address when asked by a police 
constable who has reason to believe that a person has been acting in an anti-social manner.  For 
liberals, these provisions, and others contained in the Public Order Acts, may ‘turn an already blurred 
distinction between civil law and criminal law on its head’,784 and, any misapplication to peaceful 
protesters may pose a threat to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.    
 
With regard to the security agencies, both the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and other 
Acts governing the security agencies, could be subject to extensive amendments.  Firstly, certain 
clauses which define the role of the security agencies may need to be clarified to make them more 
easily ascertainable and to ensure that surveillance activity is fully prescribed by law.   For example, 
the vague and broad terms which are currently used to describe ‘subversion’ and ‘serious crime’ in the 
Security Service Act 1989, may undergo extensive revision.  Section 1 of the Security Service Act 
1989, currently describes subversion in terms of protection ‘from actions intended to overthrow or 
undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’.785  For liberals, the 
problem may be that, as phrased, it is possible to interpret peaceful demonstrations as subversive, and 
therefore, as a legitimate target of covert investigations by the security agencies or other law 
enforcers. To prevent this, liberals may call for the words ‘political’ and ‘industrial’ to be dropped 
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from the Act, leaving only ‘violence’ as a legal reason for the government to interfere with public 
protest.      
 
All surveillance under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act could be subjected to stringent 
legal safeguards.  This may mean that both the number of public authorities that have access to 
surveillance powers may be reduced to a minimum and that the purposes for which intrusive 
surveillance could be authorised would be restricted in scope. For liberals, in order to comply with the 
requirements of the rule of law, state bodies, such as the security agencies, should be accountable to 
those whom they purport to serve and, therefore, there should be mechanisms that provide due process 
of law and access to justice by competent, independent and ethical adjudicators.
786
 The adjudicating 
body would be required to ensure that any authorisation for surveillance is strictly legal, necessary 
and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  In this climate, it may not be adequate, for example, 
to allow the Home Secretary to authorise warrants for surveillance.  Liberals have traditionally 
rejected legislation such as that found in 5(2) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which provides 
for the Home Secretary to issue a warrant 'in respect of any property so specified or in respect of any 
wireless telegraphy so specified.’ 787 For liberals, these requirements may seem imprecise and 
ambiguous. Therefore, whilst the Act provides that the Secretary of State should be satisfied that 
'what the action seeks to achieve cannot reasonably be achieved by other means,’788 liberals may 
assert that it is not possible to ascertain how far these warrants are subjected to serious scrutiny, or 
how far, assuming that they are taken seriously, a Home Secretary would be able to detect weaknesses 
in a given case.
789
  Obviously, these matters would depend partly on the particular Home Secretary in 
question, but applications have very rarely been rejected and, as Lustgatarten and Leigh point out, 
'political considerations as well as legal ones may enter into the approval.’790 
 
In addition to the safeguard of an independent judicial warrant, there may also need to be mechanisms 
in place to ensure that, where there is any unlawful interference into the individual rights of a citizen, 
there is an effective remedy available in the courts. This may mean that there could be an overhaul of 
the way in which the Investigatory Powers Tribunal adjudicates.
791
 This body may be required to 
increase its transparency during hearings, rather than adjudicating behind closed doors as is currently 
the practice. 
792
  It is not inconceivable that the Tribunal would be required to provide written details 
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of its judgments and the reasons for its final decision.  Indeed, since liberals are dedicated to open, 
clear, and accessible justice, there may even be a case for suggesting that the target of a surveillance 
operation must be informed that a warrant has been issued.
793
  Liberals may argue that this gives the 
citizen an additional layer of protection in that it opens the possibility for him or her to seek legal 
redress in the courts if covert operations have been authorised illegally or conducted improperly.  
 
Placing people rather than states as the ultimate focal point of security would certainly lead to a 
rejection of much contemporary political thought on the nature of threats, and consequently, the 
measures taken to overcome them. The point is that, in the liberal conception, security may be 
adversely affected by the state – the state is a threat to citizens as well as their protector.  For civil 
libertarian thinkers, the repeal and amendment of provisions which impede personal autonomy could 
ensure that the liberal preference for a minimal state was upheld and that security agency activity 
would be subject to the rule of law.  For liberals, the benefit of the rule of law is that it may ensure 
that the rights of individuals are determined by legal rules and not the arbitrary behaviour of 
authorities.
794
  Thus, liberals prefer systems of constitutionalism.   
 
 
5.4  Constitutionalism and the Liberal Ideal   
 
For liberals, the concept of security is often closely linked to the ideals of constitutionalism.  In other 
words, in addition to securing the borders of state from hostile attack, the security of the citizen also 
depends upon their protection from an excessively authoritarian state, which may undermine civil and 
property rights.
795
  Whilst constitutionalism has a variety of meanings, it is most generally thought of 
as a complex of ideas, attitudes and patterns of behaviour elaborating the principle that the authority 
of government derives from, and is limited by, a body of fundamental law.
796
  Throughout the 
literature dealing with public and administrative law, the central element of the concept of 
constitutionalism is that, in political society, government officials should not be free to do anything 
they please in any manner they choose.
797
  Rather, they are bound to observe both the limitations on 
power, and the procedures, which are set out in the ‘supreme’ constitutional law of the nation in 
which they are operating.
798
  It may be argued, therefore, that the touchstone of constitutionalism is 
the concept of limited government under a higher law.
799
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 For some liberals, the UK offers an unsatisfactory substitute for an ideal constitution because it is 
uncodified.
800
   Thus, whilst much of the British constitution is found in written documents, such as 
statutes, court judgments and treaties, the constitution has other unwritten sources, including 
constitutional conventions and the Royal Prerogative. For liberals, the problem with conventions may 
be that they are not enforceable by the courts and the Royal Prerogative can be used to initiate 
sweeping powers that may undermine the rights of the citizens and the rule of law.
801
  For liberals, 
these issues may be further created and underpinned by the principle of Parliamentary supremacy, and 
the particular way in which the rule of law and the separation of powers are given effect in the UK.  
The following paragraphs will explore the ways in which liberals may seek to change or adapt the UK 
constitution to better protect the security of the individual as defined by liberal ideals.  The following 
topic areas will be explored: 
 
 Parliamentary supremacy and the introduction of a Bill of Rights. 
 Strengthening the separation of powers. 
 The liberal relationship with democracy.   
 
 
5.1. Parliamentary Supremacy 
 
Parliamentary supremacy concerns the principle that Parliament may create, amend or repeal any law; 
that it may not be bound by its predecessors; and that, no court can question the validity of an Act of 
Parliament.
802
  The doctrine effectively means that Parliament, as the democratically elected branch of 
government, has absolute sovereignty and is supreme over all other government institutions, including 
the executive and judicial bodies.    
 
The doctrine of supremacy can mean that Parliament is able to create legislation which may eliminate, 
or reduce, fundamental civil and property rights which liberals may consider untouchable.  Thus, 
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some liberals may claim that in an ideal liberal state, there should be a special class of constitutional 
document, such as an entrenched Bill of Rights, which cannot be amended by Parliament alone.  In 
other words, Acts such as the Human Rights Act 1998, should be embedded into UK law in a way 
which guarantees that the Act, or parts of it, can never be expressly or impliedly repealed.     
 
When it comes to providing for the protection of the citizen by means of a Bill of Rights, it has been 
said that ‘intelligence may well be the final frontier insofar as human rights are concerned.’803  Thus, 
whilst the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was allegedly enacted in order to ensure 
compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has been argued that the RIPA did not 
grant any new surveillance powers to the security agencies.  Rather, what it did was to legalise their 
use by instituting authorisation procedures in order to ’make them judge proof against human rights 
challenges.’804 
 
For liberals, in order to fully comply with the rights protected by The European Convention on 
Human Rights, an ideal liberal Bill of Rights would generate law that is clearer, more accessible and 
more certain in its scope and application.   This could have a significant effect on security related 
legislation and on the way in which the intelligence agencies are ultimately governed.   Liberals may 
suggest, for example, that any UK Bill of Rights contains a provision which would force a five yearly 
review, and an independent  report to Parliament, of any legislation that potentially affects 
Convention rights, including that which authorises covert surveillance.  This may ensure that 
legislation such as the RIPA, which is not subject to a sunset clause, is prevented from remaining 
permanent and unchanged because it would be guaranteed regular Parliamentary scrutiny.   
 
With regards to the content of the legislation, there may be calls to limit acts of intelligence gathering 
by insisting that there is a more clearly defined ‘threshold criteria’ that may trigger intrusive action by 
the security agencies.  Indeed, it has already been suggested that failure to make these clear 
distinctions can lead to ‘blurred lines of accountability and to the risk that special powers are used in 
routine situations where there is no pre-eminent threat to the population.’805  One example of a 
surveillance activity that may not reach the minimum threshold is the use of data mining. The data 
mining technique involves analysing the information on various databases according to a number of 
variables such as ethnic origin, colour, sex, political opinions, philosophical and other beliefs, as well 
as trade union membership.  For some liberals, the use of data mining may cross the boundary 
between permissible targeted surveillance and unnecessary mass surveillance which could potentially 
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amount to an unlawful interference into the private life of the individual.  Indeed, a report by the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur suggests that there is ‘an inherent danger of over-inclusiveness in 
data mining,’806 particularly ‘as the technical capabilities of this technique can tempt the user towards 
broadening the definition of what is considered suspicious.’807   For liberal thinkers, the legislation 
generated by an ideal Bill of Rights should prevent the security agencies from gathering information 
merely because it may useful. Rather, it should insist that intelligence is only gathered for a specific 
and defined purpose.   
 
In the liberal ideal, the creation of a new Bill of Rights may also make it possible for the courts to 
preside over a more open system of redress for those targeted for surveillance operations.  As 
currently enacted, one problem is that the target person of a surveillance operation is unlikely to 
discover that covert action is taking place. Thus, it seems unlikely that anyone will discover whether 
there was a breach of the provisions of the Act.  Furthermore, even where a person does become 
aware that a surveillance operation is taking place, the only form of redress is via the Tribunal of 
Investigatory Powers. It is arguable that the decisions of this Tribunal are less likely to be impartial 
and unbiased given that its deliberations and judgments are largely kept secret. Furthermore, there is 
no right of appeal from the Tribunal in most cases and the applicant has only 1 year to bring his 
complaint.
808
 
 
Overall then, initiating a new Bill of Rights could be useful to some liberals as an opportunity to 
introduce further Parliamentary and judicial safeguards against any wrongful abrogation of rights and 
freedoms – it  could spell out more clearly the conditions that would need to be met in order to justify 
any surveillance operation carried out by the security agencies.   
 
 
5.4.2  The Separation of Powers 
 
An essential element of an ideal liberal state concerns the notion that the powers conferred on 
institutions within a state – whether executive, legislative or judicial – are sufficiently dispersed 
between the various institutions of government so as to avoid the abuse of power.  The essence of this 
doctrine is that the powers vested in the principle institutions of state should not be concentrated in the 
hands of any one institution.  For example, Montesquieu described the division of political power 
among an executive, a legislature, and the judiciary.   He perceived a separation of powers among the 
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808
 Unless the Tribunal itself considers it equitable to extend the 1 year period.   
monarch, parliament, and the courts of law.  Montesquieu paid much attention to the independence of 
the judiciary, which he claimed ‘has to be real and not apparent merely.’809  Indeed, the judiciary is 
often seen by liberals as the most important of the three state organs. Perhaps, this is because it can 
provide a check on the powers of the other two branches of power – namely the legislature and the 
executive. The point is that the judiciary can potentially make judgments in response to the abuse of 
discretion, corruption, collusion or other abuses of power. Thus, it may be able to prevent the 
potential for tyranny which might otherwise exist.  
 
However, the separation of these powers in the UK is much less distinct than in many nations because 
there is a greater overlap between the executive and the legislature.   In the UK, Parliament provides 
the personnel of the executive in that, Ministers in charge of government departments are also 
members of one of the Houses of Parliament.    Thus, far from the executive being separate from the 
legislature, they are actually drawn from its ranks.  This may lead to an apparent dominance of the 
executive in that it is much easier to put its policies into legislative practice. Thus, it has been 
criticised by some liberals. 
 
The ideal liberal state may seek to provide a constitutional framework in which the separation 
between the three principle organs of state is much more pronounced, at least as far as it is compatible 
with governmental practicability.  Thus, the head of the executive (perhaps the Prime Minister) would 
not be able to hold a seat in Parliament, nor would he be directly answerable to it.   He would need to 
be elected separately.  In the same way, members of Parliament would be prevented from being 
appointed to the executive branch of government.  In this way, the head of the executive would not 
control the business of Parliament. With regard to security, this would mean that, whilst the head of 
the executive may be able to recommend security related legislation to Parliament, he would not be 
able to ensure or enforce its enactment.  This may make it much more difficult to force through 
legislative measures that are unpopular, or even unsavoury, in that they could lead to the misuse of 
power, or which may unnecessarily undermine the liberty of the citizen.   
 
 
5.5  The Government Should be Accountable to the Electorate 
 
Liberals may advocate an extended franchise because it is thought that when citizens have a vote, 
which gives them control over their government, they will ensure that the government acts in a way 
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which is consistent with their interests.
810
 This preference for democratic principles is, perhaps, best 
explained in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address of 1863, in which he extolled the virtues of 
‘government of the people, by the people and for the people.’811  Thus, the ideal liberal state is not to 
be organised and controlled by an aristocratic elite. In the words of Thomas Paine in his ‘The Rights 
of Man’,812 there are ‘two modes of government which exist in the world - government by ‘election and 
representation’ and government by ‘hereditary succession’.  The first is known as a republic, and is 
based on ‘reason’; the second is monarchy and aristocracy, and is based on ‘ignorance.’813   
 
The liberal conception of democracy may owe much of its historical background to the writings of 
John Locke.
814
  Locke perceived a social contract between individuals and the state which involved 
the citizen in handing over certain powers (most importantly, a monopoly of coercive force) to the 
government in return for the guarantee of certain rights and protection to ‘lives, liberties and estates.’  
Lock’s conception asserted that although the government had a legitimate right to rule, and to use the 
law for the good of the people, the right was conditional and limited by the ultimate right of the 
people to overthrow a government which violated its trust.  By insisting that government held its 
power on trust, Locke was indirectly claiming the sovereignty of the people over the government. As 
Locke professed: ‘The legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains 
still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find that the 
legislative act contrary to the trust reposed on them…. Thus, the community perpetually retains a 
supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even their legislators, 
whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and 
properties of the subject.’815  Thus, Locke’s conception suggests that political authority ‘comes from 
below.’  Government arises out of the agreement or consent of individuals. The state is created by 
individuals and for individuals: It exists to serve their needs and interests.  Political authority must, 
therefore, be legitimate, it must be justifiable or acceptable in the eyes of those who are subject to it. 
Legitimate government should be rooted in the consent of those to whom its authority extends and the 
government ought to be accountable to those whose rights it purports to protect.  This implies that 
citizens do not have an obligation to observe all laws or accept any form of government.  Government 
may forsake legitimacy where it breaks the terms of the contract, in which case, the people may have 
a right of rebellion.
816
 Locke thus introduced two ideas which are central to liberalism today - that the 
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overriding purpose for the State is the securing and protection of its citizen’s basic liberties,817 and 
that  there should be some democratic accountability.  
 
However, the relationship between the ideals of liberalism and the ideals of democracy is not without 
tension.
818
  Firstly, democracy may only respect the majority at the point of electing representatives.
819
  
After an election, the real power is held by a small representative body, who in effect therefore, are a 
minority.  This may effectively mean that a small number of elected representatives may make 
decisions and policies about how a nation is governed, the laws that govern the lives of it citizens, and 
so on.  This has led to arguments that representative democracy is merely a decoration over an 
oligarchy or a plutocracy.
820
   
 
Secondly, since democracy, in its simplest terms, can be described as the theory of legitimate rule by 
the majority, it can in certain circumstances lead to the totalitarian rule of the majority who could 
ruthlessly violate the rights of minority groups. This concept is often referred to as the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’.821 In practice, this alleged ‘tyranny’ refers to the notion that the rights of the majority may 
take priority over the rights of a minority that holds a dissenting view, particularly if that view 
challenges existing political and social norms.
822
 For example, the so called ‘majority’ may justify 
introducing some limits on certain rights to prevent anti-democratic speech, or attempts to undermine 
human rights, or on speech that may promote and justify terrorism. However, in each case the 
democratic right of the individual person may potentially be undermined by any excessive derogation 
from standard civil rights.   
 
In practice then, liberal opinions may be divided on how far democracy can extend to include the 
enemies of democracy. For some, if relatively small numbers of people are excluded from certain 
freedoms for these reasons, then a country may still legitimately claim itself to be a liberal democracy. 
For others, majority rule is preferable to other systems and the tyranny of the majority is, in any case, 
preferable to the tyranny of a minority.  For still others, democracy may be upheld where alleged 
opponents of democracy have access to due process of law in the courts and where the rule of law 
                                                             
817 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690. 
818 For discussion of the complexities of the relationship between liberalism and democracy see: Bobbio Norberto, 
Liberalism and Democracy, Originally published as Liberalismo e Democrazia, Franco Angelo Libri, 1988. 
819 For a discussion of self-correcting majoritarian democracy, see: Craig, Dicey: Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and 
Public Law, (1990) 106 LQR 105. 
820 See comments in: Lord Acton, The History of Freedom in Antiquity, An Address to the Members of the Bridgnorth 
Institute, 1877. 
821 For a discussion on the tyranny of the majority and democracy see: Lord Acton, The History of Freedom in Antiquity, An 
Address to the Members of the Bridgnorth Institute, 1877.  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 185. 
822 The notion that, in a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannise and exploit diverse smaller 
interests has been criticized by Mancur Olson in the Logic of Collective Action.  Olson claims that when the benefits of 
political action (e.g., lobbying) are spread over fewer agents, there is a stronger individual incentive to contribute to that 
political activity. Narrow groups, especially those who can reward active participation to their group goals, might therefore 
be able to dominate or distort political processes, Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard Economic Studies, 
Vo. CXXIV, 1965. 
prevails. Here, it is argued that the presence of a constitutional system, which can protect the rights of 
citizens, may act as a safeguard where state power is misused.  However, perhaps in the ideal liberal 
state, changes to these constitutions would require the agreement of a ‘super-majority’, for example, 
one which may be gained from a separate referendum, or an election in which a larger majority than is 
normal would be required to make the change.  This means that a majority may, to some degree, 
legitimately coerce a minority because gaining agreement was significantly harder.   
 
 
5.6  The Benefits and Criticisms of the Liberal Approach to Security  
 
The practical benefits of an ideal liberal state are perhaps best summed up in a statement by A. J. P. 
Taylor. Taylor captures the individualist character of English life during the century before the 
outbreak of the First World War.  He suggested that ‘Until August 1914 a sensible, law abiding 
Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state beyond the post office 
and the policeman.  He could live where he liked and as he liked.  He had no official number or 
identity card.  He could travel abroad, or leave his country forever, without a passport or any sort of 
official permission.  He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit.  
He could buy goods from any country in the world on the same terms as he bought goods at home.  
For that matter, a foreigner could spend his life in this country without permit and without informing 
the police.  Unlike the countries on the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to 
perform military service.  An Englishman could enlist, if he chose, in the regular army, the navy or 
the territorial’s.  He could also ignore, if he chose, the demands of national defence.  Substantial 
householders were occasionally called on for jury service.  Otherwise, only those who wished to do 
so, helped the state. …It left the citizen alone.’823 
 
Taylor’s observation embodies a key liberal ideal – that the optimal state is one in which there is 
minimal intervention into the affairs of individuals - the citizen is to be left alone to manage his or her 
own affairs.
824
 As noted in the previous chapter, the liberal justification for this view is that 
individuals should be free to pursue their self-interest without control or restraint by society - 
individual rights should exist independently of government because they are natural, inherent and 
inalienable. Indeed, those advocating a minimal state often argue that the only function of state bodies 
should be the protection of individuals from aggression, theft, breach of contract and fraud.  In other 
words, an ideal liberal state should consist of very few branches of government and the only 
legitimate governmental institutions should be the police, judicial systems, prisons and the military 
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 For liberals, the principle of minimal government embodies two major attitudes towards the state in 
particular and political authority in general.  Firstly, the ideal liberal state should embody the interests 
of all its citizens. This, according to liberals, is best achieved where the state simply leaves the 
individual alone to pursue his own interests.
825
 The state should merely act as an impartial umpire 
when individuals or groups come into conflict with each other.
826
  Secondly, it suggests that 
government is created by individuals for individuals.  Government arises out of the agreement, or 
consent, of the governed and it exists in order to serve their needs and interests.
827
   
 
Whilst nationalists may find the concepts of individual freedom and constitutionalism attractive, those 
thinkers advocating a state-centred national security agenda, may still reject some of the ideals of 
liberalism. This is because the promotion of human rights, whilst seen as desirable, tends to be seen as 
competing with, or even compromising, core issues of national security.  In other words, upholding 
human rights is often seen as a luxury to be pursued when the government has the spare diplomatic 
capacity and national security is not being jeopardized.  The result of this thinking is that, under a 
predominantly national security agenda, there may be a predisposition to trade off liberty and 
constitutionalism in favour of security concerns, such as defeating terrorism. Thus, rather than 
protecting the civil and democratic rights of individuals, the primary concern of the national security 
agenda is to ensure the survival of the nation state, its territories, its governmental institutions and its 
right to self determination.  The remaining chapters will examine these state-centred approaches to 
national security in more detail 
 
 
5.7  The Culmination and Realisation of a State-Centred Agenda for National Security 
 
Security – being or feeling safe from danger – is usually a condition that is widely held to be of great 
value.  Politicians are often willing to exert considerable effort and devote considerable resources to 
ensuring that there is adequate protection from actual or perceived harm.  Here, security tends to be 
broadly about the pursuit of freedom from the threats posed by, for example, the hostile intentions of 
other states, terrorism, espionage, crime and the sabotage of the critical national infrastructure. In 
short, it is about preserving the nation state and its established systems of government. 
 
Preserving the nation state and its governing apparatus may prioritise certain elements of security over 
and above other interests. The predominant security concern of those advocating a national security 
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agenda may involve supporting imperatives such as: maintaining effective armed forces; marshalling 
economic power to facilitate or compel cooperation from other states and ensuring the resilience of 
the critical national infrastructure.
828
 In addition to these factors, protecting national security also 
includes: implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness measures; utilising the intelligence 
agencies to detect and defeat potential or actual threats to external or internal security; and enacting 
and implementing security related legislation such as anti terrorism measures.   
 
Thus, an ‘ideal state’, governed exclusively by the priorities of national security, may entail a strong 
military force designed to ensure the survival of its territories from the threat of invasion and/or 
annexation. There may also be an emphasis on the right of the security agencies to conduct 
surveillance and other covert operations, oriented towards the optimisation of state security, without 
the fear of redress and with limited, or even no, legal-constitutional accountability. Security related 
legislation could be rigorously enforced. This could include increased stop and search powers; the 
capacity to detain potentially hostile individuals without the need for a warrant or court appearance; 
the ability to freeze, and even confiscate, the funds of such individuals or groups; and the ability to 
limit or suspend so-called ‘basic rights’, such as free speech and association, wherever this appears to 
undermine security interests which are deemed to have an overriding quality.   
 
The subsequent paragraphs will examine the ramifications of these ideals were they to be fully, or 
unreservedly, incorporated into national security policy. The discussion will begin by exploring the 
possible measures that could realise the ideals of security on a military and economic level.  The 
discussion will then consider how a strong national security agenda could affect the measures used to 
uphold law and order. In this respect the chapter will explore the potential for the increased use of 
surveillance measures, and measures that may limit public protest, where this is seen as being against 
the national interest, or where it is used to prevent and detect crime.   This section of the chapter will 
also look at the emergency preparedness measures that may be adopted to protect the critical national 
infrastructure from internal or external attack.  Finally, the chapter will discuss how those seeking a 
stronger national security agenda may seek to promote and to protect the UK’s national identity both 
at a domestic and an international level.  This entails encouraging patriotic loyalty and pride in the 
nation.   
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5.8 The Establishment of Military and Economic Power 
 
A major aspect of security for traditionalists concerns military issues and the use of force.
829
  In this 
conception of security, the international system may be seen as a ‘brutal arena’830 in which ‘daily life 
is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in 
the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position’.831 According to 
Mearsheimer, this thinking is based on five assumptions which are frequently made about the 
international system. First, that the international system is anarchic. Second, that states inherently 
possess some offensive military capabilities. Third, that states can never be certain about the intention 
of other states. Fourth, that the most basic motive driving states is survival. And finally, that states are 
rational actors which think strategically.
832
 
The assumption that ‘states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and, therefore, 
have little reason to trust each other,’833 may dictate the behaviour of states in the following ways - 
states fear each other; each state aims to guarantee its own survival; and states aim to maximize their 
power. Thus, the conditions in the daily life of the international system may be characterised by 
competition between states and the possibility of war may always be in the background.  For example, 
during the Cold War, when security thinking centred on an idea of national security which was largely 
defined in military terms, the military scene was maintained by the division of the world into two 
poles with a rough balance of military strength between them.
834
  Whilst, the demise of the Cold War 
bipolar structures may have led to new concepts of security in which not only military realities, but 
also the political, social and economic concerns of the post-Cold war world are taken into account,
835
 
military responses to questions of nuclear strategy and deterrence, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the future nature of war, still continue to prevail.
836
   
In the climate described above, the ideal national security state must seek to protect the nation from 
aggressive external forces, such as terrorism, war and the threat of war. Intelligence operations may 
be used to assist the military to obtain information relating to any given country, its intentions and its 
capabilities. In the modern era, this may not just be related to military power, but also to economic 
power, or to intelligence relating to specific resources such as oil, minerals and access to other 
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resources. Intelligence may also be used to obtain information on a particular battle or campaign, such 
as the number of military units, their strengths, or the location of enemy supplies and depots.  In a 
strong national security state, this intelligence gathering may not be hindered by constitutional or legal 
constraints.  As we have seen in the previous chapters, in times of national emergency or war, the 
balance which usually exists between the rights of the individual and national security may tend to be 
skewed in favour of national security.  Thus, the adoption of these measures could have several major 
ramifications for citizens. Firstly, the state may need to operate in a constant state of military 
preparedness in which imperatives concerning war, or the threat of war, are prioritised as core foreign 
policy imperatives. Secondly, there may be increased resort to legal doctrines, such as the Royal 
prerogative, which can allow the government to implement security measures without recourse to 
normative constitutional and legal mechanisms for accountability. Thirdly, and at its most extreme, 
law makers may employ the use of forced military service, in the form of conscription, to expand 
military awareness and power.   
 
 
5.8.1  Military Expansion 
 
Those promoting a stronger national security state, may assert that the civilian population is 
dependent upon, and should therefore be subservient too, the needs and goals of its military for 
continued independence, freedom and prosperity.  In this conception, the maintenance of the military 
is not, as some may claim, a burdensome expense, but a necessary means of ensuring a secure and 
resilient UK, which can project its power onto the worldwide stage.   
 
Achieving recognition on the worldwide stage may require that the UK possesses both military and 
economic strength, along with diplomatic power. Enhancing state power is often closely linked to the 
ideals of security, status, capability and prosperity.  From the standpoint of security, a state may wish 
to protect its sovereignty or strategic interests from repeated or significant challenge. With regards to 
status and capability, it is often claimed that only powerful states can influence, coerce, co-operate or 
compete with other state actors. This is because such influence may need to be backed up with 
mechanisms such as the use of force, economic interaction, pressure, diplomacy and cultural 
exchange.  Since economic interaction is an important element of security, prosperity is often claimed 
to be an interconnected and mutually supportive element of the national interest.
837
  For example, the 
current Government claims that prosperity ‘enables us to afford the skills and capabilities that are 
needed to advance security from training and arms, to technical and scientific expertise and 
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equipment’.838  According to the Government ‘security and prosperity form a virtuous circle.’839  It 
seems that ‘without the security of our land and infrastructure and the ability of our citizens to live 
their lives freely, the foundations of our prosperity, trade, industry, enterprise and education, would 
be undermined.’840  
 
For some persons, military intervention and economic security are also closely tied to concepts of 
freedom and democracy.  David Blunkett, for example, argued that ‘the military engagement in 
Afghanistan illustrates not a war of competing civilizations, but a defence of democratic states from 
terrorist attacks sponsored by deep oppression and brutalisation.’841  In this conception, UK security 
should be concerned with protecting our key national values from potential foreign aggressors.
842
  In 
other words, military strength may be necessary to defend democracy and the rule of law both at 
home and abroad. Military actions are, therefore, sometimes claimed to be justified by furthering an 
overseas humanitarian cause; calming political instability; preventing acts of terrorism; defending 
refugees and providing disaster relief. Thus, it may be argued that military action can, in some 
circumstances, uphold civil liberties rather than diminish them.
843
   
 
In order to maintain these benefits, and to exercise influence in the international environment, security 
advocates may argue that the UK should operate vigilant security measures in which military and 
other threats to UK security interests are constantly assessed and reassessed. Other states, particularly 
probable enemies, may need to be evaluated with regards to their military size, their scientific and 
technological capabilities and their economic resources.  This information, along with information 
about UK resources, can be used to determine ways to improve existing means of diplomatic and 
military activity, including principles and recommendations for the preparation and waging of military 
or economic operations.   
 
It is not inconceivable that the most fervent supporters of a security state may use the need for 
vigilance in security planning to make calls for the intensification of the quality and quantity of 
military measures and the degree of legal and operational latitude that is available for their 
implementation. For example, on a constitutional level, those promoting a strong military state may 
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want to make much more use of the Royal Prerogative than is currently the case.  Perhaps the 
advantage of the Royal Prerogative, for those seeking a stronger national security agenda, is that it 
may potentially allow the government to instigate security measures, including declarations of war, 
without the need to consult Parliament.   
 
 
5.9  Domestic Security 
 
In addition to securing national interests in the military arena, ensuring security may also concern 
maintaining law and order in the domestic arena. David Blunkett, for example, stated that ’securing 
basic social order, and protecting people against attack is a basic function of government’.844 For 
Blunkett, this is a ‘fact that has been recognised since Hobbes penned his famous description of life in 
the ungoverned state as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.’845  
 
Domestic security refers to any governmental actions which are designed to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from acts of terrorism, serious crime, civil uprising and natural disasters.  The targets of 
security protection include centers of population and the critical infrastructure, including 
communications, transportation, energy supply and the government itself.
846
 In recent years, security 
matters concerning information and cyber security have also become a major concern. It is claimed 
that 'with so much of the UK infrastructure and economic activity dependent on information 
technology, cyber attacks have the potential to be extremely disruptive to our daily lives and cause 
significant and costly damage to the economy.’847 Thus, the scope of domestic security extends to 
matters of creating emergency preparedness measures; the use of domestic and international 
intelligence activities to monitor those defined as a national security risk and the enactment and 
enforcement  of legislation, such as the Terrorism Acts, which will regulate the use of criminal and 
civil law enforcement mechanisms. 
 
In the context of creating a robust national security state, the need to respond to both domestic and 
international crisis could be used to justify the creation of stronger legislation and control.  The 
justifying argument tends to be that, in times of national crisis, normal legal and constitutional 
principles should give way to the overriding need to deal with the emergency.  Indeed, in recent years 
the threat to national stability emanating from terrorism has been advanced as a legitimating factor in 
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the development of permanent, as opposed to temporary, terrorism legislation,
848
 which means that we 
now live in a state of ‘permanent emergency.’849  
 
This thinking, particularly if it is taken to its practical limits, may have major ramifications for the 
conduct of domestic life.   A ‘high threat’ climate may make it easier for those seeking a more robust 
model of state security to increasingly resort to emergency preparedness measures. These measures 
could potentially be utilised, for example, to enact temporary or permanent legislation that may deal 
with an alleged catastrophe, or to state surveillance operations, which could increasingly track the 
activities of British subjects.  In turn, this would most likely lead to an enlargement of the legal 
mechanisms with which security measures may be enforced.   
At its most extreme, the terrorist threat could even be used to legitimise a police state.   The term 
‘police state’ describes a state in which the government exercises rigid and repressive controls over 
the social, economic and political life of the population. The inhabitants of a police state may 
experience restrictions on their mobility, and on their freedom to express or communicate political or 
other views, which are subject to police monitoring or enforcement. Political control may be exerted 
by means of a secret police force, such as the security agencies, which may instigate covert 
investigations and operate outside the boundaries normally imposed by a constitutional state.  Indeed, 
any threat to the life of the nation and its citizens may be used to legitimise measures such as the 
introduction mass surveillance and the introduction of biometric identity cards, which each citizen is 
required to carry.
850
  Public protest may be banned or restricted to authorisation by the police,
851
 and 
protest leaders, even politicians, may be arrested under conditions of secrecy.
852
  One example of a 
fully realised surveillance or police state may be the one operated under the KGB in the Soviet Union.  
Here, the state was characterised by the presence of a large elite force acting as a watchdog of a 
security broadly defined as the necessity for the state to maintain an enormous vigilance and 
enforcement apparatus -- this apparatus was not accountable to the public and enjoyed immense 
power.  Indeed, it has been said that ‘every facet of daily life fell into the KGB’s domain.’853   
It seems unlikely that UK decision-makers, even those advocating a strong security agenda, would 
wish to embrace a regime that is as repressive as that which operated in the USSR. However, whilst 
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the UK may not become a ‘police state’ within the strict meaning of this term, it may develop into a 
‘policed state’, in which law enforcers experience an increase in their current powers.  This may 
include, for example, an increase in the power of the police to stop, search, detain and question 
individuals along with a corresponding decrease in the right of that individual to challenge such 
measures.  Here, for instance, the police would not be required to show that there is reasonable 
suspicion that an offence has been, or is being, committed, nor would they need a warrant to search 
the homes and vehicles of those they suspect.  The rights of the detainee could be further reduced by 
the denial of sufficient legal support and advice and an increase in the length of time that a suspect 
may be held without charge.    
These measures could have a significant effect on the relationship between British subjects and the 
government. It is therefore necessary to analyse them in more detail.  
 
5.9.1  Increased Surveillance  
A strong national security state may tend to protect security by ensuring that the activities of its 
subjects, particularly those of a political nature, are adequately monitored.  Thus, there could be more 
use of surveillance, which could allow the government to track the movements of large numbers of 
citizens and visitors. For example, there may be increased checking of an employee’s qualifications, 
political associations and CV’s along with the introduction of identity documents and corresponding 
data bases.   In the modern era, the surveillance state would tend to make the most of today’s 
technologies for mass surveillance.  This could include the use of data bases and pattern recognition 
software to cross correlate information obtained by wire-tapping, including speech recognition and 
telecommunications traffic analysis. Surveillance can also include monitoring financial transactions 
and the use of automatic number plate recognition systems. Indeed, much of the wherewithal to 
achieve such surveillance is already in place in the UK and is being utilised.  It has been argued that 
the UK could be considered to be the most expansive communications surveillance regime in the 
democratic world, with some estimating that there are more than 4.2 million CCTV cameras, the 
equivalent of one camera for every 14 people.
854
  Whist many of these CCTV cameras are privately 
owned and operated, it has been noted in recent years that there has been a rapid growth in the use of 
these covert surveillance techniques by law enforcement agencies in the UK.
855
  
National security advocates may claim strong reasons for enhancing the role of surveillance.  It has 
been argued that ‘mass surveillance is an attractive tool of security because it dispenses with the need 
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to set priorities in advance.’856 The point is that, in theory, surveillance is a preventative measure that 
thwarts danger before it materialises.
857
  In practice, the use of preventative measures may effectively 
mean that, in the face of serious or irreversible harm, lack of full and precise certainty should not be 
used as a reason for inaction or postponement of cost effective measures to prevent such harms. This 
precautious logic, it is claimed ‘becomes a ground not merely for action, but for robust pre-emptive 
measures and the enactment of emergency powers in the face of the unknown’.858 Thus, when it comes 
to security, a preventative course of action may lead to increasing demands for governance of the 
unknowable. In turn, this may fuel a resultant desire for increased data collection, mass surveillance, 
data retention, and biometric ID cards, ‘all of which may be designed to observe everyone, 
everywhere.’859 
The precautionary approach is already well evidenced in anti-terrorism legislation.  Here, the impulse 
to govern at the limits of knowledge may result in several tendencies.  Firstly, offences are commonly 
defined in broad, imprecisely defined terms that may have the potential to criminalise a very wide 
range of activities, some of which are very remote from the actual planning or preparation of any 
specific terrorist act.  Secondly, the potential to commit an offence is targeted at earlier points in time.  
For example, it has often been suggested that the Terrorism Act 2000 contains an immensely broad 
and imprecise definition of terrorism along with a number of widely drafted offences of possession 
and of providing financial support to a terrorist association. No longer need one be identified as an 
actual suspect terrorist to find oneself subject to stringent security measures. Rather, some anti-
terrorism legislation may override traditional limitations in respect of accomplice liability by relying 
on ‘guilt by association’.  Since this has the effect of significantly expanding the scope of liability, it 
can potentially be utilised to permit ‘raids of premises and the stop and search of individuals where 
the conduct of those individuals is only suspected to be at the very furthest margins of terrorist 
activity.’860   
Whilst any excessive capability afforded to the state by which to monitor the lives of individual 
citizens may seem regrettable, those promoting strong national security measures may still claim that, 
in the face of terrorism, existing legislation is inadequate and more needs to be done.  Indeed, in 
recent years there have been increasing political and public demands to intensify the tools of 
surveillance. On a political level, the Prime Minister stated: ‘I do not want to be the Prime Minister 
standing at this dispatch box saying I could have done more to prevent terrorist attacks, but we did 
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not have the courage to take difficult steps.861  The call to enhance state surveillance measures has 
reached European level.  On the 25
th
 March 2004, shortly after the terrorist attacks in Madrid, The 
European Council in its Declaration on Combating Terrorism deliberated the importance of legislative 
measures on traffic data retention.
862
  On the 15
th
 March 2006, the European Union adopted the Data 
Retention Directive,
863
  The Directive requires member states to ensure that communications 
providers retain, for a period between 6 months and 2 years, necessary data as specified in the 
Directive.  The retained data will show the source, destination, date, time and duration of a 
communication.  It will also identify the communication device and the location of mobile 
communication forms.  
By analysing the retained data, governments can identify the location of an individual, an individual’s 
associates and the members of a group, including political opponents.  The data can potentially be 
retained and accessed whether the activity of any given target is lawful or unlawful.  The data is 
required to be made available to ‘competent national authorities’, for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by the member state in its national law.  The 
bodies able to access retained data in the UK are listed in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000.  They include the police, the security agencies and HM Revenue and Customs.  Of worthy note, 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 also gives the Home Secretary powers to change the 
list of bodies with access to retained data through secondary legislation.  This is a power that has been 
utilised. Therefore, the list of authorised bodies has grown and now includes the Food Standards 
Agency, Local Authorities and the National Health Service.
864
  
Opponents of these data retention powers have claimed that the intrusion of privacy is a 
disproportionate response to the threat of terrorism. However, the drive towards increased data 
retention initiatives is ongoing.  In the Queens Speech, on the 8
th
 May 2012, it was announced:  ‘My 
government intends to bring forward measures to maintain the ability of the law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to access vital communications data under strict safeguards to protect the 
public.’865 According to the Home Office, it will implement key proposals for the storage and 
acquisition of internet and e-mail records, including introducing legislation, as necessary by the end of 
June 2015.
866
  The Home Office justification for the introduction of these measures is that they are 
                                                             
861 Queens Speech Debate, 9th May, 2012. 
862 See: Europa Press Releases, Data Retention Directive, Memo/05/328, Brussels 21st September 2005. 
863 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
864 Statutory Instrument 2000, No. 2471, granting additional bodies access to telecoms data. The national Archives, 7 th 
September 2000.   
865 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/queens-speech-2012. 
866 Home Office, Home Office Structural Reform Plan, Monthly Implementation Update, April 2012, para. 5.3. See also the 
comments in: Adam Gersch, Covert Surveillance - A Snoopers Charter, Arch. Rev, 2012, 5, 5-8. 
necessary ‘for the purpose of ‘maintaining the capabilities’ of the police in the interests of public 
safety and national security, and to keep up with terrorism and organised crime.’867  
In this climate of increased surveillance capability, the security agencies and the police may be 
permitted to operate with reduced legal and constitutional control on their powers to mandate checks 
on citizens or records held concerning them.  Rather, they may be encouraged to intensify the use of 
surveillance powers by combining the data retention provisions with other relevant enabling 
legislation. This legislation would include the Security Service Acts of 1989 and 1996 and the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).   With regards to the RIPA, there may be a 
significant increase in the number of public authorities that are empowered to seek warrants for 
surveillance under the Act and the reasons for which they may conduct this surveillance. There may 
also be further intensification of the measures used to collect data. In November 2012, answers to a 
parliamentary enquiry in the German Bundestag revealed that there may be plans in some EU 
countries, including the UK, to extend data retention to chats and postings on social networking 
sites.
868
  Further, there have been claims that the Association of Chief Police Officers has discussed 
plans to collect data, in the UK, from a nationwide network of automatic number plate recognition 
cameras and to store the data for two years.
869
  If such data is linked together, it may be possible to 
track both the movements and the activities of most British subjects, for much of the time.  If it was 
further linked to other enabling legislation, it could be utilised to create a significant increase of the 
number of surveillance targets.  For example, it could be used in tandem with section 1 of the Security 
Service Act.   Section 1 still contains provisions which allow the security agencies to define supposed 
subversives as potential national security threats. Thus, whilst current practice means that the MI5 
activity in countering subversion is assessed as negligible, the enabling Act has never been altered and 
such investigations could be conducted without the need for further amendment or parliamentary 
debate.  
Overall then, the precautionary approaches described above may be utilised to underpin a raft of 
security measures adopted by the government through which to seek to combat terrorism and serious 
crime.  However, these changes in the orientation, values, and organisation of crime control could so 
alter the means of controlling crime that they topple traditional models for analysing criminal justice.  
Indeed, it is argued that core criminal justice principles, not least the presumption of innocence, are 
already  ‘threatened by the pursuit of security, and institutions that are firmly within the system, such 
as policing and sentencing, may be reconfigured to new preventative or security orientated ends. 870  
Thus, whilst the justification for widespread surveillance would tend to be that it is essential for the 
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prevention of serious crime and terrorism which may blight our communities,
871
 the civil right of the 
British subject to his own private space could be significantly affected by the measures.
872
     
 
5.10  Protecting the National Identity and Promoting Patriotic Pride in the Nation 
When it comes to protecting security, political leaders and the intelligence agencies may tend to 
promote the ideal of an organic society, which emphasises the interdependence of every human being, 
over and above individual goals and aspirations. In this conception of security, there may be more 
weight attached to the individual’s sense of citizenship and identity within the nation-state, than on his 
or her rights to live freely from the constraints of society. For example, for David Blunkett, a 
progressive response to the challenge to terrorism and crime ‘must be found in giving content and 
meaning to citizenship and nationality’.873  Whilst for Blunkett, this ‘greater content’ can be found in 
active and real participation in the life of the community and in local and national elections, some  
protagonists of security may demand that the collective identity of the nation forms a part of the 
citizens identity in the sense that belonging to this group must supersede all other considerations.  In 
this conception of a collective identity, there may be an expectation that the patriotic citizen will, in a 
time of war or national emergency, assume great risks for the group, including the loss of his life.  
Thus, the patriotism to which Blunkett may appeal is not without its dangers. Patriotism tends to 
demand unquestioned loyalty to the state from citizens, especially in times of war, or in the face of 
perceived external and internal threats to the security of the nation. Lack of support for the 
government and its policies, made by political opponents, can potentially be labelled as unpatriotic 
and against the will of the nation.   Thus, it is not inconceivable that security thinkers can appeal to 
patriotic emotions in attacking their opponents, implicitly or explicitly accusing them of betraying the 
country. The danger is that any mistrust within communities may potentially be used to legitimise 
policy and legislative measures that would otherwise be unacceptable. For example, in the European 
Union, where once mass surveillance was considered unjustifiable, the impact of the Madrid and 
London Bombings has tended to secure its place as an essential plank of the armoury in the war on 
terror.  The point is that, at its most extreme, the potential threat to security can be applied to a range 
of radical measures. It could, and has, for example, led to the reintroduction of detention orders, or in 
some cases, deportation.   
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5.10.1  Detention and Internment in Conditions of Secrecy. 
 
Internment concerns the imprisonment or confinement of people, usually in large groups, without 
trial.  Perhaps the most infamous example of internment adopted by the British Government was 
implemented during World War II under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939.
874
  This Act, 
which was passed shortly before the outbreak of the war, provided that ‘if the Secretary of State has 
reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations, or to have been 
recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety, or the defence of the realm, or in the 
preparation or instigation of such acts, and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control 
over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained’. Effectively then, 
this Act contained rights for the Secretary of State to suspend Habeas Corpus. There was some 
provision for the Secretary of State to suspend the order and subject the detainee to other conditions 
such as prohibiting or restricting the possession or use of any specified articles; imposing 
employment, business and residential restrictions; and requiring the detainee to notify his movements 
to such authority or person as may be so specified.
875
  The provisions of the Act were utilised in 
September 1939, when the police arrested and detained a large number of Germans living in Britain.  
There was a general perception, in government and public circles, that these people may be Nazi spies 
pretending to be refugees.  
 
The most recent example of detention without charge came under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, which was rushed through Parliament as emergency legislation in the aftermath of 
the attacks of 9/11.  Part 4 of the Act allowed for a suspected international terrorist to be deported, but 
if that wasn’t possible because the person may be executed or tortured if returned to their home 
country, a foreign national could be indefinitely imprisoned without charge or trial.
876
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876 In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004) UKHL 56. These provisions were ultimately declared by the 
House of Lords to be incompatible with the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.   
Whilst these provisions were the subject of much criticism for breaching alleged fundamental human 
rights, such as the right to a fair trial and liberty,
877
 those in favour of the provisions maintained that 
the measures were necessary. David Blunkett, for example, claimed that ‘in simple terms, there is an 
obligation on those who have some influence over the levers of state power to be more careful to 
maintain democratic freedoms than there is on those who oppose those values.’878 For David 
Blunkett, the attack of 9/11 was not a rare and relatively isolated incident in a foreign state. Nor was it 
merely a threat to economic stability or to commerce and social intercourse. Rather, it was ‘such an 
appalling, inexplicable and morally unimaginable act of terror that it appeared almost to symbolise 
our vulnerability itself.’879 In Blunkett’s eyes, the attacks were a threat to democracy.  He argued that 
‘it was not just simply a terrorist action, but a fundamental rejection of the values of democracy.  The 
Al Qaida and their Taliban sponsors were motivated by doctrines that reject democratic norms, 
human rights, and the whole moral basis upon which our society has evolved in recent centuries.880  
Indeed, in Blunkett’s final analysis, the 9/11 attacks were ‘an attack on modernity itself.’881 Thus, the 
provisions in Part 4 of the Act were claimed to be morally defensible because they protected 
democracy; our traditional way of life; the right of the population, as a whole, to move freely and 
safely; and the overriding well-being of our nation-state. 
882
  
 
The point is that for those thinkers advocating a strong national security state, internment may be 
regarded, not as a grave infringement on civil liberty, but as a perfectly reasonable, if regrettable, 
response to a national emergency, particularly one which concerns an imminent threat or actual 
invasion by a foreign power. In the current climate, there is a strong perception that the UK is 
engaged in a ‘war on terror’. Therefore, the extent to which the state may legitimately lock up, or 
otherwise impose restrictions on its nationals if it believes that they may pose a threat to public order, 
continues to have resonance  in security thinking.  
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5.11 The Benefits and Criticisms of a Strong National Security Agenda 
 
The discussion in the previous paragraphs has demonstrated that the ideal national security state tends 
to prioritise the following four areas.  Firstly, it may prioritise the establishment of a military power 
which will defend the nation from hostile or aggressive foreign powers. This may also involve the use 
of the intelligence agencies to gather strategic or tactical information.
883
 Secondly, there may be a 
preference for the maintenance of the existing governing regime and the established hierarchy as key 
goals of domestic security policy. 
884
 This may involve the creation of a strong system of legal 
regulation that promotes the use of emergency and other powers, which are seen as beneficial to, and 
required by, security imperatives. Here, security measures may include combating any subversion of 
the nation’s established way of life by limiting civil liberties, such as the right to free speech and 
association, insofar as these conflict with security imperatives. The third major aim would be to 
promote an organic society. This could encompass values such as patriotism and a willingness to 
serve, fight for, and defend one’s country. Finally, there may be a preference towards protecting the 
confidentiality and secrecy of official secrets, including the sources and methods of the intelligence 
services and military intelligence.   
 
The implications of this approach to security issues can hardly be over-emphasised. If the security of 
the people and the national territory is regarded as supreme, then the search for security and achieving 
its preconditions can become the key determinant of foreign and domestic policy and international 
relations more generally.  Indeed, the perceived threat of insecurity will tend to affect the way that 
policy, and thereby legislation is drafted and expressed: It may also affect the ways in which the 
government reacts to dissenting views and political opposition.   
 
The theoretical justification for this view is perhaps in accord with the reasoning of writers such as 
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes constructed a picture of what life had been like before government was 
formed, in a stateless society, or in what was termed a ‘state of nature.’885 This state of nature would, 
it was argued, be characterised by an unending war of each against all, which in Hobbes’ words, 
would produce a life that was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.’ 886 As a result, he argued that 
rational individuals would enter into an agreement, or ‘social contract’, to establish a sovereign 
government, without which a stable and orderly life would be impossible. In other words, individuals 
would recognise that is in their interests to set up a system of law even if that meant sacrificing a 
portion of their liberty.  Therefore, the modern justification for the promotion of the organic view of 
society is that citizens and states have needs that are above and apart from the individuals that 
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comprise it. A typical argument here is that true freedom entails co-operating with others in a way 
which may, for example, facilitate each party’s happiness and liberty.   
 
In terms of security, promoting an organic society may effectively mean that each person must unite 
with others to preserve both the group and the institutions that defend their rights.  The ideal security 
state, therefore, may maintain social stability by increasing the control over, and support of, stronger, 
more authoritarian, political and social apparatus.  However, this may mean that there are fewer 
guarantees of civil liberties and meaningful opposition to government power.  For example, there may 
be a limit on the freedom to create and attend groups that question the decisions of the ruling powers, 
or which compete for power.  Indeed, the activities of such groups may be seen in terms of civil 
disobedience which needs to be tackled by the creation of more powerful law enforcement 
mechanisms, which would provide security to the governmental system by controlling internal 
opposition and dissent.  It may also mean that law enforcement bodies, such as the security agencies, 
may be more likely to be permitted to operate quite independently of the rule or the supervision of 
elected officials, or the concerns of the citizens and constituencies they purportedly serve.  Indeed, 
such agencies would be much more likely to conduct more operations ‘behind closed doors’ and in 
secrecy.  It may be thought that too much democracy and too many individual rights may threaten 
national security and economic development. 
 
Liberals, whilst they tend to accept the need to protect citizens from aggressors, such as terrorists, 
may not approve of the extent to which the national security agenda may seek to prioritise the goal of 
national security. For liberals, the danger is that the call of ‘national security’, with its emotive 
connotations, can potentially allow the security agencies to operate without adequate control and 
accountability mechanisms.  In such a case, it may not be unconceivable that the security agencies 
could be left to determine their own targets, objectives and mandate. Thus, liberals may be concerned 
that the setting of the national security agenda, in a totally state-centred scenario, could effectively be 
set down by unelected officials. These officials may have less cause or desire to either reflect the 
views of the wider public, or to seek approval of actions perpetrated in the name of national security.   
 
 
5.12 Conclusion 
 
This research has now made it possible to understand one of the most fundamental of all differences 
between civil libertarian values and the values promoted by a state-centred view of security. Whereas 
for civil libertarians, political liberty is the most prized of all political values, to those promoting the 
national security agenda, it occupies a less elevated position.  Whilst national security protagonists 
may pursue the goal of political liberty, they believe that it is only attained as a consequence of prior 
social and political arrangements, including the preservation of existing institutions and the 
maintenance of social order.   
 
Perhaps the emphasis on guarding the organs and territories of the state can be explained when one 
considers that national security is an immensely powerful concept.  Its surface simplicity and 
emotional appeal is highly seductive.  Indeed, it has been claimed that
887
 ‘the welfare, prosperity and 
power of the group into which I happened to be born is more important than the welfare, prosperity 
and power, or even the lives, of the members of any or all other groups, has been upheld by most of 
the human race.  Along with that faith is also held another – whenever we are frightened or feel 
threatened, the right, effective and virtuous thing to do is to increase our ability to kill other people.  
That was our normal method of ensuring the survival of our group in the past, but its successes 
depended upon the defensibility of our group or its ability to overcome the defences of other 
groups’888  Whatever the historical origins or theoretical justification of such thinking, it is fair to say 
that the state has become much more than an organizational unit of protection – a great deal by way of 
power and vested interest has come to be bound up in national sovereignty along with the need for 
identification with a particular social group. 
 
However, whilst attempts can doubtless be made to justify these measures as being a necessary 
response to particular circumstances, there are concerns that many of the powers are overbroad and 
that security activity could be used by the government and the security agencies as a cover to take 
powers which bear little relationship to the public emergency which induced them. Some of these 
security imperatives may also contrast with liberal ideals of a constitutionally limited government, 
which upholds, and even defends, the civil and human rights of its citizens.  Indeed, whist liberals 
may accept that say, the territorial boundaries of the state must be protected from external aggressors, 
the ideal of liberal constitutionalism tends to add that respect for human rights; the limitation of state 
power; the separation of powers; and the doctrine of responsible and accountable government, should 
also be key determinants of security policy.   
 
The perfect liberal state is certainly a desirable concept. Perhaps, few would argue that the principles 
of liberty, equality, justice and the freedom to pursue one’s own notions of happiness seem idyllic.  
However, without adequate protection from hostile internal and external security threats, the very 
values that liberals seek to uphold may be diminished, and even eradicated.  Similarly, whilst a strong 
national security agenda may provide a defence against hostile forces, the measures imposed to 
provide such defence can potentially undermine the very liberty and democracy which national 
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security protagonists often use as justification for the measures.   Thus, each of these ideals tends, in 
practice, to defeat its own objective.   
 
Overall, it seems that at least on some levels, the persons on both sides of these often conflicting 
ideals may desire similar ends. Both groups seek, in some way, to uphold the security of the citizen. 
However, the perceptions of liberal and security thinkers regarding how ‘security’ is to be achieved 
often differ markedly.  To some extent, these competing values could potentially be better reconciled 
than current security policy and practice may suggest. The next chapter will explore some potential 
reforms to the current legal and operational control of the security agencies that may go, at least some 
way, towards meshing together the greater elements of these two ideologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: SOME GUIDELINE PRINCIPLES FOR POSSIBLE REGULATORY 
CHANGES TO THE CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURES 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have examined two opposing ideologies and perspectives: the claims of liberals 
and the claims of those supporting a more state-centred view of national security. The main thrust of 
these chapters has been to consider, in principle at least, how the legal regulation of the intelligence 
agencies would need to operate in order to fully embody and adequately represent the practical 
culmination and realisation of the norms of each of these two competing ideologies. Thus, the 
chapters have examined not only which elements of security would be prioritised if liberalism was 
ever to become the pre-eminent factor by which our nation set its security agenda; but what would the 
security landscape look like if a national security agenda was the sole, or only, imperative? This line 
of enquiry has served two important purposes.  Firstly, it has assisted in elucidating the meaning and 
benefits of each of the two orientations.  Taking the principles of both liberalism and the national 
security agenda to their logical conclusion has revealed a number of their palpable and practical 
advantages as well as their limitations.  Secondly, it has placed these potential advantages and 
limitations in the context of their practical application to real life contexts by exposing how each 
exhibits various internal inconsistencies and conflicts. This has made it possible to demonstrate that, 
in practice, there are various areas in which each of these contrasting ideological orientations betrays 
its own promises and fails to deliver upon the very ideals it relies upon to legitimate itself.  This 
element of the research has been valuable because the ideologies have been evaluated, not by 
inappropriate standards that are imported from the outside, but rather by those that the ideology itself 
claims to embody.  This chapter will contend that having unfolded the internal advantages and 
inconsistencies of these ideologies, it is now possible to utilise only the least discredited elements of 
each in order to suggest possible legal and constitutional reforms.  
 
It may be argued that an adequate set of legal reforms is already to be found in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which has recently been incorporated into UK domestic law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).  It is true that the Convention has been a driving force for change, 
both before and after the inception of the HRA. The Convention, for example declares an absolute ban 
on the use of lethal force,
889
 and torture or inhumane or degrading treatment are never permitted.
890
  In 
respect of the use of covert and intrusive surveillance, the UK government has been forced, 
incrementally, to accept that a legal base for the invasion of privacy by state agents must be put in 
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place. This basis is now contained in a range of statutes, which seek to satisfy Convention 
requirements such as Article 8, which is concerned with the right to privacy.  The most recent and 
comprehensive of these has been the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  However, civil 
libertarians have argued that the creation of a legal basis for the state invasion of privacy has not 
necessarily resulted in a regulatory framework in which the requirements of Article 8 have been fully 
met.  For example, Helen Fenwick argues that: ‘the principles, which in a liberal democracy should 
inform the law governing...invasions of privacy, have largely failed to find expression in it,…despite 
the fact that the central statute, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, was introduced 
specifically in order to meet the demands of the European Convention on Human Rights.’891 Indeed, 
Fenwick suggests that if Convention rights are to have any real impact domestically, this may be 
‘most likely to occur through incremental changes in procedures, rather than through the courts or 
other complaints mechanisms.’892  
 
It is just such an incremental change in procedures that this research will address in its final stages. In 
this respect, particular attention will be paid to the principle of proportionality. This principle, which 
is a key part of Convention jurisprudence, is designed to ensure that decision-makers do not take 
excessive action and that covert surveillance is only instigated where absolutely necessary. It will be 
argued that the principle of proportionality, if suitably revised to take into account relevant criticisms, 
may adequately reconcile the greater elements of each of the two competing ideologies.  This is 
because, whilst the principle of proportionality fulfils the liberal demand for optimal protection of 
civil rights, it still allows significant incursions into privacy rights where the threat to national security 
is both genuine and restrictions to civil rights are necessary in the circumstances.     
 
The chapter will begin with an introduction to the principle of proportionality, as defined under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the Convention, and to some extent its jurisprudence, 
into the domestic law of the UK.  It will then examine certain discrepancies in the ways in which the 
principle of proportionality is currently being applied by public bodies, and security decision-makers.  
The chapter will culminate in an examination of a stricter application of the proportionality principle 
and its likely effect on security decision-making.  In its very final stages, the chapter will include a 
detailed account of the likely benefits of a strictly applied proportionality test on both the national 
security and the liberal agendas.  This will include consideration of the ways in which proportionality, 
if applied properly, may bring together the ideals of these two competing ideologies.   
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6.2 The Legal Position under the Human Rights Act 1998 
 
Section 6 of the Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for any public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.  With regards 
to the incorporation of Article 8 under the Human Rights Act 1998, public bodies engaged in any 
form of interference with an individual’s privacy must be able to demonstrate that the surveillance in 
question is authorised by law; proportionate to the purpose in question; necessary; and conducted in 
accordance with one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8(2) of the ECHR. Legitimate aims 
include national security, public safety, the economic well being of the country and the prevention of 
crime.  Since covert surveillance activity cannot be instigated until these checks are satisfied, the 
principle of proportionality is at the core of both Article 8 and the Human Rights Act.  Public 
authorities, including the security agencies, are required to ensure that any actions taken are 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   Thus, even where privacy rights are subject to 
limitations in the name of national security or the detection and prevention of serious crime, the 
security agencies are precluded from making disproportionate intrusions into those rights.  
 
The concept of proportionality is well established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. When a state claims that a particular action represents the exercise of a lawful power 
to protect a legitimate public interest, the test applied by the court will be whether the action taken 
was proportionate to the aims pursued and whether the reasons for it given by the state were both 
relevant and sufficient.
893
  Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1998, the principle of 
proportionality has also come to the forefront of judicial reasoning in the UK Courts.
894
   Indeed, In R 
(Daly) v Home Secretary,
895
   Lord Steyn identified just how the intensity of review in proportionality 
is greater under the Human Rights Act than under the concept of reasonableness outlined in the 
Wednesbury
896
 case.  Under Wednesbury, the degree of unreasonableness demonstrated by the public 
authority needed to be particularly high. Indeed, for Lord Diplock, unreasonableness was only 
demonstrated where ‘a decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic, or of accepted moral 
standards, that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have 
arrived at it.’ 897 In contrast, Steyn pointed out that the proportionality test may require the court to 
assess the balance which the decision-maker has struck in a particular case, not merely whether it is 
within a range of reasonable decisions as required by Wednesbury.  This, asserted Steyn, may require 
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the court to consider and overrule the relative weight accorded to certain interests and 
considerations.
898
 
 
At its most rigorously applied, the principle of proportionality requires a multi-stage analysis.
899
 
Firstly, the decision making body, or person, must ask whether the purpose of any rights restriction is 
suitable for attaining the identified purpose. This means, for example, that the surveillance or other 
measure under consideration is a truly effective means of countering the perceived threat.  Secondly, 
the measure must be shown to be necessary for the attainment of the purpose in the sense that there is 
no less restrictive measure available.  Finally, the decision-maker must establish whether the measure 
is proportionate in that it strikes a proper balance between the purpose and the target individual’s 
political and human rights.
900
  Thus, when it is applied properly, the principle of proportionality 
necessitates a complex assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the measure in question 
and its potential effects on both the national security agenda and with regard to the need to safeguard 
individual liberty.  It is not enough to simply ask the question, has the state ‘struck the right balance’ 
between various notions of security and liberty.  Rather, proportionality essentially means that the 
need for any given investigative technique must be genuine and it must be weighed against the 
damage it might do to personal privacy. 
 
This approach to security decision-making supports both the liberal and the national security 
objectives. It satisfies the liberal notion that the state should legitimise its power by ensuring optimal 
protection of its citizens liberties and individual freedoms. It also supports the national security 
agenda in that, even a strict application of the proportionality principle, will not prevent the state from 
ensuring that its borders, people, institutions, and values are kept free from attack by hostile foreign or 
domestic aggressors. In other words, the principle of proportionality recognises that countering risks 
such as international terrorism, cyber attack, international military crisis and large-scale civil 
emergencies,
901
 is in the public interest. This means that some of the high-priority risks facing the UK 
can be adequately dealt with.  
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6.3 The Current Application of the Proportionality Principle in the UK Security Arena. 
 
With regard to proportionality tests in covert investigations, various codes of conduct have been 
issued to those public bodies that are involved in conducting surveillance under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).
902
    The purpose of these codes, it is claimed, is to ensure that 
surveillance conducted under the Act is subject to ‘stringent safeguards, approved by Parliament, to 
ensure that investigatory powers are used in a way which is compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.’ 903  Thus, the codes are intended to present extensive and detailed 
guidance on the determination of necessity and proportionality, and on the importance of making 
correct determinations for the protection of human rights.
904
  However, whilst the codes can play an 
important role in guiding decision-makers, questions have been asked regarding the adequacy of the 
methods by which the proportionality of an action is to be assessed.
905
  In reality, the advice given to 
decision-makers in these codes is rather vague and there is little explanation of how decision-makers 
should interpret key terms.  For example, the Covert Surveillance Code of Practice explains 
proportionality in the simplest of terms as:  ‘balancing the intrusiveness of the activity on the target 
and others who might be affected by it against the need for the activity in operational terms.’906 The 
document goes on to suggest that ‘the activity will not be proportionate if it is excessive in the 
circumstances of the case or if the information which is sought could reasonably be obtained by other 
less intrusive means. All such activity should be carefully managed to meet the objective in question 
and must not be arbitrary or unfair.’907  It is argued that, whilst this description gives the decision-
maker an indication that a requirement for proportionality exists, there is little indication as to what 
many of its key terms really mean or how they should be interpreted.  For example, how is the 
balancing procedure actually supposed to be implemented? What is, or is not, excessive in the 
circumstances? How is the need for an activity supposed to be assessed?  The problem is that these 
questions are likely to be answered in various ways by different interpreters.  It is little wonder then 
that the Chief Surveillance Commissioner’s 2007 Annual Report claims that ‘there is a serious 
misunderstanding of the concept of proportionality.’908 The report argues that ‘it is not acceptable, for 
example, to judge that because directed surveillance is being conducted from a public place, this 
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automatically renders the activity overt or to assert that an activity is proportionate because it is the 
only way to further an investigation.’909  
 
These criticisms are serious in that an inadequate and inconsistent application of the principle of 
proportionality, within organisations such as the security agencies, is likely to have detrimental effects 
on public trust and could lead to concern about the possibility of the state’s infringing peoples 
legitimate expectation of privacy. For example, although tests of proportionality have been used by 
the UK courts when considering Article 8 privacy issues, it is claimed that the test is not consistently 
applied.
910
   Thus, whilst the House of Lords applied a rigorous proportionality test in R (Daly) v 
Home Secretary,
911
 it has been argued that  in the later Marper
912
 and Gillan
913
 cases, the Lords judged 
restrictions on privacy according a proportionality standard which has been described as ‘at best – 
perfunctionary.’914  In  both cases, it is argued that the Lords found the restrictions at issue to be 
justified with little discussion, and that the application of the principle consisted of a mere exercise in 
balancing competing rights rather than a thorough application of a legally defined test of 
proportionality. In this climate of uncertainty, liberals have argued that more should be done to ensure 
that the Human Rights Act provides a sufficient brake on intrusive surveillance practices and over-
zealous data collection.  
 
In response to these concerns the Select Committee on the Constitution has recommended that the 
Government should ‘instruct government agencies and private organisations involved in surveillance 
and data use on how the rights contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
are to be implemented.’915  According to the Committee, ‘the Government should also provide clear 
and publicly available guidance as to the legal meanings of necessity and proportionality.’916 The 
committee further recommended that ‘a complaints procedure be established by the Government and 
that, where appropriate, legal aid should be made available for Article 8 claims.’917 However, whilst 
the Committee has recommended that the principle of proportionality be revisited and clarified, there 
is no suggestion regarding how it is to be interpreted or applied in the future.  Moreover, a further 
problem arises in the sense that a complaints procedure may be of little use to a target of security 
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agency surveillance since such a person would not know that they are the subject of covert activity.  
Thus, since in practice, measures of secret surveillance are not open to scrutiny by the individual 
concerned, or the public at large, it may be legitimately argued that it is contrary to the ‘rule of law’ 
for the legal discretion granted to decision-makers to be expressed in terms of too much unfettered 
power.  Indeed, for liberals, the law should  indicate the scope of any discretion conferred on the 
security agencies and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, and having regard to the 
legitimate aim of the measure in question, in order to give the individual adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will examine a potential application of the proportionality principle 
which may maximise the protection of both national security and civil liberties.   Perhaps this could 
be best achieved by applying a pre-determined and strictly defined procedural proportionality test. 
Such a test would ensure that decision-makers give appropriate and demonstrable consideration to all 
aspects of the proportionality principle. Indeed, the onus would be on public authorities to verify that 
covert action fulfilled a genuine legitimate aim; that the restriction to Article 8 privacy rights 
corresponds to that aim; and that it is necessary in the sense that no other less restrictive means is 
available.  With this in mind, subsequent paragraphs will explore the answers to the following three 
questions which, it is suggested, the security agencies demonstrably apply each time a warrant for 
surveillance is issued or sought: 
 
1. Is the purpose of the covert activity aiding a sufficiently important objective? 
2. Is there a rational connection between the privacy restriction and the particular objective in 
question? 
3. Is the measure proportionate in that it strikes a proper balance between the purpose and the 
target individual’s political and human rights?918 
 
In its final stages, the chapter will seek to uncover the ways in which the principle of proportionality 
supports and benefits both the national security and the liberal agendas.  It will then be possible to 
analyse the ways in which the least discredited elements of these two opposing ideologies may be 
built and meshed together under the principle of proportionality.     
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6.4  Is the Purpose of the Covert Activity Aiding a Sufficiently Important Objective? 
 
This concerns whether the need for surveillance refers to a genuine legitimate aim and whether the 
reasons presented by the authorities are relevant and sufficient.  Whilst Article 8 offers general 
protection for a person’s private and family life, home and correspondence, from arbitrary 
interference by the state, the right to respect for these aspects of privacy are qualified.
919
 This means 
that interference by the state can be permissible if it satisfies certain conditions.  These conditions are 
that the security agencies are acting in the interests of national security, public safety, the economic 
well being of the country, or acting to prevent disorder or serious crime.
920
 
 
The current legal criterion means that, in the first instance, it is for the national authorities to make the 
initial assessment regarding whether any action is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  
However, whether the interference is necessary may be subject to review by the courts. The courts 
will consider an interference to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for a legitimate aim if it 
answers a pressing social need and more particularly, as noted above, if it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. It is noteworthy that the courts will allow a margin of appreciation to the 
competent national authorities in this assessment. This is because Convention law concedes a degree 
of flexibility and discretion in the way that protected rights are interpreted and applied in the national 
context.
921
   What is required is that member states achieve the maximum degree of compliance with 
the Convention’s general standards as is compatible with particular national interests, circumstances 
and traditions.  In practice, the breadth of this margin varies and depends on a number of factors 
including the nature of the convention right at stake and its importance for the individual; the nature 
of the interference; and the object pursued by the interference.  The margin will tend to be narrower 
where the affected right is crucial to the individual enjoyment of intimate key rights.  For example, the 
protection of personal data is said to be of fundamental importance to the enjoyment an individual’s 
right to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the convention.  Thus, the 
domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent the misuse of such data, particularly when 
it is used for police purposes.  These safeguards include ensuring that the collection of data is 
relevant, and not excessive, in relation to the purpose for which it is stored; is preserved in a form 
which permits the identification of the data subjects; and for no longer than is required for the purpose 
for which the data is stored.  
 
However, some critics have argued that national security objectives are still too widely drawn by the 
security agencies, and it may be too easy for the government to claim that the interference is in pursuit 
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of legitimate objectives unless its activity was for a clearly improper motive. Indeed, Buzan argues 
that pleas of national security may have immense functional benefits for the government.  Buzan 
claims that: ‘The appeal to national security as a justification for actions and policies, which would 
otherwise have to be explained, is a political tool of immense convenience for a large variety of 
sectional interests in all types of state.’922 Buzan goes on to note that the call of national security may 
confer considerable leverage over domestic affairs and it may offer scope for power maximising 
strategies to both political and military elites.  For example, the cultivation of hostile images abroad 
may justify intensified political surveillance or it may justify a shift of resources to the military, with 
deep implications for the conduct of domestic political life.
923
  Buzan’s claims are not unfounded.   In 
recent years, it has been argued that government claims regarding the need for a ‘war on terror’ are 
both misleading and dangerous. Kostakopoulou, for example, claims that: ‘It is misleading, because 
terrorism...is neither a war nor an invasion to be fought by launching a military crusade. Nor does it 
represent a threat to the safety of the state.’924  Rather, according to Kostakopoulou, whilst terrorism 
can destroy buildings and cause suffering, ‘it cannot destroy the state.’925  It is dangerous in that, 
where there is a perception that the nation's survival is at stake, fear may take hold of populations as 
they contemplate ways of thwarting the threat. Kostakopoulou argues that under these circumstances, 
it may be too easy for officials to invoke the existence of an emergency to justify current security 
policy, whether or not the threat is genuine.  In other words, government officials may be willing to 
apply the national security exception to areas where, clearly, national security is not at issue.  One 
dramatic illustration of this arose in February 2003 when, on the basis of intelligence that some 
Islamic terrorists would mount an attack with surface-to-air missiles on London’s Heathrow airport, 
the Government deployed armoured tanks, a nimrod MR2 reconnaissance aircraft, and 1,500 armed 
police.
926
 Although allegedly based on credible intelligence of a planned ‘spectacular’ attack, sceptics 
suggested that the decision to turn the airport in a quasi-military zone was less to do with an imminent 
threat and more about seeking to persuade the growing number opposed to the war with Iraq of its 
necessity.  After all, these critics argued, tanks would be of little practical value to anyone, other than 
their occupants, in the event of a missile attack on the airport.  The point is that, whilst ‘highly visible’ 
demonstrations of state commitment to counter feared threats may have little or no practical effect in 
increasing security, they will tend to satisfy public demand for reassurance; silence critics; or as in 
this case, legitimise military action in the face of public opposition.
927
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In the light of these concerns, liberals have claimed that it is necessary ‘to distinguish between a 
lawful interference in an individual’s private life which is genuinely in the public interest, as opposed 
to an unlawful interference which has occurred because it is merely something in which the public 
might be interested.’928  
 
Perhaps, a distinction between lawful and unlawful security measures can be achieved by considering 
some possible limits on what is, or is not, a legitimate aim and by building a legal framework of 
proportionality upon which these limits are to be grounded.  For example, one possible limit is that 
there is a ‘real and imminent threat’ requirement.  This would oblige policy makers to identify and 
furnish evidence that, without the proposed security measure, actual harm would result.  The German 
courts have considered the importance of the imminent threat requirement.
929
 The Federal Court, 
when adjudicating on a case involving data mining
930
 for counter-terrorism purposes, found that the 
threshold for intervention specified in the empowering Act,
931
 was set at the level of a ‘present 
danger’.  The Court found that the term ‘present danger’ needed to be interpreted to mean ‘concrete 
danger’, that is, there was a sufficient probability that the interests in question would be violated 
within the foreseeable future. The Court stated that this could well be a prolonged period but there 
needed to be grounds for believing that there were preparations for terrorist attacks, or persons ready 
to commit such acts, in Germany or elsewhere.  Ultimately, the Court found that if understood as 
described in the empowering Act, the data mining operation satisfied these requirements. However, 
the Court found that the general state of threat from terrorism that had existed virtually ever since the 
9/11 attacks did not satisfy the standard. Thus, the Court warned that if the reference point for data 
mining were simply the general threat of terrorism, the powers this conferred on the police would be 
too open-ended. 
 
The principle of requiring a ‘real and imminent threat’ or a ‘present danger’ may circumscribe and 
inhibit the introduction of surveillance measures which are disproportionate in that they find their 
justification in sources of minor nuisance and trivial threats, rather than those that present a genuine 
risk. For example, a ‘real and imminent threat requirement’ would  prevent covert activity, under the 
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Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, from being used by public authorities who are investigating 
less serious crimes such as underage sales, rogue traders and anti-social behaviour.
932
  It may also go 
some way towards addressing whether those who resort to the rhetoric of national security do so 
honestly or in order to pursue some other objective.  Certainly, a requirement that the threat be ‘real 
and immanent’ would ensure that surveillance is at least only targeted at those whose activities are 
criminal or cause physical harm to others. Whilst this would not prevent the security agencies from 
instigating surveillance measures where the legitimate aim makes it necessary, it would go some way 
towards satisfying a civil libertarian agenda.  Civil libertarians have generally accepted that there is 
potential danger emanating from unrestrained conduct and that some activities must be restricted.  
Mill, for instance, suggested that where there is harm to others stemming from individual behaviour, 
there is a justification for the state and the criminal law intervening. Of course, for liberals, the danger 
or physical harm must ultimately be a threat to some fundamental aspect of the citizen’s well-being or 
health, which emanates from, for example, crime or violence. Mill stressed the need to show that the 
harm to individuals or their interests is real and specific, or alternatively, that the risk of damage is 
strong.
933
  Thus, abstract, vague or speculative harm must, according to liberal thinkers, not be used to 
turn liberty into a ‘weak background assumption’934 that is consistently out-trumped by security 
considerations.    
 
 
6.5 Is There a Rational Connection Between the Privacy Restriction and the Particular 
Objective in Question? 
 
This aspect of the principle of proportionality requires that there be a reasonable relationship between 
a particular legitimate objective to be achieved and the means used to achieve that objective. 
According to the Covert Surveillance Code of Practice, this requires the decision-maker to explain 
how and why the methods to be adopted will cause the least possible intrusion to the subject and 
others and to evidence, as far as reasonably practicable, what other methods have been considered and 
why they were not implemented.
935
   Thus,  realising this aspect of proportionately  is achieved, not by 
simply analysing the nature of the potential threats and whether they are legitimate, but by also asking 
whether a particular measure could be achieved by less restrictive means and whether the interference 
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is being kept to a minimum.  Whilst it is not possible to examine how every decision-maker has 
implemented this aspect of proportionality, partly because the deliberations of the security agencies 
are subject to secrecy, it is possible to both look at the codes of practice that govern the use of 
surveillance, and at instances where government bodies have considered the principle. 
 
6.5.1  The Codes of Practice 
There are several codes of practice currently in operation under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000.
936
  Each code concerns itself with a different aspect of covert activity, namely the 
interception of communications;
937
 the acquisition and retention of data; the authorisation of covert 
surveillance;
938
 the authorisation and conduct of covert human intelligence sources;
939
 the laws 
relating to investigating protected electronic information; and property interference.
940
  Each code 
gives advice on how to carry out covert activities in compliance with the powers granted by 
Parliament under the RIPA.  To this end the codes identify the key points of the relevant legislation; 
they provide a source of instruction and give some practical examples of good and bad practice.   
 
In recent times, some of the codes have been revised to give a fuller description and account of the 
principle of proportionality and the circumstances in which it is, or is not, appropriate to conduct 
covert surveillance. This change came, partly, in response to concerns brought forward by the Office 
of Surveillance Commissioners which noted that ‘pubic authority employees, when completing 
authorisation forms, do not give enough thought to proportionality and consequently authorisations 
are granted where the impact on the privacy of the target is disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
offence,’941  Under the revised codes, for example, the Code of Practice Governing the Acquisition and 
Retention of Data, ‘The designated person must believe that the conduct required by any 
authorisation or notice is necessary. He or she must also believe the conduct to be proportionate to 
what is sought to be achieved by obtaining the specified communication data’942 and ‘that the conduct 
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is no more than is required in the circumstances.943 This, according to the code, ‘involves balancing 
the extent of the intrusiveness of the interference with an individual’s right of respect for their private 
life against a specific benefit to the investigation or operation being undertaken by a relevant public 
authority in the public interest.’944 The principle of proportionality is further explained in the codes 
as:  
 
 Balancing the size and scope of the proposed activity against the gravity and extent of the 
perceived crime or offence. 
 Explaining how and why the methods to be adopted will cause the least possible intrusion on 
the target and others. 
 Considering whether the activity is an appropriate use of the legislation and a reasonable way, 
having considered all reasonable alternatives, of obtaining the necessary result. 
 Evidencing, as far as reasonably practicable, what other methods have been considered and 
why they were not implemented. 
 Considering the examples given in the code of surveillance.945 
 
From the perspective of assessing how the security agencies may approach these requirements, one 
very real problem is that, whilst the instructions outlined in the codes make it clear that there is a 
requirement to consider the necessity of any given operation, and this must be explained and 
evidenced, it still suggests that the decision-maker approaches the question by implementing a mere 
balancing act.    The codes give little indication as to how this balance might be achieved and this may 
make it difficult for decision-makers to interpret the principle consistently. Indeed, this issue has been 
raised by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner.  In his Annual Report of 2009/2010, the 
Commissioner observed that ‘greater precision in articulating why the activity is proportionate is still 
required in many authorisations. A failure to detail other less intrusive means considered suggests 
that minds are either not applied rigorously or that some tactics are considered routine.’946 For 
example, the Commissioner pointed out that there should not be ‘over-reliance on the seriousness of 
the crime as an automatic justification of proportionate covert surveillance.’947 Nor should ‘strategic 
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priorities and cost-effectiveness, of themselves, provide insufficient basis for authorisation.’948  For 
the Commissioner ‘A wise authorising officer will ensure that details of his considerations are 
recorded; he may find them helpful if cross-examined some time later. Thus, whilst there is some 
reassurance in the code that, ‘any conduct that is excessive in the circumstances, or is in any way 
arbitrary, will not be proportionate,’949 and that ‘consideration must also be given to any actual or 
potential infringement of the privacy of individuals who are not the subject of the investigation or 
operation,’950 it is difficult, in any given circumstance, to determine the outcome of a decision-
maker’s interpretation.951   
 
Another notable problem with the codes is that most of the practical examples relate to the practice of 
surveillance by Local Authorities, rather than to the more serious work undertaken by the security 
agencies.  Thus, whilst these examples make it clear that the days of Local Authorities conducting 
directed surveillance for minor offences, such as dog fouling and littering, may be gone for good, the 
examples give little indication as to how proportionality should be considered by the security agencies 
in relation to serious crime and terrorism. However, whilst proportionality is only described in the 
most cursory way in the various codes of practice, this does not necessarily mean that the principle is 
not given full attention at the legislative and policy formulation levels. 
 
 
 
6.5.2  Policy Formulation 
 
Proportionality is not only a doctrine that can be applied by public authorities and law enforcers, such 
as the security agencies, to assess the legality of executive action, it is also a legislative doctrine 
which the political institutions and law creators can observe in their decision-making functions.  
Indeed, in this sense, the principle of proportionality may form an essential component of public 
policy and good governance.  
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 The principles of proportionality and necessity were recently given thorough consideration as part of 
the Government’s Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers.952  As part of its remit, this 
Review was tasked to consider the efficacy of the derogating and non-derogating Control Order 
regime.
953
  In conducting an assessment of necessity and proportionality the Review examined the 
impact of Control Orders on both the rights of the people subject to restrictions, and on the broader 
public consent to the Government’s approach to terrorism.  With regard to potentially less intrusive 
alternatives to the Control Order regime, the Review considered the use of prosecution; the use of 
communications intercept material as evidence in court; and an increase in the use of technical and 
human surveillance.  Overall, the Review was in favour of an increased resort to prosecution as a 
method of avoiding a disproportionate resort to Control Orders.  However, the Review found that the 
need for law enforcers to intervene early, in order to pre-empt an attack and protect the public, often 
means that there is often insufficient evidence to sustain a prosecution.
954
 Thus, in its search for 
another less intrusive method of realising the legitimate aim, the Review examined arguments that the 
use of communications intercept material as evidence in court would remove the need for Control 
Orders by making prosecution easier.  However, the evidence presented to the Review did not support 
such arguments. For example, the Review noted that the cross-party Privy Council review, chaired by 
Sir John Chilcot,
955
 had already considered a number of issues relating to intercept as evidence. In the 
context of that work, a study of nine, now former, control order cases by independent senior criminal 
counsel concluded that intercept as evidence would not have resulted in a criminal prosecution being 
brought in any of the cases examined. This view is further supported by Lord Carlile, who has stated 
that intercept as evidence would not be ‘the quick and easy solution that some have assumed and 
asserted.’956  Finally, the Review considered claims that increased human and technical surveillance 
could, on their own, adequately manage the risk posed by people on Control Orders. Again, these 
claims have been contested.  Indeed, the police and the security agencies themselves argued that 
surveillance does not provide control; rather, it merely monitors activities to some extent.  Thus, in 
their opinion, whilst surveillance can be important in the evidence-gathering process, and can lead to 
prosecution and conviction, surveillance does not, of itself, prevent or disrupt any activities. For these 
reasons, the Review concluded that although increased covert investigative resources could form an 
important part of any arrangements replacing Control Orders, surveillance alone could not mitigate 
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risk to the level of a control regime. Moreover, the Review noted that the costs of surveillance exceed, 
by a considerable margin, the costs of Control Orders. 
 
Ultimately then, the Review found that it may still be necessary to impose restrictions on certain 
terrorist suspects when they are deemed necessary and when they satisfy the legal criteria in that they 
have not been struck down by the courts. Indeed, the Review claimed that the restrictions imposed 
may facilitate further investigation as well as prevent terrorist activities. However, the Review 
concluded that the Control Order regime can and should be amended, and the Government should 
move to a system which will still protect the public but will be less intrusive; more clearly and tightly 
defined; and more comparable to restrictions imposed under other powers in the civil justice 
system.
957
  A number of these recommendations have been implemented by Parliament in the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Act 2011. The Review found that: 
 
(a) The system is neither a long term nor an adequate alternative to prosecution, which remains the 
priority. In respect of the duration of any given control order, the Review found that, any control 
order measures should be time limited to two years maximum to emphasise that they are a short 
term expedient not a long term solution.
958
 
 
(b) Covert investigative techniques, including surveillance, whilst they cannot themselves control, 
can help to do so and may actually produce evidence for use in a prosecution.  Thus, since the 
use of surveillance is complimentary to the Control Order regime, and arguably less intrusive, the 
Review found that, where possible, restrictions should facilitate surveillance, although the 
priority of protection may be paramount.
959
 
 
(c) The Review recommended an end to the use of forced relocation and lengthy curfews that 
prevent individuals from leading a normal daily life.
960
  Indeed, it found that the more restrictive 
obligations can have a significant impact on the individual’s health, personal life and their ability 
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to go about their normal lives.  The Review found that lengthy curfews and relocating an 
individual to a different part of the country raised particularly difficult issues.
961
  
 
The benefit of a thorough application of the principles of proportionality, such as the one conducted 
by the Review, is that it shows, for example, that the principle of necessity would not necessarily limit 
the types of activity that could be investigated but it could, potentially, affect the methods by which 
such an investigation would be conducted. It may accomplish this in two ways.  Firstly, a defined test 
of proportionality would keep surveillance measures within the confines of necessity in the sense that 
the same outcome cannot be achieved by any lesser means.   Here, the security agencies would not be 
given tasks that may be carried out with equal efficiency by other, more accountable, bodies or by 
other methods. However, it may also show, as in the case of seeking an adequate alternative to control 
orders, that in reality surveillance is, in itself, the least intrusive method of realising the legitimate 
aim, and may, in fact, need to be increased  Secondly, a principle of minimalism could be built into 
the test.  For example, both liberals and security decision-makers may support the notion that, whilst 
there is a general threat of terrorism that may necessitate some intrusion into privacy, the surveillance 
must, wherever possible, be limited to conversations or correspondence which is likely to be about 
terrorist or criminal activity – surveillance should be broken off or curtailed where the 
communications range into personal territory and any remaining evidence, such as recorded 
conversations, should be destroyed.   
 
Applied in this way, the principle of proportionality may benefit the national security agenda in that, 
whilst civil liberties would retain their importance, they would only occupy the space which is left 
once other important security related matters have been adequately dealt with.  The appeal to liberals 
is that it embodies the principle of minimal government in which the state merely acts as an impartial 
umpire when individuals or groups come into conflict with each other, and otherwise leaves citizens 
alone.  Indeed, minimising the use of information unrelated to national security could have a dramatic 
effect on the interpretation of relevant statutes and on the operational procedures used to implement 
them.  For example, it may render unconstitutional certain applications of the provisions that allow for 
the retention and dissemination of evidence, regardless of whether it constitutes genuine evidence or 
useful intelligence information.
962
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6.6  Is the Measure Proportionate in that it Strikes a Proper Balance Between the Purpose and 
the Target Individual’s Political and Human Rights. 
 
This is the last stage of the proportionality test.  It essentially asks whether, in the final analysis, the 
surveillance or other measure in question, and its implementation, retains a reasonable relationship 
between the means and the aim sought to be realised.  In other words, it requires that the decision-
maker has considered whether there is a ‘fair balance’ between the general and individual interests at 
stake (such as the right to privacy). Thus, it isn’t enough that the state interferes with an individual’s 
rights for a legitimate purpose and by employing reasonable methods; the decision-maker must also 
be satisfied with the restriction and consider it requisite given the circumstances.  
 
Before progressing further with this discussion, it should be noted from the outset, that this is not a 
mere balancing act. Indeed, while the rhetoric of balance has featured prominently in the post-9/11 
public and academic debate on security and human rights and civil liberties, it is submitted here that 
the mere rhetoric of balance is unsuitable for reconciling respect for civil liberties and human rights 
with the alleged imperatives of national security.  The problem with a mere balancing act is outlined 
by Christopher Michaelson. He has pointed out that ‘where this balance falls depends on the political 
colours of the respective commentator.’963 In other words, there is no avoiding the fact that deciding 
whether the targets of security agency activity are a real and genuine threat involves the decision-
maker in making a qualitative decision regarding the merits of the relevant domestic provision and its 
application.  Thus, whilst national security remains a value-laden term with no agreement on its 
composition, there will be ambiguities in its interpretation.  Therefore, the way in which balance is 
examined here is based on a legal principle of proportionality in that it is a decision-making procedure 
and an analytical structure that leads to the formulation of policy implementation, rather than an 
attempt to merely balance competing interests. It requires an analysis of whether the measure is 
appropriate and strictly proportionate with reference to a rigorously applied legal test regarding the 
appropriateness of the measure in question.   
 
In order to analyse this legal test of proportionality, it is useful to examine the strict way in which the 
question has been approached in a German case.  In a case before the Federal Constitutional Court, 
the applicant, a Moroccan Muslim studying at the University of Duisburg, alleged that an order based 
on Section 31 of the Police Act of the Federal State of North Rhine Westphalia (NRW Police Act), 
which authorised police to employ data mining in order to identify terrorist ‘sleeper-cells’, violated 
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his basic rights as protected by the Basic Law.
964
  Section 31 of the NRW Police Act allowed the 
police to demand the personal data relating to certain groups from the files of various authorities with 
a view to automated comparison with other databases. This use of data was to be permitted to the 
extent that it was necessary to forestall a ‘present danger’ to the survival or security of the Federation 
or a state or to the person, life, or freedom of an individual. It was limited to data required for a 
specific case and not subject to professional confidentiality or official secrecy. The data was to be 
destroyed if the purpose of collection was attained or proved unattainable. The measure needed to be 
ordered by the judge of the local lower court (the so called Amtsgericht). 
 
Applying its standard proportionality analysis, the Court found that Section 31(1) was proportionate. 
First, prevention of danger to the public or individual interests was a legitimate goal. Second, the 
method of data mining was generally appropriate. Third, the intrusion was necessary for the legitimate 
purpose and could not have been achieved by less drastic means. Fourth, the statutory power was also 
proportionate in the narrow sense, since the seriousness of the intrusion was not out of proportion to 
the seriousness of the grounds justifying it. It was necessary that the NRW Police Act specified a 
threshold for intervention, which it did, namely, a ‘present danger’ for the legal interest threatened.  
However, The Federal Constitutional Court still held that the Düsseldorf Amtsgericht had infringed 
the student’s basic right to control information about himself under Article 2(1), read in combination 
with Article 1(1) of the Basic Law. The problem was that, whilst the operation complied with the 
Basic Law in form and substance, it had been interpreted in a way that infringed upon the applicant’s 
basic right. 
 
The Court’s decision in the Data Mining case supports the national security argument in that it 
demonstrates that the principle of proportionality may allow for quite severe invasions of basic rights 
in the event of concrete danger to the survival or security of the state and its citizens, or to the 
freedom of an individual. On the other hand, the civil libertarian agenda is satisfied in that the case 
illustrates that the proportionality principle requires a narrow interpretation of the NRW Police Act in 
order to remain constitutionally valid. The case is significant as it shows that the Court recognises the 
legislature’s wide margin of appreciation in determining the necessity and appropriateness of specific 
‘security’ laws. However, when extraordinary measures are granted to the police, these need to be 
interpreted to comply with the principles of the superior Basic Law. In the Data Mining case, the 
Court thus set functional limits for the exercise of police powers which arguably still enable the 
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authorities to use data mining but which, on the other hand, protect the individual’s basic right to 
control information about oneself. 
 
 
6.7  Proportionality and its Benefits for the National Security Agenda  
 
The requirement that covert action must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim satisfies the national security 
agenda in several ways. Firstly, it provides a legal basis by which to override certain civil rights when 
the requirements of national security warrant it.  For example, in times of perceived national 
emergency, it can be justifiably argued that normal legal and constitutional principles should give way 
to the prevailing need to deal with the emergency.  In Lord Pearce’s words, ‘the flame of individual 
right and justice must burn more palely when it is ringed by the more dramatic light of bombed 
buildings.’965 The point is that, if the UK government and citizens perceive a threat to the stability of 
the nation and the life its citizens, protecting the homeland may, in some circumstances, legitimately 
triumph over human rights protection and the government should be permitted a latitude of action 
which, in democratic societies at least, should not be tolerated for any other purpose.  
 
The second benefit of limiting security service activity to the pursuit of legitimate aims is that, full 
compliance with current legal obligations and restraints, including adherence to the proportionality 
principle, may prevent state institutions from facing legal challenges to their powers of surveillance in 
the courts. The point is that, where it can be established that the security agencies have observed and 
conformed to all the relevant legal and operation safeguards, such as those found in their codes of 
practice, there may be less grounds for any litigant to make a successful claim.  This may be of 
significant benefit to the government  because, whilst the courts have traditionally sought to pay due 
deference to the intention of parliament, this does not mean that counsel for the government may 
merely intone the phrase ‘national security’ to be assured of success in the courts.  Rather, the courts 
have adopted the stance that they must be satisfied that some evidence exists for the executive’s 
claim.  For example, in the GCHQ case, Lord Roskill made the following statement: ‘The courts have 
long shown themselves sensitive to the assertion by the executive that considerations of national 
security must preclude judicial investigation of a particular individual grievance.  But even in that 
field, the courts will not act on a mere assertion that questions of national security were involved.  
Evidence is required that the decision under challenge was in fact founded on those facts.’966  More 
recently, the UK courts have confirmed this approach.  In Secretary of State for the Home Department 
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v Rehman,
967
 (a case involving deportation for alleged terrorist support and training), Lord Hoffmann 
cited three examples illustrative of the extent to which matters of national security would be 
susceptible to judicial review.  Firstly, the factual basis for the executive’s opinion that deportation 
would be in the interests of national security must be established by evidence. Secondly, the 
Commission would be able to overturn the decision of the Secretary of State where his decision was 
Wednesbury unreasonable; and thirdly, the Commission would be able to intervene if deportation 
would violate the deportee’s non-derogable rights (such as the right to be free from torture as 
guaranteed by Art 3 of European Convention), in which situation the judgement as to what is in the 
interests of national security is, in Hoffmann’s words, irrelevant.   Thus, whilst in the actual event, 
both the Court of Appeal
968
 and the House of Lords
969
 unanimously agreed with the Government’s 
interpretation that the promotion of terrorism in a foreign country by a resident of the UK would be 
contrary to the interests of national security, the case showed that the government can no longer rely 
on a favourable court hearing.   Indeed, similar assertions to those of Roskill and Hoffmann have also 
been made at European level. In Chahal v United Kingdom,
970
 the European Court of Human Rights 
encouraged the domestic courts to take a more rigorous approach when considering government 
claims regarding national security and not to be overly deferential to the executive in this area.  Thus, 
in spite of government claims that a deportation was necessary on grounds of national security, the 
Court held that if Chahal were to be deported to India, there was a real risk of him being ‘subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment,’ contrary to Art. 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
971
 The court also held that there had been a violation of Art 13 of the Convention in 
conjunction with Art. 3 in that, effective remedies did not exist before the courts and that the UK was 
in breach of the Convention by failing to adopt adequate domestic judicial procedures. 
 
In the light of these judgments, the advantage of ensuring proper operational safeguards, such as 
proportionality, cannot be overstated.  Where the government cannot be certain of a favourable result 
in the courts, it becomes all the more important to improve the methods by which Ministers, the 
security agencies and other related bodies, understand and apply the term. This is because, ultimately, 
if government claims that a given measure was necessary for the objective of protecting national 
security is subsequently defeated in the courts, public trust may be undermined. This is especially so 
when one considers that ‘recourse to judicial review has increased significantly in recent decades, 
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from 160 applications in 1974...to 10,548 in 2010,’972 and it has been noted that, in the case of the 
security agencies, ‘the increased awareness of the importance of national security, in the years after 
the attacks of 11th September 2001, were drivers for this change.’973 The point is that the public must 
be confident that security decision-makers have adopted a clear and objective standard with which to 
distinguish a legitimate aim from that which will merely lead to coercive and unnecessary action by 
state officials. Thus, civil damages claims filed by former Guantanamo detainees, and successful 
appeals against decisions relating to control orders and immigration decisions, along with other 
judicial reviews of government decisions in the national security context, do little to enhance the 
relationship between the security agencies and the citizen.
974
 It is submitted, therefore, that the 
proportionality principle identifies a clear perspective from which decision-makers can view every 
case impartially and in a factual way.  The result of this thinking may be that measures taken in the 
name of national security, including covert surveillance investigations, would be subject to a strictly 
legal standard of fairness and even handedness, rather than potentially imbalanced attempts to 
reconcile competing values. Thus, applied as a strict legal test, proportionality is beneficial to the 
national security agenda in that activities such as increasing surveillance are both justified and 
legitimated by the application of the principle.   
 
 
6.8  Proportionality and its Benefits for the Liberal Agenda 
 
For liberals, proportionality essentially means that the need for any given investigative technique 
should be genuine and it should be weighed against the damage that it might do to personal freedom 
and privacy. This suggests that, the more intrusive the technique, the more difficult it should be for 
the security agencies to authorise and justify its use and that, except in emergencies, less intrusive 
techniques should be preferred to more intrusive ones.
975
  
 
This approach to defining security essentially upholds a number of fundamental liberal ideals.  Firstly, 
it supports, to some extent, the liberal notion that the state should legitimise its power by ensuring 
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optimal protection of its citizens’ liberties and individual freedoms.  As we have seen in previous 
chapters, liberals tend to emphasise that human beings are essentially self-interested and largely self-
sufficient and therefore, as far as possible, should be responsible for their own lives and 
circumstances.
976
  In the liberal ideal, it is for the Government and the security agencies to justify and 
legitimise any activities and powers that may interfere with individual freedom. Therefore, the 
principles that inform security policy should optimise the rights of the individual and security 
legislation should seek to prioritise the principle of limited government. Under a firm application of a 
properly defined proportionality test, any act undertaken by the security agencies and other 
government officials must respect basic criteria for assessing the way they deal with the different 
interests and values. Thus, when security decision-makers are faced with a claim that surveillance 
adversely affects privacy or freedom of expression, they will be required to provide a fuller and more 
accurate assessment of the necessity of the security measure in question, and its suitability for 
achieving the legitimate aim.  When it is applied properly then, the proportionality principle requires 
security decision-makers to measure the legitimacy each case before them by standards that are 
potentially more rational and balanced, rather than skewed in favour of national security imperatives.   
 
Secondly, proportionality supports the liberal ideal of a nominal or minimal approach to government 
interference in that, the security agencies would not be given tasks that may be carried out, with equal 
efficiency, by other more accountable bodies or by other methods. Since, classical liberalism is 
distinguished by a belief in a ‘minimal state’, whose function is limited to the maintenance of 
domestic order and personal security, rights are often understood by liberals as prohibitions that may 
be imposed upon the state, which prevent state interference into the lives and choices of individuals, 
rather than in any state control of public morality. Thus, for liberals, the strict application of a 
proportionality principle may provide some guarantee that, in order to gain authorisation for 
surveillance, the security agencies would need to provide strong grounds showing that the same work 
cannot be adequately performed elsewhere or by other means.  No surveillance would be instigated 
against an individual or group without fully comprehensive authorisation which takes into account the 
full range of circumstances in which the operation takes place.   
 
Thirdly, the principle of proportionality may uphold the rule of law.  A key liberal principle is that the 
exercise of power be within the legal limits conferred by Parliament on those with power and that 
those who exercise power are accountable to law. This embodies the fundamental liberal principle 
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which insists that the law should govern and that those in power should be ‘servants of the laws’.977 
The benefit of the rule of law, for liberals, is that it can potentially ensure that the rights of individuals 
are determined by legal rules and not the arbitrary behaviour of authorities.  Therefore, for liberals, in 
order to comply with the requirements of the rule of law, the security agencies should ensure that 
there is a basis in law for the invasion of privacy or any other intrusion into the lives of individuals. 
These laws should be stable, prospective and clear.  For example, as we have seen in relation to the 
demands of the European Convention on Human Rights, attempted restrictions to Convention rights 
are only valid if they are founded on, and in full compliance with, an established form of law which is 
readily accessible and available to members of the general public and is phrased in sufficiently clear 
terms to enable the individuals affected to adjust their conduct as required.  These requirements are 
thought to promote legal certainty in that they eliminate randomness from legal decision-making. The 
concept is intertwined with predictability. As such, it has much in common with the requirements of 
proportionality because it tends to promote the rights of an individual in the circumstances of a single 
case.  
 
 
6.9  Conclusion 
 
In recent years, liberals have claimed that ‘the rights based model of a liberal democracy may have 
been displaced by a security agenda which is based on the perception that the UK faces an increasing 
threat from hostile forces, particularly terrorism.’978  These perceived threats, according to liberals, 
have underpinned the government’s framing of both the level of the threat and the means to counter it. 
It is true that in response to the threat of terrorism successive UK governments have gradually 
constructed one of the most extensive and technologically advanced surveillance systems in the 
world. The development of electronic surveillance, and the collection and processing of personal 
information, may have become pervasive, routine, and almost taken for granted. The governmental 
justification for increased surveillance measures is that, in times when there is a threat of major 
catastrophe or war, the state has a duty to intervene in order to prevent individual or collective harm 
and to promote the general welfare of citizens. 
 
However, in an attempt to preserve democracy and national values, governments may introduce 
measures that abrogate rights and civil liberties.  Indeed, it has been argued that the terrorist attacks in 
America on 9/11 shattered commonly held perspectives on the ideal of a liberal democracy. For 
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example, Dora Kostakopoulou, has claimed that, ‘The soft and facilitating state, which cherished 
individual liberty, was replaced by a strong and intrusive state, and the categorical gap between 
rights-based democracies and authoritarian polities narrowed worryingly under a declared open-
ended state of emergency and the so called 'war on terror'.979   
 
With regard to the effect of the ‘war on terror’ on the activities of the security agencies, this erosion of 
civil liberties has also been recognised by government bodies which oversee covert surveillance 
investigations.  For example, when commenting on the development of surveillance measures in 
August 2004, the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, warned against the possibility of the 
UK sleepwalking into what he referred to as a ‘surveillance society’.980  The Commissioner claimed 
that surveillance was ‘traditionally associated with totalitarian regimes, but some of the risks can 
arise within a more democratic framework.’ 981 Similarly, when reporting to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, Professor Bert-Jaap Koops and others, thought that Article 8 
privacy rights under the Convention were ‘too easily overridden by the government’s unsubstantiated 
assertions about the necessity of, for example, an anti-crime measure.’982  In addition, there have also 
been concerns regarding whether government agencies, and other public bodies, understand how the 
principles of necessity and proportionality operate in the context of privacy and the limitations set out 
in Article 8(2).
983
  Thus, whilst the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 requires that those 
engaged in surveillance must consider the necessity of an action and its proportionality to the 
legitimate aim pursued, bodies such as the Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC), have 
claimed that there is some confusion surrounding the meaning and nature of these key terms.  
 
Civil libertarians have claimed, therefore, that what is needed is a ‘charter for the security services 
containing a comprehensive treatment of the functions, powers and duties of the services.’984 With 
regard to their functions, it is suggested that this charter should lay down clear guidelines as to the 
persons that can be investigated for intelligence gathering purposes; the standards that should be met 
before an investigation can be instituted; the restrictions that should exist on the scope of an 
investigation; and the investigative techniques that may be used.
985
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This chapter has explored the possibility of testing the legitimacy of security service activity through 
the prism of proportionality. It has claimed that the security agencies should employ a strict standard 
of proportionality when assessing potential objects and targets of surveillance.   A firm application of 
the principle of proportionality has the advantage of creating a framework of analysis around which a 
powerful theory of surveillance authorisation can be built.  If it is impartially applied, proportionality 
permits disputes about the limits of legitimate surveillance activity to be settled on the basis of reason 
and rational argument.  It makes it possible to compare and evaluate radically different ideologies and 
interests in a way which is more balanced and fair.  This is because the principle of proportionality is 
essentially unbiased.   It carries no particular ideal in itself and, as such, it can be argued that it is well 
positioned to satisfy the demands of civil liberties in a context in which the imperatives of national 
security are not compromised.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN – THE CONCLUSION 
 
Perhaps few would dispute that the ideals contained in both the civil libertarian claims and the 
countervailing arguments advanced by those who support the national security agenda are both central 
to the interests of the citizen.  Without security and protection from harms, such as terrorism, the 
liberties and the democratic values that are essential for the personal freedom of each individual may 
be defeated.  However, a strong defence against terrorism may be of less value to the citizen if his 
liberties and democratic rights are excessively overridden by legislative and defence measures taken 
in the name of national security.  Thus, whilst the strength of the national security argument is that the 
public have a right to optimal protection from hostile foreign and internal enemies; its weakness is 
that it is sometimes ill at ease with the fundamental constitutional principles and civil rights which are 
integral to the demands of a liberal democracy. 
 
In the face of these tensions, and particularly in the post September 11
th
 era, liberal democracies have 
faced the question of whether, and to what extent, they should change the relationship between liberty 
and security. It seems that the political and legal debate on this issue has been predominantly framed 
in the language of balancing or rebalancing the two interests.  Thus according to the dominant 
discourse, the key challenge for liberal democracies when fighting terrorism has seemingly been to 
find some kind of equilibrium between respect for human rights, as legal guarantees of individual 
liberty, and the protection of national security.  
 
In order to reconcile these competing values, this thesis has attempted to create some new suggestions 
and possible changes to the current legal structures which regulate the security agencies. Thus, the 
final phase of this research has culminated in an evaluation of various recommendations for law 
reform and improvement in the overall regulatory framework.   To this end, the thesis has argued that 
a strengthened application of the principle of proportionality may be both necessary and beneficial.   
The problem is that, as they are currently drafted and applied, the relevant Acts governing the 
collection and use of intelligence material provide no clear or explicitly stated principles which will 
fully guarantee the rights of the individual. For example, both governmental bodies and civil 
libertarians have expressed concerns that, although proportionality is implicit in the Human Rights 
Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, the codes of practice governing their 
implementation may not pay enough attention to ensuring that only the most democratic options are 
pursued when authorising and conducting surveillance, or that surveillance is only authorised where 
absolutely necessary.
986
  Thus, whilst it has been recognised that the proportionality test can be ‘a very 
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effective protection indeed,’987 some have argued that, in practice, public authorities have not fully 
absorbed the principle into their decision-making procedures and that ‘there has been a tendency, on 
the part of the Government and the courts, to see Article 8 as providing a minimum standard that 
must be attained rather than as a foundation for the development of better regulation.’988 
 
The thesis claims that the potential benefit of a firmer application of the principle of proportionality is 
that it is an impartial criterion of constitutionality by which the security agencies can base their 
decisions without favouring any one ideal. The point is that, if proportionality is applied as a strict 
legal test, rather than an attempt to balance competing rights, it is more likely to produce an unbiased 
result. Since the principle of proportionality, when it is applied properly, is not ideologically based, it 
is argued that it is well positioned to draw out the greater elements of each of the two opposing 
ideologies. For example,  the national security agenda is facilitated in the sense that the 
proportionality test both assists decision-makers by demonstrating clearly how rights arguments are 
resolved and legitimates the decision making process by furnishing it with legal transparency.  The 
upshot of this, in theory at least, is that intelligence officials may be less likely to face legal challenges 
to their powers of covert surveillance. In other words, if they have fully complied with agreed Home 
Office guidelines for the proportionate and formal authorisation of surveillance, there may be less 
grounds for a successful claim under the Human Rights Act 1998, including those made to the 
European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, the principle goes some way towards satisfying the 
liberal preference for the control of state power.   The liberal approach to state power effectively 
means that, whilst the requirement of national security is seen as vitally important, such 
considerations should not lead to arbitrary or unnecessary actions by state officials such as the 
security agencies. Rather, the state should be characterised by a constitutional government which 
includes a system of checks and balances amongst major institutions, including operational safeguards 
such as proportionality 
 
However, the requirement that the rules and principles of constitutional law be applied impartially is 
more than just a way of avoiding selective and inconsistent enforcement of security measures. 
Applying the principles of proportionality also entails recognising that which is ‘just and proper’ in 
regards to the particulars of each surveillance investigation.  For example, tests  regarding the 
‘suitability’ of any given measure and their ‘necessity’ may be more likely mark out cases which, in 
effect, contain no legitimate reasons of any kind by which to justify the potential infringement of an 
individual’s civil rights.  In other words, laws that can’t pass the necessity test, may in fact, constitute 
gratuitous infringements on people’s constitutional rights because they are broader and more 
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burdensome than they need to be. Where there is no rational reason, or legitimate interest, in pursuing 
a less restrictive alternative, which would accomplish the Government’s objectives, both the security 
bodies and civil libertarians may agree that the measure should not be imposed. 
 
A further benefit of a strict and consistent application of the principle of proportionality is that it is 
consistent with certain ideals integral to the rule of law, to which both the national security agenda 
and liberals may, in varying degrees, subscribe.  For example, it supports the ideal of legal certainty. 
Legal certainty is a principle of jurisprudence which holds that legal rules must be clear and precise in 
order that citizens can understand the requirements of the law.  The concept implies that legal 
decision-making will be predictable and that randomness or arbitrariness will be eliminated from the 
legal process. Rather, any act undertaken by the security agencies and other government officials must 
respect basic criteria for assessing the way in which they deal with the different interests and values. 
Thus, when security decision-makers are faced with a claim that surveillance adversely affects 
privacy or freedom of expression, they will be required to provide a full and accurate assessment of 
the necessity of the security measure in question and its suitability for the achieving the legitimate 
aim.    When it is applied properly then, the proportionality principle requires security decision-
makers to measure the legitimacy of each case before them by standards that are rational and 
balanced, rather than by standards that may be ideologically driven. 
 
Overall then, this research finds that there is some sense in applying qualifications to certain civil 
rights and liberties where the demands of national security warrant it.  The interest in national security 
is a strong one and many people would accept that certain circumstances – such as the maintenance of 
democratic integrity in the face of violent attempts to influence a nation’s political processes - are not 
compatible with the institutions and ideals of a liberal democratic society. In these cases a defendant 
government may make a convincing case that a particular application of the right to free speech or 
privacy may significantly undermine, or put in danger, some aspect of public welfare or national 
security. In such cases it seems fair that a strong individual right, such as privacy, may be overridden. 
Indeed surveillance measures may become both necessary and even desirable. However, this must be 
done in relation to the demands of the European Convention on Human Rights.  Attempted 
restrictions to Convention rights are only valid if they are founded on, and in full compliance, with an 
established form of law; readily accessible; available to members of the general public; and phrased in 
sufficiently clear terms to enable the individuals affected to adjust their conduct as required. This 
thesis argues that fully complying with these requirements demands that the principle of 
proportionality is rigorously and consistently applied. 
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